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ABSTRACT 
 
The weather environment has a significant impact on the reliability of a power system 
due to its effect on the system failure mechanisms of overhead circuits and on the 
operational ability of an electric power utility. The physical stresses created by weather 
increase the failure rates of transmission or distribution lines operating in adverse 
weather conditions, resulting in increased coincident failures of multiple circuits. 
Exceptionally severe weather can cause immense system damages and significantly 
impact the reliability performance. Recognition of the pertinent weather impacts clearly 
indicates the need to develop appropriate models and techniques that incorporate 
variable weather conditions for realistic estimation of reliability indices. 
 
This thesis illustrates a series of multi-state weather models that can be utilized for 
predictive reliability assessment incorporating adverse and extremely adverse weather 
conditions. The studies described in this thesis are mainly focused on the analyses using 
the three state weather model. A series of multi-state weather models are developed and 
utilized to assess reliability performance of parallel redundant configurations. The 
application of weather modeling in reliability evaluation is illustrated using a practical 
transmission system. The thesis presents an approach to identify weather specific 
contributions to system reliability indices and illustrates the technique by utilizing a test 
distribution system. The analysis of a range of reliability distributions with regard to 
major event day segmentation is presented.  
 
The research work illustrated in this thesis clearly illustrates that reliability indices 
estimated without recognition of weather situations are unrealistic and that at minimum 
the three state weather model should be applied in reliability evaluation of systems 
residing in varying weather environments. The conclusions, concepts and techniques 
presented in this thesis should prove useful in practical application. 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Background 
 
Electric power transmission systems are among the most complex networks and the 
largest systems that exist in the world. The electrical power industry is undergoing 
considerable changes with respect to structure, operation, re-regulation and deregulation. 
Networking with neighbouring power systems is highly utilized in order to assure 
supply continuity and to achieve economic system operation. Transmission systems are 
highly interconnected and modern utilities purchase economic energy from sources 
outside their own systems. Transmission systems often traverse a long distance to 
transport the energy over various networks to load centres. Parallel redundancy of 
transmission lines is a common way of improving the reliability of power supply. 
Multiple transmission line outages can significantly alter the transmission system 
operating configuration and possibly result in supply interruptions to a large number of 
customers. One of the major causes of transmission line outages is extreme adverse 
weather conditions.  
 
Power supply interruptions to consumers are generally due to problems that arise in the 
distribution system or the bulk power system. Experience indicates that disturbances on 
the bulk system are rare but have a great impact when they do occur. On the other hand, 
problems occurring in the distribution system are relatively frequent and impact smaller 
numbers of customers. Distribution systems are usually concentrated in small 
geographic areas and therefore are directly affected by prevailing adverse weather 
situations.  
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In the past, electric utility customers have tended to tolerate service disturbances with 
relatively few complaints. In the current electricity market, consumers are using more 
sophisticated computerized processes and are becoming increasingly sensitive to power 
interruptions. Customers in a competitive energy market may require different levels of 
supply reliability at the lowest associated cost. The balance between the reliability and 
economic aspects can be achieved by integrating reliability evaluation into the planning, 
design and operating phases.   
 
 
1.2  Power system reliability evaluation 
 
Power system reliability refers to the ability of the system to satisfy the system load 
requirement as economically as possible and with a reasonable assurance of continuity 
and quality. It involves the two basic aspects of system adequacy and system security as 
shown in Figure 1.1. System adequacy relates to the existence of sufficient facilities 
within the system to meet the consumer demand, whereas system security refers to the 
ability of the system to respond to disturbances arising within the system [1].   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1  System adequacy and system security 
 
A complete power system is composed of the main three functional segments designated 
as generation, transmission and distribution. A reliability study can be done within an 
individual functional zone or the zones can be combined to form hierarchical levels. 
Hierarchical Level I (HLI) analyses are concerned only with generating capacity 
adequacy. The ability of the generation and transmission systems to perform their 
system reliability 
system adequacy system security 
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function is designated as HLII analysis. An overall assessment considering all three 
functional segments is known as HLIII analysis. Reliability evaluation in this thesis is 
limited to the domain of adequacy assessment within the transmission and distribution 
functional zones. 
 
Reliability analysis of a power system can be conducted using either deterministic or 
probabilistic techniques. The early techniques used in practical application were 
deterministic and some of them are still in use today. The basic weakness inherent in the 
deterministic methods is the inability to respond or recognize the stochastic or random 
nature of component failures, customer demands or the overall system behaviour. These 
limitations have led utilities to apply probabilistic approaches that overcome these 
problems. Probabilistic methods are now reasonably well developed and most modern 
power utilities extensively apply these techniques. The research described in this thesis 
extends the probabilistic evaluation of transmission and distribution systems by 
incorporating adverse weather considerations.   
 
 
 
1.3  Importance of weather considerations in reliability assessment 
 
Transmission and distribution systems are usually overhead facilities that operate in a 
wide range of weather conditions.  The failure rates of transmission and distribution 
lines are greatly enhanced in severe weather situations. Adverse weather conditions such 
as gales, lightning, snow, frost, icing, high wind, etc. can significantly increase the 
likelihood of multiple overlapping outages. The coincident failure of multiple circuits 
during these periods is generally known as failure bunching. Failure bunching in 
transmission or distribution systems can significantly impact the reliability performance. 
 
There is a number of reliability indices traditionally used to quantify reliability 
performance at different levels. The fundamental load point indices are the average 
failure rate, outage duration and annual outage time.  The most commonly used 
reliability indices to measure aggregate electric power utility performance are the 
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System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), the System Average 
Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), the Customer Average Interruption Duration Index 
(CAIDI), and the Index of Reliability (IOR) [2]. Additional system indices together with 
their definitions are presented in [1].  
 
The Canadian Electricity Association (CEA) classifies the causes of power interruptions 
into ten groups. These are designated as adverse weather, scheduled outage, loss of 
supply, tree contact, lightning, defective equipment, human element, foreign 
interference, and other/unknown [2]. Adverse weather is one of the major causes of 
power interruptions. The CEA publishes an annual Service Continuity Report on 
Distribution System Performance in Electrical Utilities. The individual utility data are 
confidential to the members. The overall Canadian performance is, however, provided in 
the annual report and includes details on outage causes and relevant indices. The report 
presents the annual reliability indices of SAIFI, SAIDI, CAIDI and IOR together with 
the interruption cause contributions for the participating utilities and for Canada as a 
whole. Figures 1.2-1.3 present the Canadian individual cause contributions to SAIFI, 
SAIDI and CAIDI for 2003 [2].  
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0.27
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0.21
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0.07
0.06
Tree contact 
(11.9%)
Adverse weather 
(14.9%)
Defective equipment 
(17.9%)
Loss of supply 
(2.6%)
Human element
(1.3%)
Unknown
 (9.5%)
Scheduled outage 
(16.9%)
(14.9%) 
Foreign intereference 
(2.3%)
Adverse environment 
(7.8%) 
Lightning
 
Figure 1.2  Contributions to SAIFI for 2003 
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Figure 1.2 shows the contributions to SAIFI for each of the ten cause codes. The values 
shown in the parentheses are the percentages of interruptions. The total SAIFI for the 
year was 2.67. Figure 1.2 shows that adverse weather caused approximately 15% of the 
total interruptions and contributed 0.35 to the total SAIFI.  
 
Figure 1.3 shows the contributions to SAIDI and CAIDI for 2003. The total SAIDI was 
10.65 hours per year, which represents a substantial increase of 61.9% over the 2002 
figure of 4.06 hours. This increase was primarily due to the August 14th blackout and 
Hurricane Juan. The contribution of adverse weather in 2003 was 13%. The average 
customer interruption duration per interruption (CAIDI) was 3.99 hours. The CAIDI 
associated with adverse weather conditions was 7.01 hours, and as shown in Figure 1.3, 
is the largest cause code contribution.  
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Adverse weather
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Adverse environment
Human element
SAIDI (hrs/customer-yr) and CAIDI (hrs/interruption)
SAIDI CAIDI
 
Figure 1.3  Contributions to SAIDI and SAIFI for 2003 
 
Figures 1.2-1.3 clearly illustrate that adverse weather has a significant impact on overall 
system reliability. The CEA 2000 Service Continuity Report [3] states that the SAIFI in 
1998 was 3.58 and was 2.40 with the ice storm excluded. The storm had an even greater 
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impact on the SAIDI, which was 30.31 hours in total and 3.32 hours excluding the ice 
storm. Extraordinary events such as “Ice Storm 98” are designated as major events and 
are normally excluded from an assessment of basic utility performance and reviewed 
separately. 
 
The above comments illustrate the impact of adverse weather on power system 
reliability as a whole. The British Electricity Board noted that virtually all the failures in 
their distribution systems occur in adverse weather conditions, such as lightning, wind, 
and ice storms [4].  A study of data (1986-1990) from Alberta Power Limited (APL) 
illustrates that, for 144kV transmission lines, about 33% of all interruptions were caused 
by adverse weather. In the case of 240kV lines, 45% of all outages were due to adverse 
weather situations. An analysis of APL’s bulk electric system for the period 1988-1991 
revealed that among the weather related outages, 61% were credited to lightning, 35% 
were due to wind and wet snow, and 4% were caused by frost and icing [5]. These data 
bases are insufficient to generalize the effects of a specific weather condition, but they 
clearly indicate that a large proportion of outages are attributable to abnormal weather 
periods.  
 
The number of customers interrupted, the extent of damage to plant and the duration of 
outages due to problems created by weather conditions vary considerably due to factors 
such as weather severity levels, density of customers, system infrastructures, topology 
etc. Extreme adverse weather situations and their implications for various utilities based 
on the 44 responses of six participating utilities in a survey conducted by the Edison 
Electric Institute (EEI) are shown in Tables A.1-A.3 [6] in Appendix A. This clearly 
shows the magnitude of physical destruction, the number of customers out of service 
and the periods of supply interruption.  
 
A great deal of experience indicates that most customer supply interruptions are due to 
failures that occur in the distribution system. It has been observed that in Canada, 
customer interruptions caused by generation and transmission system outages constitute 
approximately twenty percent of the total customer interruptions. The remaining eighty 
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percent of the interruptions are due to distribution system failures [7]. This is primarily 
due to the localized effect of the weather environments in which the distribution systems 
are situated. It is, therefore, important to incorporate the weather conditions in reliability 
evaluations of transmission and distribution systems and recognize the impact on the 
resulting reliability of the overall power systems. 
 
 
 
1.4  Historical development of weather effect considerations 
 
The basic concepts of incorporating weather-related failures were first introduced in [8] 
with an application to a two-component redundant system. This paper proposed a two 
state weather model to consider adverse weather in the calculation of the system failure 
rate. It was stated that the assessment of system failure rate without considering weather 
conditions could be quite optimistic. The techniques presented initiated considerable 
future research work in quantitative reliability assessment of transmission and 
distribution systems.  
 
The ideas presented in [8] can be applied to distribution or transmission systems 
residing in common weather environments. Failure bunching evaluation is difficult to 
conduct for transmission systems that occupy large geographic areas and traverse a wide 
range of weather conditions. This problem was addressed in [9] by incorporating 
regional weather effects on large-scale systems with transmission lines passing through 
different geographical regions having different weather conditions. 
 
References 8 and 10 provided the basic framework for the developments in [11, 12]. A 
three state weather model was postulated in [11] in order to incorporate the effect of 
severe storm disasters, which were not considered in [8]. Reference 11 also applied the 
technique to a three line parallel redundant system using a two weather state model. The 
effects of weather on common mode failures are illustrated in [13]. A previously 
published three state weather model [14] is extended to multi-state weather models in 
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[15] in which the continuously varying weather is incorporated more precisely and 
illustrated using a range of multi-state weather models. 
 
 
 
1.5  Evaluation method 
 
The application of probability techniques for transmission and distribution system 
reliability evaluation was introduced in [8, 16] using a series of approximate equations. 
These publications presented methods for calculating the failure frequency, the average 
outage duration and the unavailability of simple series and parallel systems. The 
application of Markov processes to transmission system reliability evaluation was 
introduced in [10]. This paper noted that the developed approximate equations did not 
provide consistent results.  These equations were modified in [11, 12] where the Markov 
method was used as the standard evaluation approach against which the accuracy of the 
approximate equations was assessed. The equations were further modified in [14] and 
results were shown to be more accurate than those presented in previous literature. The 
Monte Carlo Simulation technique was used in [9] in order to incorporate the regional 
weather effects. In this thesis the Markov approach [10, 17] which is regarded as a 
benchmark method in power system reliability, is utilized to develop and illustrate a 
series of weather models. 
 
 
 
1.6  Research objectives 
 
The primary objectives of the research work described in this thesis are to examine the 
existing weather models and extend them to reflect the effect of continuously changing 
stress created by weather in reliability assessment of transmission and distribution 
systems. The research in this area was initiated in the 1960s, and significant 
developments have been made since that time. The research described in this thesis can 
be regarded as a continuation of the work that was recently presented in [18] at the 
University of Saskatchewan. Previous studies have incorporated the effects of adverse 
and major adverse weather by developing two and three weather state models. These 
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models were explicitly examined using a two line parallel redundant system. This thesis 
examines these models using both two component and three component parallel 
configurations. It also examines the impact of incorporating weather considerations on 
the customer related reliability indices of a practical distribution system. The research 
described in this thesis extends the existing weather models to multi-state weather 
models in order to recognize the range of weather severity levels. An additional 
objective is to investigate the separate contributions of individual weather states to the 
unreliability of a system. The research also examines the underlying lognormal 
distribution assumptions used in IEEE Standard 1366 [19] to classify major event days 
associated with widespread customer outage situations. 
 
 
1.7  General overview of the thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Following the introduction in Chapter 1, 
Chapter 2 introduces the basic concepts of weather modeling. Reliability evaluation of a 
two component redundant system and a three component redundant system 
incorporating normal and adverse weather is described using the Markov approach. The 
results are presented by the fundamental reliability indices of failure rate, outage 
duration and unavailability. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the consideration of extreme weather conditions. A two component 
parallel system and a three component parallel system are analysed to examine the effect 
of incorporating extreme weather conditions utilizing the Markov approach. A number 
of systems with different failure rates and repair times residing in the same weather 
environment are studied to examine the effects of weather considerations. The impact of 
the frequency of occurrence and duration of the extreme weather is discussed.  
 
Chapter 4 illustrates the application of weather modeling to a practical transmission or 
distribution system. The significance of using the two state and three state weather 
models over the conventional single state representation in evaluating load point indices 
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and system indices is presented. A comparative illustration of results obtained for 
different weather models is provided. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the concept of creating a multi-state weather model as a direct 
extension of the three weather state model described in Chapter 3. A series of multi-state 
weather models are developed and used to predict the basic reliability indices of the 
system failure rate, outage duration and unavailability. The influence of incorporating 
multi-state weather models is illustrated using Error Factor curves.  
 
Chapter 6 introduces an approach to segment the reliability indices into a series of 
weather specific indices. The system performance indicators SAIFI and SAIDI are 
divided into the three segments of normal weather, adverse weather and extreme 
weather indices. A test distribution system is used to illustrate the method introduced in 
this chapter. The impact of the time to repair following the system outage due to 
extreme weather is illustrated. The studies also discuss the effects of the frequency of 
occurrence of major adverse weather. The influence of coincident multiple circuit 
failures inherent in radially operated distribution systems is described. 
 
Chapter 7 briefly discusses the methods of classifying a Major Event Day [19]. A set of 
theoretical reliability distributions and a number of histograms associated with utility 
data are presented and the applicability of the lognormal distribution used in [19] is 
discussed.   
 
Chapter 8 presents the summary of the thesis and highlights the conclusions.  
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Chapter 2 
 
BASIC WEATHER MODELING CONCEPTS 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Electrical transmission and distribution networks exist in the two basic forms of 
underground facilities using cables and overhead facilities on appropriate tower 
structures. Cables normally operate in a relatively stable environment, while overhead 
circuits operate in a wide range of weather conditions and are subjected to varying 
degrees of physical stress due to continuously changing weather patterns. The variation 
in stress manifests itself in terms of highly variable overhead line failure rates. The 
stress created by severe weather is much higher than in fair weather and increases with 
the bad weather intensity level, leading to increases in line failure rates. The likelihood 
of coincident line failures during high stress periods increases significantly. The 
phenomenon of multiple line failures during these periods is generally referred to as 
failure bunching. It is important to appreciate that these overlapping failures are 
independent events and should not be misunderstood as common mode failures which 
are an entirely different failure process in parallel circuits on common tower structures. 
 
Parallel redundancy of transmission or distribution elements is a common way of 
improving the reliability of power supply. As noted earlier, overhead circuits are under 
the influence of the weather environment to which they are exposed; therefore, 
reliability assessments without recognizing weather conditions can be highly optimistic 
and erroneous. This chapter describes basic concepts of weather modeling and illustrates 
the inclusion of weather conditions in reliability analyses of parallel redundant systems. 
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2.2  Two state weather modeling 
 
The failure rate of a transmission or distribution line is a continuous function of the 
weather conditions. It is not realistic to attempt to model and collect data for all possible 
weather intensity levels. IEEE Standard 346 divides the weather environment into three 
classes designated as normal weather, adverse weather and major storm disaster [20].  
 
Normal weather: It includes all weather conditions not designated as adverse or 
major adverse weather. 
 
Adverse weather: Designates weather conditions which cause an abnormally 
high rate of forced outages for exposed components while such conditions 
persist, but do not qualify as major storm disasters. Adverse weather conditions 
can be defined for a particular system by selecting the proper values and 
combinations of conditions reported by the weather bureau: thunderstorms, 
tornadoes, wind velocities, precipitation, temperature etc. 
 
Major storm disaster: Designates weather which exceeds design limits of plant 
and which satisfies all of the following: 
 extensive mechanical damage to plant 
 more than a specified percentage of customers out of service 
 service restoration times longer than a specified time 
 
The utilization of a two state fluctuating weather model [8] was a major step in 
recognizing the failure bunching phenomenon and provided the basic framework to 
include multi-state weather conditions. The following describes the consideration of two 
weather conditions designated as normal and adverse weather. 
 
Randomly occurring weather conditions can be represented as shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1  Chronological weather pattern 
 
In Figure 2.1, 
  in = duration of the 
thi normal weather period 
  ia = duration of the 
thi adverse weather period 
 
The adverse weather periods are assumed to occur randomly and the probability 
distributions associated with the weather durations are assumed to be exponential. The 
randomly occurring normal and adverse weather periods can be modeled by the periodic 
weather pattern shown in Figure 2.2.  
 
In Figure 2.2,       
        N  = average duration of normal weather 
                 A  = average duration of adverse weather 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2  Average weather profile 
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Provided that the necessary conditions are valid, the fluctuating weather can be 
represented by the Markov model shown in Figure 2.3. The basic concepts of the 
Markov approach are given in [17]. The weather statistics required for the two state 
weather model are the average durations of normal weather and adverse weather. 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Two state weather model 
 
 
2.3  Failure rate considerations 
 
The normal and adverse weather failure rates are expressed in failures per year of time 
in the respective weather state, not in the number of failures per year.  The average 
failure rate and the weather specific failure rates are related as shown in Equation 2.1. 
avgλ = 'λλ an PP +       (2.1) 
     where,  
avgλ  = average component failure rate expressed in failures per year  
  )( ANNPn +=  = steady state probability of normal weather 
  )( ANAPa +=  = steady state probability of adverse weather 
  λ  = failure rate expressed in failures per year of normal weather 
 λ ′  = failure rate expressed in failures per year of adverse weather 
 
It is extremely difficult to determine the transmission line failure rates associated with a 
particular weather condition from available historical data. They can, however, be 
estimated using Equations 2.2 and 2.3 using the fraction of the total number of failures 
that can be attributed to adverse weather (F) and normal weather (1-F).  
   
na  = 1/A 
an  = 1/N Normal 
weather 
(N) 
Adverse 
weather 
(A) 
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navg PF )1( −= λλ       (2.2) 
  aavg PFλλ ='                     (2.3) 
 
Figure 2.4 shows the two state representation of the component failure rate. 
 
 
Figure 2.4  Failure rate representation in the two state weather model 
 
 
2.4  Evaluation techniques 
 
There are various techniques that can be employed to incorporate the failure bunching 
effect of the weather environment. The basic approximate equation approach was 
initially introduced to recognize weather effects. It is probably the most popular method 
in practical application. One of the reasons behind its popularity is that this two state 
weather representation can be easily included in existing software applications.  
 
The two state weather model has been used for many years [8, 10]. It has been realized, 
however, that the two state model does not fully reflect the actual weather severity. This 
led to the development of three or more state weather models. Three state weather 
modeling is illustrated in [14, 18]. An important conclusion drawn from these 
publications is that numerical results obtained using the approximate approach are 
inconsistent. In certain cases, relatively wide assumptions are made to simplify the 
equation derivation process and the representation of actual system behaviour may be 
lost.   
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On the other hand, the Markov approach reflects the stochastic system behaviour with 
relatively few assumptions. The most relevant assumptions are that the time duration of 
each system state is exponentially distributed, and the transition rates are constant. One 
disadvantage of this approach is that the number of system states increases significantly 
as the failure modes or the number of system components increase. In this thesis, only 
two or three components are considered in the failure bunching process and the system 
element is represented by the two operating states designated as up and down. When a 
system model contains a large number of states, it can be solved using a relatively 
simple computer program. The weather modeling studies in this chapter and in the 
subsequent chapters were analysed using the Markov approach.  
 
 
 
2.5  Markov analysis of a two component system  
 
Figure 2.5 shows the system state space diagram of a two component system with a two 
state weather model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5  System state space diagram with a two state weather model 
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The letters U and D inside the rectangles in Figure 2.5 denote the component currently 
being in the up-state (operating) and down-state (failed) respectively. The parameters 
an and na are the transition rates between normal and adverse weather. The failure rates 
in normal and adverse weather are λ and 'λ  given by Equation 2.2 and Equation 2.3 
respectively and µ  is the repair rate in normal weather, which is the reciprocal of the 
component repair time. The repair activity is assumed to be carried out only in normal 
weather. The repair rate in the adverse weather state is therefore zero. 
 
The steady state probabilities can be determined using the frequency balance approach. 
The procedure is described in detail in [17]. 
 
0)( 53221121 =−−−++ PaPPPn na µµλλ      (2.4a) 
  0)( 64222111 =−−+++− PaPPnP na µλµλ      (2.4b) 
0)( 73214112 =−+++−− PaPnPP naµλµλ      (2.4c) 
 0)( 84213122 =−+++−− PaPnPP naµµλλ      (2.4d) 
0)( 5121 =′+′++− PaPn na λλ              (2.4e)                               
0)( 62512 =′++′−− PaPPn na λλ       (2.4f) 
0)( 71523 =′++′−− PaPPn na λλ       (2.4g) 
0871624 =+′−′−− PaPPPn na λλ       (2.4h) 
 
Equation 2.4 is a system of dependent simultaneous equations and therefore, to solve for 
the eight variables, an additional independent equation is needed. This additional 
equation is 
187654321 =+++++++ PPPPPPPP                    (2.5) 
The above linear equations can be expressed in the matrix form: 
 
[ ][ ] [ ]0=PbX
                                        (2.6) 
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where,  
[ ]Pb = Transpose of [ ]87654321 PPPPPPPP  
 
[ ]X = 
 
















−−−
+−−
+−−
++−
−++−−
−−++−
−−++−
−−−++
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
an
an
an
an
an
an
an
an
'
1
'
2
'
1
'
1
'
2
'
2
'
2
'
1
2112
2212
2211
2121
0000
00000
00000
000000
0000
0000
0000
0000
λλ
λλ
λλ
λλ
µµλλ
µµλλ
µλµλ
µµλλ
 
 
Equation 2.5 can be substituted for any Equation from 2.4a to 2.4h. If Equation 2.4h is 
replaced by Equation 2.5, each element in the last row of the matrix [X] becomes 1 and 
the system of equations is represented by Equation 2.7. 
 
[ ][ ] [ ]YPbX =        (2.7) 
where,  
[ ]Y  = Transpose of [ ]10000000  
 
 Now, [ ] [ ] [ ]YXPb 1−=        (2.8) 
 
The stochastic transitional probability matrix possesses a feature that can be employed 
in order to obtain matrix [X]. The stochastic transitional probability matrix constructed 
using the state space diagram shown in Figure 2.5 is as follows. 
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[ ]P =  

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
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The matrix [X] can be produced by subtracting the transpose of [P] from the identity 
matrix.  
[ ] [ ]−= IX Transpose of [ ]P       (2.9) 
 
The probabilities associated with each state can also be determined using limiting state 
probability analysis [17].  
 
The system failure rate can be obtained using the stochastic transitional probability 
matrix [17]. The system states 4 and 8 represent the down state for the two component 
parallel redundant system. If the rows and columns corresponding to the system down 
states are removed, the resulting matrix is [Q] as given below. 
     
 [ ]Q = 

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

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
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The truncated matrix [Q] is subtracted from the identity matrix and inverted. Equation 
2.10 gives the resulting matrix [N]. 
 [N] = 1][ −− QI        (2.10) 
State 1 is considered to be the starting state. The total expected time before entering the 
absorbing state is the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) and is obtained by summing the 
first row of the matrix [N]. 
MTTF = ∑
=
6
1 ,1i i
N         (2.11) 
The average system failure rate, designated as Wλ , is the reciprocal of the MTTF as 
shown in Equation 2.12. 
 MTTFW 1=λ         (2.12)    
The average system outage duration )( Wr is the average time spent in the down state and 
is obtained by dividing the cumulative probability of the failed state by the frequency of 
encountering the failed state. It is shown in Equation 2.13. 
)( 214
84
µµ +
+
=
P
PP
rW                     (2.13) 
The average system unavailability )( WU  is the probability of the system being in the 
down state. Equation 2.14 gives the unavailability for the two component parallel 
redundant system. 
84 PPUW +=                  (2.14) 
The average system unavailability is usually expressed in hours per year by multiplying 
WU  by 8760 hours per year. 
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2.6  Markov analysis of a three component system 
 
The state space diagram for the three component system residing in two weather states is 
shown in Figure 2.6. The absence of a repair rate in the adverse weather state indicates 
that repair is not considered during adverse weather. The individual state connections 
between the two different weather conditions are not shown. The two thick arrows 
between the two weather states indicate these transitions. For example, consider state 1 
and state 9. States 1 and 9 represent the system states in which both components are in 
the up-state, but are in two different weather conditions. The parameter an indicates the 
transitions from state 1 in normal weather to state 9 in adverse weather. Similarly 
na demonstrates the transitions from state 9 to state 1. Likewise, states 2 and 10, 3 and 
11, 4 and 12 and so on form the set of similar operating states and are defined similar to 
that described for the set of states 1 and 9. 
 
The average system failure rate can be evaluated using the transitional probability 
matrix associated with the state space diagram in Figure 2.6. The procedure is similar to 
that described for the two component system in Section 2.5. The stochastic transitional 
probability matrix is given in Appendix B.1. The system MTTF is used to obtain the 
average system failure rate as shown in Equation 2.15. System states 8 and 16 are the 
down states for redundant operation of the three component system. The average system 
outage duration and unavailability are calculated as shown in Equation 2.15. 
 
MTTFW 1=λ         (2.15a) 
)( 3218
168
µµµ ++
+
=
P
PP
rW       (2.15b)     
168 PPUW +=       (2.15c) 
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Figure 2.6  State space diagram for a three component system 
                                        with a two state weather model 
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2.7  Sensitivity study 
 
The simple transmission system shown in Figure 2.7 is used to illustrate the application 
of two state weather modeling. In the following analysis, transmission lines 1 and 2 are 
used to form a two line parallel configuration, or a second order mincut. Line 3 is added 
to form a three line parallel system, or a third order mincut. A mincut can be defined as 
the assembly of system components in which all components must fail to cause the 
system to fail. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7  A simple parallel transmission system 
 
The following data are used in the analysis:  
Average failure rate for each component = 1.0 f/yr 
Average repair time for each component = 7.5 hrs      
Average duration of normal weather = 200 hrs 
Average duration of adverse weather = 2 hrs 
The system failure rate of the two line system without considering weather conditions 
can be evaluated using the Markov approach or approximated by Equation 2.16 [17]. 
Similarly Equation 2.17 can be used to determine the average system failure rate of the 
three line parallel system.  
  
Two line parallel system:   ( )2121 rrsystem += λλλ     (2.16) 
Three line parallel system: ( )133221321 rrrrrrsystem ++= λλλλ  (2.17) 
2 
3 
1 
Supply 
Load 
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The ratio of the system failure rate considering weather effects )( Wλ  and the system 
failure rate without incorporating weather conditions ( systemλ ) is designated as the Error 
Factor as expressed by Equation 2.18  
Error Factor = 
system
W
λ
λ
       (2.18) 
Table 2.1 shows the weather specific failure rates, average system failure rate and Error 
Factor for the two component parallel redundant system. The percentage of line failures 
occurring in adverse weather is varied from 0 to 100% in 10% increments.  
  
 
Table 2.1 Failure rate and Error Factor for a second order mincut 
% of line 
failures in 
adverse 
weather 
Normal 
weather 
failure rate 
( λ ) 
Adverse 
weather 
failure rate 
( 'λ ) 
System failure rate 
( Wλ ) 
(failures/yr) 
Error Factor 
0 1.010 0.00 0.0017 1.01 
10 0.909 10.10 0.0022 1.27 
20 0.808 20.20 0.0035 2.06 
30 0.707 30.30 0.0058 3.37 
40 0.606 40.40 0.0089 5.18 
50 0.505 50.50 0.0128 7.48 
60 0.404 60.60 0.0176 10.27 
70 0.303 70.70 0.0232 13.52 
80 0.202 80.80 0.0295 17.25 
90 0.101 90.90 0.0367 21.42 
100 0.000 101.00 0.0446 26.05 
 
 
The Error Factor as a function of the percentage of line failure occurring in adverse 
weather is presented pictorially in Figure 2.8. It can be seen from Figure 2.8 that the 
system failure rate increases with the percentage of failures occurring in adverse weather 
and that disregarding adverse weather conditions can severely underestimate the 
predicted average system failure rate. 
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Figure 2.8  Error Factor for a second order mincut 
 
Table 2.2 shows the average system outage duration and unavailability of the two 
component system for varying failure percentages assigned to adverse weather. These 
indices are shown graphically in Figure 2.9. Figure 2.9 shows that the average outage 
duration initially increases sharply as more failures occur in adverse weather and then 
becomes relatively stable for further increases in adverse weather failures. The 
unavailability, however, increases gradually as more failures occur in adverse weather.  
 
Table 2.2 System outage duration and unavailability for a second order mincut 
% of line failures in 
adverse weather 
Average outage 
duration (hours) 
Unavailability 
(hours/year) 
0 3.79 0.0065 
10 4.36 0.0095 
20 5.01 0.0177 
30 5.37 0.0310 
40 5.56 0.0493 
50 5.65 0.0725 
60 5.71 0.1005 
70 5.74 0.1331 
80 5.76 0.1704 
90 5.78 0.2121 
100 5.79 0.2583 
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Figure 2.9  Unavailability and outage duration for a second order mincut 
 
Table 2.3 presents the average system failure rate and the Error Factor for a three 
component parallel redundant system with a two state weather model.  
 
Table 2.3 Average system failure rate for a third order mincut 
% of line 
failures in 
adverse 
weather 
Normal 
weather 
failure rate 
( λ ) 
Adverse 
weather 
failure rate 
( 'λ ) 
System failure 
rate ( Wλ ) 
(failures/yr) 
Error Factor 
0 1.010 0.00 0.000002 1.02 
10 0.909 10.10 0.000007 3.25 
20 0.808 20.20 0.000034 15.46 
30 0.707 30.30 0.000100 45.59 
40 0.606 40.40 0.000222 101.12 
50 0.505 50.50 0.000416 189.11 
60 0.404 60.60 0.000695 316.24 
70 0.303 70.70 0.001075 488.76 
80 0.202 80.80 0.001567 712.61 
90 0.101 90.90 0.002184 993.33 
100 0.000 101.00 0.002938 1336.16 
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The Error Factor is displayed in Figure 2.10. Figure 2.10 illustrates that the Error Factor 
increases sharply with the percentage of failures in adverse weather. The influence of 
adverse weather on the higher order mincut can be illustrated by comparing the Error 
Factor in Figure 2.10 with that in Figure 2.8.  
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Figure 2.10  Error Factor for a third order mincut 
 
The average system outage duration and unavailability are shown in Table 2.4. These 
indices are shown graphically in Figure 2.11.  
 
Table 2.4 System outage duration and unavailability for a third order mincut 
% of line failures in 
adverse weather 
Average outage 
duration (hours) 
Unavailability 
(hours/year) 
0 2.52 0.000006 
10 3.81 0.000027 
20 4.31 0.000147 
30 4.42 0.000443 
40 4.46 0.000993 
50 4.49 0.001866 
60 4.50 0.003130 
70 4.51 0.004848 
80 4.52 0.007079 
90 4.52 0.009880 
100 4.52 0.013302 
 28 
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentage of line failures in adverse weather
Un
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
(hr
s/
yr
)
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Av
er
ag
e 
ou
ta
ge
 
du
ra
tio
n
 
(hr
s)
Unavailability
Outage duration
 
 
Figure 2.11  Unavailability and average outage duration 
 
 
As shown in Figure 2.11, the unavailability increases as the percentage of failures 
occurring in adverse weather increases. The unavailability increases faster as more 
failures occur in adverse weather. The average system outage duration initially increases 
rapidly with adverse weather failures and then becomes almost constant with further 
increases in the percentage of failures in adverse weather.  
 
 
 
2.8  Summary 
 
The basic concepts used to incorporate the weather environment in a reliability study of 
outdoor transmission or distribution systems are introduced in this chapter. Weather 
conditions are divided into the two categories of normal and adverse weather to create a 
simple fluctuating two state weather model. Reliability models for systems containing 
two and three lines in parallel in two weather conditions are developed and utilized to 
compute the fundamental reliability indices using the Markov approach. The Error 
Factor is used to provide a comparative analysis of the system failure rates with and 
without considering the weather effects.  
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The application of the two state weather model is illustrated using two different 
redundant systems consisting of two and three lines. The reliability indices of the 
average system failure rate, outage duration and unavailability are evaluated 
incorporating adverse weather. The effect of failure bunching due to adverse weather on 
the average system failure rate is clearly demonstrated using the Error Factor. The 
studies show that failure bunching has even greater influence in a third order mincut. 
The impact on the average outage duration and unavailability are also described. The 
analysis in this chapter clearly shows the importance of incorporating adverse weather in 
the reliability assessment of multi-line systems exposed to a fluctuating weather 
environment. The influence of separately incorporating extremely adverse weather 
conditions is described in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 
 
EXTREME WEATHER CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The previous chapter illustrates the concept that environmental stresses have great 
influence on transmission line forced outage rates and that the effect of failure bunching 
can be incorporated in a reliability assessment by utilizing a two state weather model 
including normal and adverse weather. It is important to note that disastrous weather 
conditions such as major hurricanes, high intensity tornadoes, heavy thunderstorms, ice 
storms etc. cannot be aggregated with other generally less destructive periods of adverse 
weather. These extreme conditions, while less probable, can have great impacts on 
power system operations. This dictates a need to examine the effect of violent weather 
events on the predicted reliability indices of transmission and distribution configurations 
operating in a wide range of randomly occurring weather conditions. In this chapter, a 
three state weather model is developed to include major adverse weather. This is a direct 
extension of the two state weather model incorporating normal and adverse weather. 
 
A three state weather model was introduced in [11] and further work was conducted in 
[14, 18]. The focus in these publications was on weather modeling using the basic 
approximate equations in the context of a second order mincut. This chapter examines 
the application of a three state weather model to second order mincuts and extends the 
analysis to incorporate third order mincuts, using the Markov method. The analyses 
described in this chapter illustrate the influence of incorporating major adverse weather 
conditions on the reliability performance of a parallel transmission system. The results 
are presented in terms of the system average failure rate, average outage duration and 
average annual unavailability. 
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3.2  Three state weather model  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, the weather environment can be divided into the three categories 
of normal, adverse and major storm disaster [20]. Failures that occur in extremely severe 
weather can be incorporated using the three state weather model shown in Figure 3.1. 
The terms extreme weather or major adverse weather are used to describe extremely 
adverse weather situations. Adverse and extreme weather conditions are collectively 
designated as bad weather in this thesis. 
 
 
 
                              Figure 3.1  Three state weather model 
 
The transition rates between the various weather states in Figure 3.1 are as follows: 
        an  =  adverse weather to normal weather  
              am =  adverse weather to major adverse weather 
           na = normal weather to adverse weather 
           nm =  normal weather to major adverse weather 
            ma =  major adverse weather to adverse weather        
      mn =  major adverse weather to normal weather 
 
The steady state probabilities associated with a specific weather state can be determined 
using the frequency balance approach in conjunction with the state space diagram shown 
in Figure 3.1. Unlike the case of the two state weather model, the steady state 
probabilities in the three state weather model cannot be simply obtained using the 
average durations of the weather states. It is possible, however, to estimate the steady 
state probabilities using the actual durations of each weather state. In this case, the 
  Bad weather 
Normal 
weather 
mn  
nm  
am  
an  
na  
ma Extreme 
weather 
Adverse 
weather 
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probability of a weather state is the ratio of the total time associated with that weather 
state and the total period of observation. The frequency balance approach or limiting 
state probability technique [17] can be used to determine the steady state probabilities 
when the transition rates between the different weather states in the Markov model 
shown in Figure 3.1 are known. The transition rates can also be used to compute the 
average weather durations and frequencies of occurrence [17]. The weather statistics 
required in the three state weather model are the weather transition rates. Detailed 
weather statistics are not available and the collection of such data is beyond the scope of 
this thesis work. 
 
The following transition rates were assumed in order to create a realistic and practical 
three state weather model.  
n a = 1/200 occ/hr   a n = 1/2 occ/hr 
a m = 1/8760 occ/hr    m a = 1/2 occ/hr           
 n m = 1/8760 occ/hr      m n = 1/2 occ/hr 
 
The steady state probabilities, average durations and frequencies of occurrence 
associated with the weather states are as follows. 
 
Steady state probability: 
Normal weather,   
321
1
DDD
DPn ++
=  
Adverse weather,  
321
2
DDD
DPa ++
=  
Extreme weather, 
321
3
DDD
D
Pm ++
=       
        where, nnmnna amamamD ++=1  
anmaaa nmnmnmD ++=2   
mmnmma anananD ++=3  
Average duration:  
Normal weather,  ( )ma nnN += 1  
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Adverse weather, ( )mn aaA += 1  
Extreme weather, ( )na mmM += 1  
Frequency of occurrence: 
Normal weather,  )( manN nnPf +=   
Adverse weather,  )( mnaA aaPf +=    
Extreme weather,  )( namM mmPf +=  
 
Table 3.1 shows the steady state probability, frequency of encountering and average 
duration of the different weather states for the data shown above.    
 
Table 3.1 Weather statistics 
Weather state Steady state probability 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(Occ/year) 
Average duration 
(hours) 
Normal weather 0.989875 44.346 195.54 
Adverse weather 0.010011 43.856 1.9995 
Extreme weather 0.000114 0.9999 1.0 
 
 
 
3.3  Failure rate representation 
 
The failure rate of a component is a continuous function of the weather conditions to 
which it is exposed [1]. In the three state weather model, continuously varying weather 
conditions are grouped into three weather categories. The three relevant failure rates are 
defined as follows: 
 
nλ   =  normal weather failure rate expressed in failures per year of normal weather 
aλ   =  adverse weather failure rate expressed in failures per year of adverse weather 
mλ =  major adverse weather failure rate expressed in failures per year of major  
         adverse weather 
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The average component failure rate as a function of the failure rates in the various 
weather states is given by Equation 3.1. 
m
m
a
a
n
navg PPP λλλλ ++=       (3.1) 
where, nP , aP  and mP  are the steady state probabilities of normal, adverse and major 
adverse weather respectively. 
 
The failure rates nλ , aλ and mλ are given by Equation 3.2. 
    nbavg
n PF )1( −= λλ       (3.2a) 
        ambavg
a PFF )1( −= λλ        (3.2b) 
   mmbavg
m PFFλλ =         (3.2c) 
where, bF is the fraction of total line failures occurring in bad weather and mF is the 
fraction of bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather.  
 
The variation in the component failure rate as a result of considering the three state 
weather model can be represented in the general form shown in Figure 3.2 where the 
component failure rate increases significantly during adverse weather and extreme 
weather periods.  
 
 
Figure 3.2  Failure rate representation in the three state weather model 
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Assuming that the average annual failure rate is 1.0 f/yr, the failure rates for the three 
weather states under the condition that the percentage of line failures occurring in bad 
weather vary from 0% to 100% and that 20% of the bad weather failures are allocated to 
major adverse weather ( mF = 20%) are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Line failure rates in the three weather states  
% of total line 
failures that 
occur in bad 
weather ( bF ) 
Normal 
weather 
failure rate 
( nλ ) 
Adverse 
weather failure 
rate 
( aλ ) 
Extreme 
weather failure 
rate 
( mλ ) 
0 1.0102 0 0 
10 0.9092 7.992 175.22 
20 0.8082 15.983 350.44 
30 0.7072 23.975 525.66 
40 0.6061 31.966 700.88 
50 0.5051 39.958 876.10 
60 0.4041 47.949 1051.32 
70 0.3031 55.941 1226.54 
80 0.2020 63.932 1401.76 
90 0.1010 71.924 1576.98 
100 0 79.915 1752.20 
 
 
The magnitude of the failure rates in adverse weather and major adverse weather shown 
in Table 3.2 change according to the percentages of bad weather failures attributed to 
the major adverse weather period. The failure rate profile presented in Figure 3.2 
represents the values in one row of Table 3.2. 
 
 
 
3.4  Markov analysis of a two component system 
 
The Markov model for a two component system with a three state weather model is 
shown in Figure 3.3. It should be noted that in Figure 3.3, repair is not performed in bad 
weather i.e. in neither adverse weather nor major adverse weather.  
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Figure 3.3  State space diagram for a two component system 
                                         with a three state weather model 
 
There are a number of possible approaches to determine the steady state probabilities 
associated with each state of a Markov model. The stochastic transitional probability 
matrix for the system is shown in Equation 3.3. 
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  [ ] 44][ xn IaD =    [ ] 44][ xm IaF =     
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The absorbing states in Figure 3.3 are states 4, 8, and 12.  The elimination of these states 
results in the [Q] matrix, which is subtracted from the identity matrix and inverted as 
shown in Equation 3.4.  
[N] = 1][ −− QI        (3.4) 
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State 1 is considered to be the starting state. The MTTF is given by the summation of 
the elements of the first row of [N] as shown in Equation 3.5. The average system 
failure rate, outage duration and unavailability are given in Equations 3.6-3.8. 
   
 MTTF = 
ii
N
,1
9
1∑ =        (3.5)                       
 MTTF
1
=Wλ        (3.6) 
)( 214
1284
µµ +
++
=
P
PPP
rW        (3.7) 
1284 PPPUW ++=        (3.8) 
 
The average system unavailability is usually expressed in hours per year and is obtained 
by multiplying WU  by 8760.           
 
 
 
3.5  Markov analysis of a three component system 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the system state space model of a three component system with a three 
state weather model. Figure 3.4 is a simplified form of the complete state space diagram. 
The individual system state transitions between the different weather states are not 
shown. The system state transitions between the weather categories in Figure 3.4 are the 
various weather transition rates. This can be illustrated as follows. Consider the states 1, 
9 and 17. These states have similar operating modes with all the components in the up-
state in the three weather conditions. While the system is operating in this mode, a 
change in weather condition could occur. The system could transit from state 1 to state 9 
or state 17 depending on the variation in the weather environment. In this case, the 
arrow going downwards from normal weather to adverse weather originates at state 1 
and terminates at state 9, and that going to major adverse weather begins at state 1 and 
ends at state 17. The rest of the transitions can be described in a similar manner. 
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Figure 3.4  System state space diagram for a three component system 
                                  with a three state weather model 
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The stochastic transitional probability matrix in this case is given in Appendix B.2. The 
system states 8, 16 and 24 represent the system down states for the parallel redundant 
configuration. These states are removed from the stochastic transitional probability 
matrix, resulting in a truncated matrix which is subtracted from the identity matrix and 
inverted. The final matrix [N] is used to determine the MTTF using Equation 3.9. 
MTTF = 
ii
N
,1
21
1∑ =       (3.9) 
The reciprocal of MTTF is the average system failure rate as shown in Equation 3.10. 
 MTTF
1
=Wλ       (3.10)   
The average system outage duration and unavailability are given by Equations 3.11-
3.12.  
)( 3218
24168
µµµ ++
++
=
P
PPP
rW       (3.11)  
24128 PPPUW ++=        (3.12) 
 
 
 
3.6  Sensitivity analysis 
 
The analyses presented in this section are focused on the average system failure rate, 
average system outage duration and the system unavailability. In addition to these 
reliability indices, the Error Factor is presented to provide a comparative measure of the 
average system failure rates. The weather data shown in Table 3.1 is used in the 
following analysis. The percentage of failures in bad weather ( )bF  is varied from 0% to 
100% and the percentage of bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather 
( )mF  is allowed to vary from 0% to 50% in 10% increments. 
 
Table 3.3 shows the average system failure rate obtained by varying the portion of 
failures in adverse weather and different percentages of bad weather failures attributed 
to major adverse weather. The condition that 0% of failures occur in major adverse 
weather is analogous to the two state weather model.  
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Table 3.3 Average system failure rate for a second order mincut (failures/year) 
bF (%) mF = 0% mF =10% mF =20% mF =30% mF =40% mF =50% 
0 0.001725 0.001725 0.001725 0.001725 0.001725 0.001725 
10 0.002176 0.002304 0.002799 0.003631 0.004772 0.006195 
20 0.003516 0.004005 0.005839 0.008802 0.012713 0.017422 
30 0.005726 0.006782 0.010606 0.016562 0.024160 0.033018 
40 0.008790 0.010587 0.016898 0.026391 0.038124 0.051416 
50 0.012691 0.015381 0.024544 0.037883 0.053893 0.071567 
60 0.017410 0.021123 0.033399 0.050721 0.070949 0.092759 
70 0.022932 0.027777 0.043340 0.064652 0.088913 0.114508 
80 0.029241 0.035308 0.054260 0.079478 0.107503 0.136483 
90 0.036321 0.043684 0.066067 0.095039 0.126513 0.158456 
100 0.044156 0.052875 0.078682 0.111209 0.145787 0.180275 
  
 
The effect on the average system failure rate as a function of the percentages of failures 
occurring in bad weather is clearly shown in Figure 3.5.  
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Figure 3.5  System failure rate for a second order mincut 
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Profile 1 in Figure 3.5 represents the system failure rate obtained using the two state 
weather model. The rest of the profiles are for the three state weather model with 
varying percentages of bad weather failures in major adverse weather. The failure rate 
increases with increase in the percentage of bad weather failures attributed to major 
adverse weather. It can be seen that the predicted system failure rate calculated using the 
two state weather model is increasingly optimistic when the percentage of bad weather 
failures occurring in major adverse weather increases. Figure 3.6 further illustrates this 
effect in terms of the Error Factor. 
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Figure 3.6  Error Factor  for a second order mincut 
 
The average system outage duration and unavailability are shown in Tables 3.4-3.5 and 
are further illustrated in Figures 3.7-3.8. In Figure 3.7, the average system outage 
duration initially increases considerably with the utilization of the three state weather 
model and then eventually appears to be constant as more failures are assigned to bad 
weather. The effect on the average system unavailability can clearly be seen in Figure 
 43 
3.8. The average system failure rate in Figure 3.5, the Error Factor in Figure 3.6, and the 
system unavailability in Figure 3.8 all vary in a similar manner. 
 
 
Table 3.4 Average system outage duration for a second order mincut (hours) 
 
bF (%) mF = 0% mF =10% mF =20% mF =30% mF =40% mF =50% 
0 3.7884 3.7884 3.7884 3.7884 3.7884 3.7884 
10 4.3618 4.4411 4.6801 4.9348 5.1396 5.2894 
20 5.0046 5.1007 5.3176 5.4771 5.5738 5.6326 
30 5.3682 5.4340 5.5627 5.6448 5.6909 5.7178 
40 5.5545 5.5946 5.6678 5.7120 5.7363 5.7505 
50 5.6539 5.6778 5.7198 5.7447 5.7583 5.7663 
60 5.7103 5.7243 5.7485 5.7627 5.7706 5.7752 
70 5.7442 5.7521 5.7656 5.7735 5.7780 5.7807 
80 5.7654 5.7695 5.7764 5.7805 5.7828 5.7842 
90 5.7792 5.7808 5.7835 5.7851 5.7861 5.7867 
100 5.7884 5.7884 5.7884 5.7884 5.7884 5.7884 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 System unavailability for a second order mincut (hours/year) 
 
bF (%) mF = 0% mF =10% mF =20% mF =30% mF =40% mF =50% 
0 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 
10 0.0095 0.0102 0.0131 0.0179 0.0245 0.0328 
20 0.0176 0.0204 0.0311 0.0482 0.0709 0.0982 
30 0.0308 0.0369 0.0590 0.0936 0.1376 0.1889 
40 0.0489 0.0593 0.0959 0.1509 0.2189 0.2959 
50 0.0718 0.0874 0.1405 0.2178 0.3106 0.4130 
60 0.0995 0.1210 0.1921 0.2925 0.4097 0.5361 
70 0.1318 0.1599 0.2501 0.3735 0.5141 0.6623 
80 0.1687 0.2039 0.3137 0.4597 0.6221 0.7899 
90 0.2101 0.2527 0.3824 0.5502 0.7324 0.9174 
100 0.2558 0.3063 0.4558 0.6441 0.8443 1.0440 
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Figure 3.7  Average system outage duration for a second order mincut 
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Figure 3.8  System unavailability for a second order mincut 
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The analysis can be extended to a third order mincut. Line 3, which is identical to lines 1 
and 2, is added in Figure 2.7 to form a three line parallel redundant system. Table 3.6 
shows the average system failure rate of the third order mincut for varying percentages 
of failures occurring in major adverse weather. The increase in the failure rate is clearly 
shown in Table 3.7 and Figure 3.9 using the Error Factor.  
 
 
Table 3.6 Average system failure rate for a third order mincut (failures/year) 
 
bF (%) mF = 0% mF =10% mF =20% mF =30% mF =40% mF =50% 
0 0.000002 0.000002 0.000002 0.000002 0.000002 0.000002 
10 0.000007 0.000013 0.000053 0.000150 0.000324 0.000589 
20 0.000034 0.000077 0.000350 0.000986 0.002056 0.003591 
30 0.000100 0.000233 0.001047 0.002832 0.005674 0.009549 
40 0.000222 0.000517 0.002228 0.005787 0.011181 0.018215 
50 0.000416 0.000954 0.003938 0.009838 0.018389 0.029110 
60 0.000695 0.001568 0.006189 0.014911 0.027045 0.041736 
70 0.001075 0.002377 0.008980 0.020905 0.036893 0.055650 
80 0.001567 0.003396 0.012293 0.027714 0.047694 0.070483 
90 0.002184 0.004638 0.016106 0.035231 0.059242 0.085935 
100 0.002938 0.006113 0.020393 0.043355 0.071359 0.101770 
 
 
Table 3.7 Error Factor for a third order mincut  
 
bF (%) mF = 0% mF =10% mF =20% mF =30% mF =40% mF =50% 
0 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 
10 3.21 5.94 23.96 68.32 147.52 267.99 
20 15.18 34.87 159.27 448.45 934.9 1632.97 
30 44.71 106.17 475.95 1287.60 2580.04 4342.47 
40 99.11 235.00 1013.2 2631.72 5084.45 8283.09 
50 185.32 433.85 1790.55 4473.88 8362.18 13237.30 
60 309.88 713.00 2814.55 6780.60 12298.52 18978.95 
70 478.93 1080.87 4083.4 9506.56 16776.56 25306.52 
80 698.29 1544.39 5590.01 12602.73 21688.52 32051.66 
90 973.42 2109.20 7324.1 16020.81 26939.89 39078.39 
100 1309.48 2779.88 9273.62 19715.53 32450.03 46279.00 
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Figure 3.9  Error Factor for a third order mincut 
 
Figure 3.9 illustrates that the Error Factor increases dramatically with increase in the 
percentage of failures occurring in bad weather. The profiles in Figure 3.9 can be 
compared with the corresponding profiles in Figure 3.6 for a second order mincut. In the 
case of a third order mincut, the Error Factor increases by a larger margin when the 
percentage of failures occurring in major adverse weather increases. This indicates that a 
third order mincut suffers more prominently from failure bunching than does a second 
order mincut. 
 
Table 3.8 presents the system unavailability for a third order mincut. It is clear from 
Table 3.8 that the system unavailability increases rapidly as a result of incorporating bad 
weather conditions and recognizing major adverse weather failures. The average system 
outage duration for the same system is shown in Table 3.9. It can be seen from Table 3.9 
that the average outage duration increases significantly as the fraction of bad weather 
failures increases but quickly becomes relatively constant. 
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Table 3.8 System unavailability for a third order mincut (hours/year) 
bF (%) mF = 0% mF =10% mF =20% mF =30% mF =40% mF =50% 
0 0.000006 0.000006 0.000006 0.000006 0.000006 0.000006 
10 0.000027 0.000054 0.000232 0.000672 0.001458 0.002655 
20 0.000147 0.000339 0.001574 0.004448 0.009285 0.016227 
30 0.000443 0.001045 0.004721 0.012793 0.025651 0.043186 
40 0.000993 0.002324 0.010064 0.026167 0.050574 0.082407 
50 0.001866 0.004300 0.017799 0.044503 0.083202 0.131725 
60 0.003130 0.007078 0.027992 0.067467 0.122391 0.188887 
70 0.004848 0.010741 0.040627 0.094610 0.166979 0.251887 
80 0.007079 0.015359 0.055632 0.125444 0.215891 0.319049 
90 0.009880 0.02099 0.072907 0.159487 0.268187 0.389017 
100 0.013302 0.027678 0.092332 0.196290 0.323063 0.460718 
 
 
Table 3.9 Average system outage duration for a third order mincut (hours) 
bF (%) mF = 0% mF =10% mF =20% mF =30% mF =40% mF =50% 
0 2.5256 2.5256 2.5256 2.5256 2.5256 2.5256 
10 3.8068 4.1154 4.4030 4.4707 4.4928 4.5026 
20 4.3083 4.4185 4.4923 4.5084 4.5141 4.5169 
30 4.4209 4.4740 4.5084 4.5162 4.5190 4.5205 
40 4.4638 4.4947 4.5148 4.5195 4.5213 4.5222 
50 4.4860 4.5055 4.5183 4.5214 4.5226 4.5232 
60 4.4997 4.5123 4.5207 4.5227 4.5235 4.5240 
70 4.5091 4.5170 4.5223 4.5237 4.5242 4.5245 
80 4.5160 4.5205 4.5236 4.5244 4.5247 4.5249 
90 4.5213 4.5233 4.5247 4.5250 4.5252 4.5253 
100 4.5256 4.5256 4.5256 4.5256 4.5256 4.5256 
 
 
 
 
3.7  Effect of failure rate and repair time 
 
The forced outage rates and repair times of different transmission elements can vary 
from one utility to another depending on the transmission structures and available 
resources. It is of interest to analyse the effect when system elements with different 
reliability parameters operate in the same weather environment. The following analyses 
consider different combinations of the failure rates and repair times in a second order 
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mincut operating in three weather states. It is assumed that the percentage of bad 
weather failures in major adverse weather is 10%. The studies were conducted by 
varying the repair time using a constant component failure rate. Three cases are 
examined with the component failure rates held constant at 1.0, 0.5 and 5.0 f/yr. The 
repair times are assumed to be 3.75, 7.50 and 15.0 hours in each case. 
 
Table 3.10 shows the average system failure rate and the Error Factor for the three 
different repair times. Table 3.10 was calculated using the average line failure rate of 1.0 
f/yr. The average outage duration and unavailability are presented in Table 3.11. It can 
be seen from Table 3.10 that the failure rate initially increases proportionately as the 
repair time increases, but the difference decreases as the percentage of failures occurring 
in bad weather increases. This difference becomes insignificant when the most of the 
failures occur in bad weather. It is interesting to note that the Error Factor decreases 
significantly when the repair time increases and the percentage of failures in bad 
weather increases. In this case, the Error Factor does not clearly reflect the impacts of 
repair time on the average system failure rate.   
 
Table 3.10 Average system failure rate and Error Factor, ( =λ 1.0 f/yr) 
Average system failure rate (f/yr) Error Factor 
bF (%) r = 3.75 
hours 
r = 7.5  
hours 
r = 15 
hours 
r = 3.75 
hours 
r = 7.5 
hours 
r = 15  
hours 
0 0.00086 0.00173 0.00344 1.01 1.01 1.01 
10 0.00144 0.00230 0.00402 1.69 1.35 1.17 
20 0.00315 0.00401 0.00571 3.68 2.34 1.67 
30 0.00593 0.00678 0.00847 6.93 3.96 2.47 
40 0.00975 0.01059 0.01226 11.39 6.18 3.58 
50 0.01455 0.01538 0.01703 17.00 8.98 4.97 
60 0.02031 0.02112 0.02274 23.72 12.34 6.64 
70 0.02698 0.02778 0.02936 31.52 16.22 8.57 
80 0.03453 0.03531 0.03685 40.33 20.62 10.76 
90 0.04293 0.04368 0.04518 50.14 25.51 13.19 
100 0.05214 0.05287 0.05433 60.91 30.88 15.86 
 
Table 3.11 clearly shows how average outage duration and unavailability are impacted 
as a result of increase in the component repair time. It is obvious that both the average 
outage duration and unavailability will increase if service restoration is delayed. 
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Table 3.12 provides the average system failure rate and the Error Factor when the 
average failure rate is 0.5 f/yr. The average system unavailability and average outage 
duration in this case are shown in Table 3.13. The reliability indices when the average 
component failure rate is 5.0 f/yr are shown in Tables 3.14-3.15. 
 
Table 3.11 Average system outage duration and unavailability, ( =λ 1.0 f/yr) 
Average outage duration (hours) Average unavailability (hours/yr) 
bF (%) r = 3.75 
hours 
r = 7.5  
hours 
r = 15 
hours 
r = 3.75 
hours 
r = 7.5 
hours 
r = 15  
hours 
0 1.89 3.79 7.58 0.002 0.007 0.026 
10 2.82 4.44 8.04 0.004 0.010 0.032 
20 3.46 5.10 8.61 0.011 0.020 0.049 
30 3.69 5.43 9.01 0.022 0.037 0.076 
40 3.79 5.59 9.24 0.037 0.059 0.113 
50 3.84 5.68 9.38 0.056 0.087 0.16 
60 3.86 5.72 9.46 0.078 0.121 0.215 
70 3.88 5.75 9.51 0.105 0.160 0.280 
80 3.88 5.77 9.54 0.134 0.204 0.352 
90 3.89 5.78 9.56 0.167 0.253 0.433 
100 3.89 5.79 9.58 0.203 0.306 0.521 
 
 
Table 3.12 Average system failure rate and Error Factor, ( =λ 0.5 f/yr) 
Average system failure rate (f/yr) Error Factor 
bF (%) r = 3.75 
hours 
r = 7.5 
 hours 
r = 15 
hours 
r = 3.75 
hours 
r = 7.5 
hours 
r = 15 
hours 
0 0.00022 0.00043 0.00086 1.01 1.01 1.01 
10 0.00036 0.00058 0.00101 1.69 1.35 1.18 
20 0.00080 0.00101 0.00144 3.72 2.36 1.68 
30 0.00151 0.00173 0.00215 7.07 4.03 2.52 
40 0.00251 0.00272 0.00314 11.70 6.35 3.67 
50 0.00377 0.00398 0.00440 17.60 9.29 5.14 
60 0.00529 0.00550 0.00592 24.72 12.85 6.91 
70 0.00708 0.00728 0.00770 33.06 17.01 8.99 
80 0.00911 0.00932 0.00973 42.58 21.76 11.36 
90 0.01140 0.01160 0.01200 53.25 27.10 14.02 
100 0.01393 0.01412 0.01452 65.06 32.99 16.96 
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The results shown in Table 3.10 can be compared with those in Table 3.12 and Table 
3.14. It can be observed that the failure rate in Table 3.10 is larger than that in Table 
3.12 and smaller than that in Table 3.14. The Error Factor is smaller for the large 
component failure rate. The average outage durations in Tables 3.11, 3.13 and 3.15 are 
very similar. This implies that the component failure rate does not affect the average 
outage duration. On the other hand, the system unavailability changes in accordance 
with the change in average system failure rate. The effect on the Error Factor for the 
three case studies is further illustrated in Figure 3.10. 
 
Table 3.13 Average system outage duration and unavailability, ( =λ 0.5 f/yr) 
Average outage duration (hours) Average unavailability (hours/yr) 
bF (%) r = 3.75 
hours 
r = 7.5 
hours 
r = 15 
hours 
r = 3.75 
hours 
r = 7.5 
hours 
r = 15 
hours 
0 1.89 3.79 7.58 small  0.002 0.007 
10 2.82 4.44 8.04 0.001 0.003 0.008 
20 3.46 5.11 8.62 0.003 0.005 0.012 
30 3.69 5.44 9.02 0.006 0.009 0.019 
40 3.79 5.60 9.25 0.009 0.015 0.029 
50 3.84 5.68 9.38 0.014 0.023 0.041 
60 3.86 5.73 9.46 0.020 0.032 0.056 
70 3.88 5.75 9.51 0.027 0.042 0.073 
80 3.88 5.77 9.54 0.035 0.054 0.093 
90 3.89 5.78 9.56 0.044 0.067 0.115 
100 3.89 5.79 9.58 0.054 0.082 0.139 
 
 
Table 3.14 Average system failure rate and Error Factor, ( =λ 5.0 f/yr) 
Average system failure rate (f/yr) Error Factor 
bF (%) r = 3.75 
hours 
r = 7.5 
hours 
r = 15 
hours 
r = 3.75 
hours 
r = 7.5 
hours 
r = 15 
hours 
0 0.02148 0.04269 0.08430 1.00 1.00 0.98 
10 0.03503 0.05606 0.09733 1.64 1.31 1.14 
20 0.07222 0.09276 0.13308 3.37 2.17 1.55 
30 0.12896 0.14876 0.18762 6.03 3.48 2.19 
40 0.20222 0.22105 0.25803 9.45 5.16 3.01 
50 0.28964 0.30733 0.34209 13.53 7.18 4.00 
60 0.38935 0.40576 0.43803 18.19 9.48 5.12 
70 0.49984 0.51488 0.54445 23.35 12.03 6.36 
80 0.61984 0.63343 0.66017 28.96 14.8 7.71 
90 0.74829 0.76039 0.78421 34.96 17.76 9.16 
100 0.88426 0.89486 0.91574 41.31 20.90 10.70 
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Table 3.15 Average system outage duration and unavailability, ( =λ 5.0 f/yr) 
Average outage duration (hours) Average unavailability (hours/yr) 
bF (%) r = 3.75 
hours 
r = 7.5 
hours 
r = 15 
hours 
r = 3.75 
hours 
r = 7.5 
hours 
r = 15 
hours 
0 1.89 3.79 7.58 0.041 0.162 0.644 
10 2.79 4.42 8.02 0.098 0.249 0.787 
20 3.42 5.06 8.57 0.248 0.471 1.150 
30 3.67 5.40 8.96 0.474 0.806 1.695 
40 3.77 5.57 9.20 0.764 1.235 2.392 
50 3.82 5.66 9.34 1.110 1.745 3.220 
60 3.85 5.71 9.44 1.503 2.326 4.162 
70 3.87 5.74 9.49 1.938 2.967 5.203 
80 3.88 5.77 9.53 2.410 3.663 6.331 
90 3.89 5.78 9.56 2.914 4.406 7.538 
100 3.89 5.79 9.58 3.447 5.192 8.814 
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Figure 3.10  Variation of Error Factor with component reliability parameters 
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The Error Factor moves in the opposite direction to the system failure rate when the 
repair time increases. As discussed earlier, the average system failure rate increases with 
increase in the repair time, but the Error Factor decreases. The Error Factor is lower for 
systems having large component failure rates. This implies that the worst performing 
systems experience lower impacts compared to those with better reliability parameters. 
 
 
 
 
3.8  Extreme weather severity analysis 
 
Continuous exposure of a system element to unfavourable weather conditions for a 
prolonged duration can create different system failure mechanisms. On the other hand, 
the number of interruptions tends to increase as bad weather hits the system more 
frequently. It is evident that the number of storms varies from one place to another. 
Table 3.16 shows statistical data for storms that took place in the provinces of Canada 
between 1950─2003 [21].  
 
 
Table 3.16 Number of severe weather events by province between 1950─2003 
Provinces of Canada 
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Alberta, AB 18 0 2 2 5 3 30 
British Columbia, BC 2 0 7 0 4 0 15 
Manitoba, MB 5 0 0 0 2 2 9 
New Brunswick, NB 0 5 0 1 (‘98) 4 0 10 
Newfoundland, NF 0 3 1 (‘59) 3 8 0 15 
Nova Scotia, NS 0 7 0 0 5 1 (‘54) 13 
Ontario, ON 2 1 (‘54) 0 2 7 11 23 
Prince Ed Island, PE 0 1 (‘90) 0 0 5 0 6 
Quebec, QC 3 4 2 1 (‘98) 8 7 25 
Saskatchewan, SK 5 0 0 2 1 (‘64) 2 10 
Total 35 21 12 11 49 26  
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In Table 3.16, the figure in the brackets indicates the year in which the weather event 
was experienced. These are not complete statistics, but they do provide a means of 
comparison. It is important to note that the impacts of disturbances caused by different 
storms are not the same and that they cannot be compared between different systems. 
Table 3.16 indicates that the number of stormy weather events and the types of storms in 
the various provinces vary significantly. 
 
It is interesting to note that the territories NT, NU and YK did not receive any major 
storms in the categories given in Table 3.16 during the period 1950─2003. These 
provinces were excluded in the calculation of the frequencies of storm occurrence. Table 
3.17 presents the frequencies of storms in the rest of the provinces. These data clearly 
show that Alberta, Quebec and Ontario are the most impacted provinces. The variation 
in the number of weather events indicates a need to examine the effect of the frequency 
of encountering major adverse weather. 
    
Table 3.17 Frequencies of major storms in the Provinces of Canada 
Statistics BC, MB, NB, NF, PE, SK, NS 
All (except NT, 
NU, YK) Only AB, ON, QC  
Average number by 
province 11 15.6 26 
Average frequency 
(events/yr) 0.203 (once in 5 yrs) 
0.289 
(once in 3.46 
yrs) 
0.481 
(once in 2 yrs) 
 
 
The following analysis of a second order mincut considers the frequency of occurrence 
to vary in the range from 0.2 to 1.0 occurrence per year. The durations of normal and 
adverse weather are held constant at 200 hours and 2 hours respectively and the duration 
of major adverse weather changes in accordance with the variation in its frequency such 
that the steady state probability remains unchanged. Under the assumption that extreme 
weather occurs once per year with an average duration of one hour, the probability of 
extreme weather is 0.000114. The frequency of occurrence of major adverse weather is 
given by Equation 3.13.   
)()( mamnm aPnPf +=     (3.13) 
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         Assume, mm an =  
  manm nPPf )( +=  
)( anmm PPfn +=   
Since, 0.1)( ≈+ an PP   
 mm fn ≈  
 
The duration of major adverse weather (M) can be simply obtained by dividing the 
probability by the frequency of encountering the extreme weather. The resulting 
transition rates are as follows: 
 
== mm an  0.2 to 1.0 occ/yr  
ma nn −= 200/8760  occ/yr 
mn aa −= 2/8760  occ/yr     
Mmm an 2/1==  occ/yr 
 
The weather state characteristics are given in Table 3.18. Table 3.19 shows the Error 
Factor when the frequency of encountering major adverse weather varies from 0.2 to 1.0 
occ/yr in 0.2 occ/yr increments for the case when 10% of bad weather failures occur in 
major adverse weather. The Error Factor appears to be quite stable over the range in 
frequency of occurrence of extreme weather. 
 
Table 3.18 Weather characteristics for variable frequency of extreme weather 
Steady state probability Frequency of 
extreme 
weather 
(Occ/yr) 
Duration of 
extreme 
weather (hr) 
Normal 
weather 
(Pn) 
Adverse 
weather 
(Pa) 
Extreme 
weather 
(Pm) 
0.2 5.00 0.990008 0.009878 0.000114 
0.4 2.50 0.990030 0.009856 0.000114 
0.6 1.67 0.990052 0.009833 0.000114 
0.8 1.25 0.990075 0.009811 0.000114 
1.0 1.00 0.990097 0.009789 0.000114 
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Table 3.19 Error Factor for variable frequency of extreme weather 
Frequency of occurrence 
 bF (%) 
0.2 Occ/yr 0.4 Occ/yr 0.6 Occ/yr 0.8 Occ/yr 1.0 Occ/yr 
0 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
10 1.34 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 
20 2.34 2.34 2.35 2.35 2.36 
30 3.97 3.97 3.98 3.99 4.00 
40 6.19 6.21 6.23 6.24 6.26 
50 9.00 9.03 9.05 9.08 9.10 
60 12.36 12.40 12.43 12.47 12.51 
70 16.26 16.31 16.35 16.40 16.45 
80 20.67 20.73 20.79 20.85 20.92 
90 25.57 25.65 25.73 25.80 25.88 
100 30.95 31.04 31.14 31.23 31.33 
 
 
The results shown in Table 3.19 indicate that less often occurring weather events with 
longer durations and more often encountering weather events but with relatively short 
durations have similar impacts on the average system failure rate. In other words, the 
probability of normal weather which is very close to 1.0 increases by a small amount 
while that of adverse weather decreases by the same value, resulting in a small change in 
component failure rates in normal and adverse weather conditions. This change causes 
little or no effect on the predicted average system failure rate because the average 
system failure rate is largely dominated by the component failure rate in major adverse 
weather.  
 
 
 
3.9  Summary 
 
This chapter describes the importance of incorporating extreme adverse weather 
conditions in the reliability evaluation of transmission and distribution systems. A three 
state weather model is developed and illustrated by application to two line and three line 
parallel redundant systems. The studies described in this chapter reveal that estimated 
reliability indices can be quite optimistic if extreme weather conditions are not included 
in the analysis. This is clearly shown using a number of graphical illustrations.  
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A series of studies using a range of reliability parameters are presented for varying 
percentages of the total line failures occurring in bad weather. The portion of bad 
weather failures attributed to major adverse weather is 10% in these studies. The 
analyses show that the average system failure rate increases significantly with the repair 
time when the percentage of failures in bad weather is small. It, however, increases only 
marginally when relatively more failures occur in bad weather. On the contrary, the 
impact as a result of increase in the average component failure rate is small when the 
percentages of failures that are attributed to bad weather are small, but is significant 
when large percentages of the failures occur in bad weather. It should be noted that the 
impacts on the average system failure rate are not clearly reflected by a simple 
comparative study of Error Factors for different systems with different repair times. In 
these cases, the actual system failure rates should also be considered.  
 
The influence on the reliability parameters due to varying the number of extreme 
weather events is also illustrated. The results obtained for a higher frequency of weather 
events occurring per year with short durations are compared with those for a lower 
frequency of weather events with longer durations. It is shown that the two cases have 
similar effects on the estimated average system failure rate. The analysis conducted in 
this chapter indicates that major storms have a significant influence on predicted 
reliability indices. 
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Chapter 4 
 
PRACTICAL SYSTEM RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The application of the two state weather model to two line and three line parallel 
redundant circuits is illustrated in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes the technique for 
incorporating extreme adverse weather conditions and applications to two line and three 
line parallel redundant configurations. Chapters 2 and 3 clearly demonstrate that the 
predicted reliability indices increase significantly when weather conditions are 
incorporated in the analysis. These chapters focus mainly on computation of the average 
system failure rate, the average outage duration and the unavailability of second order 
and third order mincuts using the two different weather models.  
 
A transmission or distribution system is composed of a number of components that in 
different combinations contribute to supply interruptions. Although the basic indices are 
important elements, they do not in themselves reflect the significance and severity of 
customer outages. It is essential to evaluate customer oriented system indices that can be 
used to assess the overall system performance in decision making, design and planning. 
This chapter illustrates the application of weather modeling to a simple practical system. 
Two types of indices designated as load point indices and system indices are described 
and evaluated to illustrate the impacts due to the inclusion of weather conditions in the 
analysis.  
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4.2  Example system 
 
The single line diagram of a simple transmission or distribution system is shown in 
Figure 4.1. This system consists of four lines, three buses and two load points. Bus 1 is 
the supply bus whereas Bus 2 and Bus 3 are the load buses to which load points L1 and 
L2 are connected respectively. The following analyses assume that the power supply is 
constantly available and the unavailability of the bus bars is not considered. 
 
 
Figure 4.1  Simple transmission or distribution system 
 
 
The minimal cut set approach can be used to identify the set of elements contributing to 
the failure of a load point. The minimal cuts identified for load points L1 and L2 are as 
follows: 
Load point L1:  1-2-3,  1-2-4 
Load point L2:     3-4,  1-2-4    
 
The following data are used in the analysis: 
Average line failure rate for component 1: 5.11 =λ  f/yr 
Average line failure rate for component 2: 5.12 =λ  f/yr 
Average line failure rate for component 3: 0.13 =λ  f/yr  
Average line failure rate for component 4: 0.24 =λ  f/yr 
Average repair time for each line = 10 hours 
 
The hypothetical system load data are shown in Table 4.1.  
Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 1 
1 
2 
4 
3 
L2 L1 Supply 
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Table 4.1 System load data 
Load point L1 Load point L2 
User sector % Load Load (kW) 
Number of 
customers % Load 
Load 
(kW) 
Number of 
customers 
Agricultural 10 2000 50 5 800 20 
Commercial 30 6000 150 25 4000 100 
Industrial 20 4000 5 30 4800 6 
Residential 40 8000 3200 40 6400 2560 
Total 100 20000 3405 100 16000 2686 
 
The customer types are agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential. The 
distribution of consumer load and the number of customers at each load point are shown 
in Table 4.1. The total system load of 36 MW is distributed over 5091 customers. 
 
Table 4.2 presents the sector interruption costs, also known as customer damage 
functions (CDF), for typical outage durations of 1 hr, 4 hrs and 8 hrs [1]. The actual 
outage durations depending on the failure events may vary and the interruption cost 
relevant to the specific outage period should be evaluated. In this situation, an 
interpolation technique can be applied to determine this cost using Equation 4.1 [22].  
 
Table 4.2 Sector customer damage function (CDF) 
Interruption cost ($/kW) User sector 1 hr 4 hrs 8 hrs 
Agricultural 0.649 2.064 4.120 
Commercial 8.552 31.317 83.008 
Industrial 9.085 25.163 55.808 
Residential 0.482 4.914 15.690 
 
[ ] )log/(log1}log{loglog}log{logloglog xyyrCxrCC xyr −×−−−=       (4.1)                                           
where,   
   r  = duration of an outage event in hours 
   x  = outage durations less than r hours 
               y  = outage durations greater than r hours 
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rC = interruption cost for an outage duration of r hours  
xC  = interruption cost for an outage duration of x hours  
yC  = interruption cost for an outage duration of y hours  
 
The parameters x and y are 4 hrs and 8 hrs respectively for an outage duration falling 
between 4-8 hrs. For durations between 1-4 hrs, interpolation between 1 hr and 4 hours 
is required. The outage costs associated with various interruption durations for the 
different user sectors are given in Table C.17 in Appendix C. 
 
The customer costs associated with an interruption at any load point involves the 
combination of costs associated with all customer types affected by that outage. This 
combined cost is referred to as a composite customer damage function (CCDF). The 
particular customer costs together with the percentage of load allocated to the respective 
classes of consumers results in the composite cost functions given by Equation 4.2. 
  
SS FCDPCCDF ∑=         (4.2) 
where,  
SP  = percentage of total load at that load point  
SCDF  = sector customer damage function  
 
CCDF for L1 = resindcomagr CDFCDFCDFCDF 4.02.03.01.0 +++    (4.3) 
CCDF for L2 = resindcomagr CDFCDFCDFCDF 4.03.025.005.0 +++   (4.4) 
  
where,  
agrCDF  =  interruption cost for the agricultural sector 
comCDF =  interruption cost for the commercial sector 
indCDF  =  interruption cost for the industrial sector 
resCDF  =  interruption cost for the residential sector 
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4.3 Reliability indices 
 
Reliability indices are important elements in the quantitative adequacy assessment of a 
system. Load point indices in conjunction with system indices can be used to measure 
distribution system adequacy. Load point indices provide the reliability at the individual 
load buses while system indices are indicators of total system reliability. Although the 
two sets of indices function differently, they complement each other. Load point indices 
are usually evaluated when the adequacy assessment is intended to identify and 
reinforce poorly performing buses in the system. On the other hand, system indices are 
used when the purpose of study is to assess global system adequacy and to provide a 
comparative analysis of different alternatives. Both sets of indices computed in this 
chapter are mainly focused on comparing the effects of various weather conditions. This 
section briefly describes the load point and system indices.   
 
 
 
 
4.3.1  Load point indices 
 
The traditional load point indices are the average failure rate, the average annual outage 
time or unavailability, and the average outage duration. The load point failure rate and 
unavailability are simply the sum of the failure rates and the unavailability of the 
individual failure events respectively. These indices are given by Equations 4.5-4.7.  
 
Average failure rate, ∑= kλλ      (4.5) 
Average annual outage time,  ∑= kUU     (4.6) 
Average outage time, ∑
∑
=
k
kU
r λ       (4.7) 
where, 
  k denotes an outage event, or minimal cut 
 62 
4.3.2  System indices 
 
The load point indices provide an indication of the average performance at each 
individual load point in the system. These values can be aggregated to provide a set of 
overall system indices [1]. The system indices utilized in Canada and compiled by the 
Canadian Electricity Association (CEA) are noted in Chapter 1 of this thesis. These 
indices together with some other useful indicators [1] are defined as follows. 
 
 
SAIFI: System Average Interruption Frequency Index 
      
servedcustomersofnumbertotal
sterruptionincustomerofnumbertotalSAIFI =        
            ∑
∑
=
i
ii
N
Nλ (interruptions/customer-yr)          (4.8) 
    where iλ is the failure rate and iN is the number of customers at load point i  
 
SAIDI: System Average Interruption Duration Index 
    
servedcustomersofnumbertotal
durationsterruptionincustomerofsumSAIDI =  
            ∑
∑
=
i
ii
N
NU
     (hr/customer-yr)         (4.9) 
   where iU is the annual outage time and iN is the number of customers at load point i   
 
CAIDI: Customer Average Interruption Duration Index: 
             
sterruptionincustomerofnumbertotal
durationsterruptionincustomerofsumCAIDI =     
∑
∑
=
ii
ii
N
NU
λ = SAIFI
SAIDI
   (hrs/interruption)     (4.10) 
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ASAI: Average Service Availability Index 
 
         
demandedhourscustomer
serviceavailableofhourscustomerASAI =         
∑
∑∑
×
−×
=
8760
8760
i
iii
N
NUN
= 
8760
1 SAIDI−    (4.11) 
 
         ASUI = 1 – ASAI, where 8760 is the number of hours in a year 
 
 
EENS: Expected Energy Not Supplied 
 
       ∑= iiavg ULEENS )(      (MWh/yr)            (4.12) 
        where )(iavgL  is the average load connected to load point i   
 
AENS: Average Energy Not Supplied 
 
   ∑∑
∑
==
ii
iiavg
N
EENS
N
UL
AENS )(         (MWh/Cust-yr)     (4.13) 
 
ECOST:  Expected Customer Cost                          
  
krkiavg
NE
k
NL
i
CLECOST λ)(
11
∑∑
==
=       ($/yr)                           (4.14)                                                           
where, 
    k     =  minimal cut or an outage event      
        kλ     =  failure rate for the kth minimal cut or an outage event  (f/yr) 
        rkC    =  CDF for an outage duration of r hours due to failure event k  ($/kW) 
        NE    =  total number of outage events or minimal cuts of load point i  
        NL    =  total number of load points 
 
It should be noted that the above indices can be evaluated at different levels in a system 
and can be used to assess the performance of a single feeder, a zone in the system or the 
 64 
entire system. The energy and cost indices such as EENS, ECOST etc. can also be 
calculated for each outage event at the system lowest level. 
 
 
 
4.4  Reliability assessment 
 
The reliability indices described in the previous section are evaluated using the classical 
single weather state method and then by incorporating the weather conditions using the 
models developed in the previous chapters. In the classical approach, the component 
failure rate is assumed to be constant throughout the year. As described in the previous 
chapters, the component failure rate increases with weather severity. The impact of 
adverse weather is recognized using a two state weather model. The effects of extreme 
adverse weather conditions are incorporated in the analysis using the three state weather 
model. 
 
 
4.4.1  Incorporating a single state weather model  
 
The system and data described in Section 4.2 are used to calculate the various indices. 
Table 4.3 shows the reliability indices of average system failure rate, average outage 
duration and unavailability together with ECOST and EENS for the individual outage 
events (minimal cuts) at load point L1. The EENS was calculated using Equation 4.15 
and ECOST using Equation 4.16.  
 
kavgULEENS =        (4.15) 
kravg CLECOST λ=       (4.16) 
where,  
kλ    =  failure rate of minimal cut k 
kU   =  unavailability of minimal cut k  
rC    = composite customer damage function for outage duration r  
avgL  = average load at the load point  
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The sector composite interruption costs associated with various outage durations are 
given in Table C.17 in Appendix C. The indices associated with load point L2 are given 
in Table 4.4. This table clearly shows that the second order minimal cut largely 
dominates the indices. It is obvious that load point L1 is more reliable than load point 
L2. This effect is directly related to the degree of redundancy. 
 
Table 4.3 Reliability indices for load point L1  
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS  
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.000009 3.33 0.00003 2.51 0.6 
1-2-4 0.000018 3.33 0.00006 5.01 1.2 
Total 0.000027 3.33 0.00009 7.52 1.8 
      
 
Table 4.4 Reliability indices for load point L2  
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.004566 5.00 0.022831 1713.89 365.29 
1-2-4 0.000018 3.33 0.000060 4.24 0.94 
Total 0.004584 4.99 0.022891 1718.13 366.23 
 
 
It is interesting to note that the failure rate and unavailability of mincut 1-2-4 are double 
those of mincut 1-2-3. This is because the failure rate of component 4 is double that of 
component 3. This shows the impact of this reliability parameter on the failure rate and 
unavailability. The system indices are listed below. The IEAR (Interruption Energy 
Assessment Rate) is given by the ratio of the ECOST and the EENS. 
 
SAIFI  =  0.002037 (intr/cust-yr) 
SAIDI  =  0.010143  (hrs/cust-yr) 
EENS  =  367.99 (kWh/yr) 
ECOST =  1725.65 ($/yr) 
IEAR  =  4.67  ($/kWh) 
ASAI  =  0.999999 
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4.4.2  Incorporating a two state weather model 
 
This section illustrates the effects of incorporating the two state weather model in the 
analysis. It, therefore, implies that the system can reside in normal or adverse weather 
conditions. The studies assume that component repair is performed only in normal 
weather. The failure events in the form of the minimal cuts are analysed using the 
Markov approach and the fundamental reliability indices of average system failure rate, 
outage duration and unavailability associated with each mincut are determined. 
Additional indices such as ECOST and EENS are also computed. The percentages of 
line failures in adverse weather are held at 50% and 90%, which are designated as Cases 
I and II respectively. Tables 4.5-4.8 show the results for the two cases. 
 
 
 
Case I: 50% of failures occur in adverse weather 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 Reliability indices for load point L1 (50% of failures in adverse weather) 
 
Minimal cut Failure rate (f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.000948 5.31 0.0050 462.62 100.00 
1-2-4 0.001854 5.31 0.0099 904.75 198.00 
Total 0.002802 5.31 0.01490 1367.37 298.00 
  
 
 
Table 4.6 Reliability indices for load point L2 (50% of failures in adverse weather) 
 
Minimal cut Failure rate (f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.026270 6.88 0.1810 15097.89 2896.00 
1-2-4 0.001854 5.31 0.0099 753.76 158.40 
Total 0.028124 6.79 0.1909 15851.65 3054.40 
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Case II:  90% of failures occur in adverse weather 
 
 
Table 4.7 Reliability indices for load point L1 (90% of failures in adverse weather) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.004812 5.36 0.0258 2378.09 516.00 
1-2-4 0.009248 5.36 0.0496 4570.36 992.00 
Total 0.014060 5.36 0.0754 6948.45 1508.00 
 
 
Table 4.8 Reliability indices for load point L2 (90% of failures in adverse weather) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.07212 7.04 0.5083 42741.20 8132.80 
1-2-4 0.00925 5.36 0.0496 3808.04 793.60 
Total 0.08137 6.85 0.5579 46549.24 8926.40 
 
 
The results presented in Tables 4.5-4.8 show that the load point indices increase 
considerably by incorporating the two state weather model. The increase in the 
percentage of failures in adverse weather has a significant effect on the load point 
indices.  
 
The system indices obtained without considering the weather conditions together with 
those obtained using the two weather state model are shown in Table 4.9.  
 
Table 4.9 System indices for the single and two state weather models 
Condition 
SAIFI 
(intr/cust-
yr) 
SAIDI 
(hrs/cust-
yr) 
ASAI EENS (kWh/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
IEAR 
($/kWh) 
Single 
state  0.002037  0.010143  0.999999 367.99 1725.65  4.67  
2-state, 
Case I 0.013968  0.092512  0.999989 3352.4  17219.02 5.14 
2-state, 
Case II 0.043742 0.288172 0.999967 10434.4  53497.69 5.13 
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It can be seen from Table 4.9 that there are quite large differences between the indices 
obtained using the basic formulae and those obtained using the two state weather model. 
The effect of adverse weather on these indices becomes more severe for larger 
percentages of failures occurring in adverse weather. The ASAI differs only marginally 
from that obtained using the single state weather model. It is evident that the system 
indices are dominated by the indices of load point L2 which is relatively unreliable.  
 
 
 
4.4.3  Incorporating a three state weather model 
 
The previous section illustrates the application of the two state weather model. It is clear 
that the load point indices are greatly influenced by the adverse weather conditions. 
Similar studies have been conducted to illustrate the effect of major adverse weather. 
The weather statistics are 200 hrs, 2hrs and 1 hr. The percentages of failures occurring 
in bad weather are held at 50% and 90% and the percentage of failures attributed to 
major adverse weather is varied from 10% to 50%. Tables 4.10-4.13 show the load point 
indices, energy indices and cost indices under the condition that 20% of bad weather 
failures occur in major adverse weather. The results for the cases when 10%, 30%, 40% 
and 50% of bad weather failures occur in extreme weather are presented in Tables C.1-
C.16 in Appendix C. 
 
 
Case I: 50% of line failures occurring in bad weather ( bF  = 50%) 
 
 
Table 4.10 Reliability indices for load point L1 ( bF = 50% and mF = 20%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage duration 
(hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.007683 5.36 0.0412 3796.94 824 
1-2-4 0.013351 5.36 0.0716 6598.06 1432 
Total 0.021034 5.36 0.1128 10395.00 2256 
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Table 4.11 Reliability indices for load point L2 ( bF = 50% and mF = 20%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage duration 
(hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.046157 6.96 0.3215 26940.91 5145.60 
1-2-4 0.013351 5.36 0.0716 5496.34 1145.60 
Total 0.059508 6.61 0.3931 32437.25 6291.20 
 
 
 
Case II:  90% of line failures occurring in bad weather ( bF  = 90%) 
 
 
Table 4.12 Reliability indices for load point L1 ( bF = 90% and mF = 20%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.029009 5.37 0.1558 14371.06 3116.00 
1-2-4 0.047159 5.37 0.2533 23362.57 5066.00 
Total 0.076168 5.37 0.4091 37733.63 8232.00 
 
 
 
Table 4.13 Reliability indices for load point L2 ( bF = 90% and mF = 20%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.116821 7.04 0.8240 69232.79 13184.00 
1-2-4 0.047159 5.37 0.2533 19459.69 4052.80 
Total 0.163980 6.57 1.0773 88692.48 17236.80 
 
 
Table 4.14 shows the system indices for varying percentages of bad weather failures 
occurring in major adverse weather for 50% and 90% of the failures occurring in bad 
weather. The system indices shown in Table 4.14 can be compared with those in Table 
4.9 where the indices were computed using the single and two state weather models. The 
differences are illustrated graphically in the next section. 
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Table 4.14 System indices obtained using the three state weather model 
 
Failure condition 
SAIFI 
(intr/ 
cust-yr) 
SAIDI 
(hrs/ 
cust-yr) 
ASAI EENS (kWh/yr) 
ECOST 
($/kW) 
IEAR 
($/kWh) 
mF = 10% 0.0186 0.1207 0.999986 4373.76 22311.48 5.1012 
mF = 20% 0.0380 0.2364 0.999973 8547.20 42832.25 5.0112 
mF = 30% 0.0692 0.4191 0.999952 15135.2 74965.72 4.9532 
mF = 40% 0.1081 0.6460 0.999926 23312.8 114597.90 4.9157 
 
Fo
r 
F b
 
=
 
50
%
 
mF = 50% 0.1518 0.8990 0.999897 32430.8 158870.39 4.8987 
mF = 10% 0.0559 0.3625 0.999959 13111.4 66625.80 5.0815 
mF = 20% 0.1149 0.7037 0.999920 25468.8 126426.11 4.9639 
mF = 30% 0.1898 1.1348 0.999870 40951.2 201672.80 4.9247 
mF = 40% 0.2709 1.5993 0.999817 57683.6 282424.69 4.8961 
Fo
r 
F b
 
=
 
90
%
 
mF = 50% 0.3518 2.0612 0.999765 74320.4 362621.88 4.8792 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5  Significance of using the two and three state weather models  
 
The variations in SAIFI, SAIDI, EENS and ECOST with changing percentages of bad 
weather failures in extreme weather are illustrated pictorially in Figures 4.2-4.5. The 
system indices for the two cases when the system resides in two weather states are also 
shown. Figure 4.2 illustrates that the SAIFI increases significantly when a large number 
of failures occur in extreme weather. The effect is more acute when the failure 
percentages in bad weather increase from 50% to 90%. Figure 4.2 clearly shows that the 
two state weather model severely underestimates the predicted SAIFI. Similar variations 
in SAIDI, EENS and ECOST are illustrated in Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 respectively.  
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Figure 4.2  SAIFI using the two and three state weather models 
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Figure 4.3  SAIDI using the two and three state weather models 
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Figure 4.4  EENS using the two and three state weather models  
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Figure 4.5  ECOST using the two and three state weather models 
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4.6 Summary 
 
A simple practical system comprised of second order and third order minimal cuts was 
examined using the two different approaches. The first approach determines the system 
performance in a conventional way without considering the weather conditions, while 
the second approach employs the two different weather models to incorporate the effects 
of adverse and major adverse weather in the analysis. The load point indices and system 
indices were evaluated for varying percentages of line failures occurring in adverse 
weather and extreme weather periods. Load point indices show the actual adequacy at 
the customer connection points and the system indices provide an overall appraisal of 
the system adequacy. The significance of recognising the environmental stresses in the 
analysis is illustrated by comparing the estimated reliability indices in the different 
cases.  
 
The load point adequacy studies clearly show the reliability benefits associated with 
increasing the level of redundancy in the system. This benefit, however, is severely 
affected when a large proportion of failures are attributable to extreme adverse weather. 
The analyses conducted in this chapter show that the reliability indices obtained using 
the two state weather model are significantly larger than those calculated using the 
conventional single weather state approach. The system indices increase further as a 
result of incorporating three weather states. A pictorial illustration of the differences 
between SAIIFI, SAIDI, EENS and ECOST determined using the two and three state 
weather models is presented in Figures 4.2-4.5. The influence of increasing the number 
of failures in major adverse weather is shown. These studies reveal that the application 
of the three weather state model becomes increasingly important as more failures occur 
in extreme weather periods.  
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Chapter 5 
 
CONSIDERATION OF MULTI STATE WEATHER MODELS 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
The influence of failure bunching due to fluctuating weather is illustrated in Chapter 2 
using a two state weather model applied to two line and three line parallel systems. The 
three state weather model is developed and utilized in Chapter 3 in order to recognize 
the impacts of extreme weather periods. Weather is a continuous phenomenon that 
creates continuously varying stress on an associated system element. The failure rate of 
a component varies in accordance with the stress placed on that component. 
Transmission/distribution line failure rates are functions of weather conditions and 
increase with the weather intensity level.  
In the three state weather model, a wide range of adverse weather conditions falling 
between normal and extreme weather is aggregated and generally termed as adverse 
weather. If the adverse weather state includes many relatively mild and non-destructive 
adverse weather periods, the failure bunching effect of more severe periods will be 
diluted. This suggests that only the weather periods that create a certain range of stress 
levels should be aggregated to form relevant weather states. This can be achieved by 
using a number of substates with different severity levels instead of using a single 
adverse weather state. A series of multi-state weather models are developed in this 
chapter and used to examine a two line parallel redundant configuration. The effects are 
illustrated using the basic reliability indices and the Error Factor. The basic techniques 
and processes underlying multi-state weather modeling are similar to those applied to a 
three state weather model. The number of actual states required to model the weather 
environment should be sufficient to represent the variable weather conditions and
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minimize the potential error in the results. The objective of the work described in this 
chapter is to identify the number of weather states required to provide a reasonably 
accurate representation of the weather environment in a distribution system reliability 
study. 
 
 
 
5.2  General methodology 
 
The state space diagram for a general multi-state weather model is shown in Figure 5.1. 
In this model, the traditional classification [20] of the weather environment into three 
basic categories is maintained but the adverse weather state is represented by a number 
of substates in order to incorporate the variability in stress levels that occur due to the 
wide range of adverse weather. It can be seen in Figure 5.1 that the adverse weather is 
divided into S substates while the normal and extreme weather states retain their basic 
characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1  State space diagram for a general multi-state weather model 
 
 
The weather statistics required in the multi-state weather modeling approach described 
in this chapter are not generally available. The following assumptions were made to 
illustrate the proposed approach. The average durations of normal, adverse and major 
adverse weather designated as N, A and M are approximately 200 hrs, 2 hrs, and 1 hr 
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respectively. The average duration of adverse weather substate A1 is approximately 2 
hours and that of A2, A3, …, AS is 1 hour.  
 
The assumed transition rates between the different weather states in occurrences per 
hour are as follows: 
 
Any substate of adverse weather to normal weather, na = 1/A 
Normal to major adverse weather, mn = 1/8760 
Major adverse to normal weather, nm =1/2M  
Any substate of adverse weather to major adverse weather, ma  = 1/8760  
Major adverse to any substate of adverse weather, 
am = 1/(2SxM)   
 
It is assumed that the frequency of encountering the less severe substates is higher than 
that of the more severe substates and that the occurrences of these periods are more 
likely following normal weather periods. 
 
The transition rate from normal weather to the ith adverse weather substate,  
          
NSS
iS
nai
1
2/)1(
)1(
×
+
−+
=
    (where, Si ....3,2,1= ) 
The transition rate from a more severe adverse weather substate k to a less severe 
adverse weather substate i  ( ki < ),    
Ak
u k
1
)1(
1
×
−
=  
The transition rate from a less severe adverse weather substate to a more severe adverse 
weather substate,   
8760/1=d  
 
The frequency balance approach can be used to determine the steady state probabilities 
of each weather state. 
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5.3  Markov analysis 
 
The complete system state space diagram becomes large and unmanageable with 
increase in the system states. Increasing the number of adverse weather substates can 
create a considerable number of system states. An n -component system with a m -state 
weather model results in mn ×2  system states. A two component system with a ten state 
weather model generates 40 states and this increases to 80 states for a three component 
system. The stochastic transitional probability matrix can, however, be obtained without 
creating an exhaustive state space diagram, using the same concepts involved in creating 
the transitional probability matrix for a three state weather model. Equation 5.1 shows 
the generalized transitional probability matrix for the multi-state weather model with a 
two component system. The off-diagonal sub-matrices and their elements are easier to 
manipulate. Each of the diagonal sub-matrices is different in that the appropriate failure 
and repair rates are associated with the respective weather state.  
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where, [I] is the identity matrix. 
 
The matrix NM  is associated with normal weather. The failure rates and repair rates in 
this matrix are the component parameters in normal weather.  
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nnX
1
is the sum of the departure rates from normal weather. 
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The matrix AiM is associated with the 
thi  adverse weather substate and aiX is the sum of 
the departure rates from the  thi  adverse weather substate. The component failure rates 
in this case are those for the corresponding weather state. It should be noted that all the 
elements below the diagonal are zero when no repair is performed in adverse weather.  
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where, smmX anm +=   
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The matrix MM  represents the condition when the system resides in major adverse 
weather. The term mX which is subtracted from each diagonal element is the sum of the 
departure rates from the major adverse or extreme weather. 
 
The stochastic transitional probability matrix can be used to calculate the steady state 
probabilities of each system state. The system failure rate is obtained using the process 
described in Chapter 2. Equation 5.2 is a generalized form of Equation 2.11.  
 
  MTTF = 
i
D
i
N
,11∑ =       (5.2)      
where, D is the dimension of the square matrix [N].    
 
The average system failure rate is the reciprocal of the MTTF. The average system 
outage duration can be obtained by dividing the sum of the failure state probabilities by 
the frequency of occurrence of the combined failure state. Equation 5.3 is used to 
evaluate the outage duration and Equation 5.4 gives the average system unavailability. 
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∑= )(idnW PU       (5.4) 
where,  
)(idnP  is the probability of the 
thi failure state. 
 
 
 
5.4  Failure rate considerations 
 
As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, there are virtually no available historical data on weather 
related failure rates. The average component failure rate can, however, be utilized to 
estimate the required parameters. Equation 5.5 is an extension of Equations 2.1 and 3.1 
and indicates the contributions of the individual weather related failure rates to the total 
 80 
average failure rate. The individual weather related failure rates can be estimated using 
Equation 5.6. 
∑
=
=
WS
k kkavg
P
1
λλ               (5.5)    
kkavgk PFλλ =         (5.6)   
where,  
avgλ = average component failure rate per calendar year 
   kλ   =  average component failure rate per year of the kth weather state 
WS  = total number of weather states  
kF  = fraction of total failures occurring in the k
th  weather state  
 kP = steady state probability of the k
th
 weather state 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the variation of the component failure rates in the multi-state weather 
representation. The parameters on the x-axis represent the normal weather, the adverse 
weather substates, and major adverse weather conditions.  
 
 
(a)      (b) 
 
Figure 5.2  Component failure rates as a function of the weather condition: 
                             (a) four-state weather model, (b) six-state weather model 
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Tables 5.1-5.5 show the component weather related failure rates and the weather state 
probabilities, durations and frequencies for selected weather state models obtained using 
the data assumed in the previous section. The total average component failure rate 
)( avgλ is 1.0f/yr. The weather specific failure rates assume that 80% of the component 
failures are caused by bad weather and 20% of bad weather failures occur in major 
adverse weather.  
 
 
Table 5.1 Weather parameters and component failure rates with a 3-state model 
Weather state Steady state probability 
Average 
duration 
(hours) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(occ/yr) 
Component 
failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Normal weather 0.989875 195.5357 44.35 0.202 
Adverse weather 0.010011 1.9995 43.86 63.93 
Extreme weather 0.000114 1 1 1401.76 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Weather parameters and component failure rates with a 4-state model 
Weather state Steady state probability 
Average 
duration 
(hours) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(occ/yr) 
Component 
failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Normal weather 0.989875 195.5357 44.35 0.202 
Adverse weather, A1 0.008332 1.9991 36.51 38.41 
Adverse weather, A2 0.001679 0.9999 14.71 190.58 
Extreme weather 0.000114 1 1 1401.76 
 
     
Table 5.3 Weather parameters and component failure rates with a 5-state model 
Weather state Steady state probability 
Average 
duration 
(hours) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(occ/yr) 
Component 
failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Normal weather 0.989875 195.5357 44.35 0.202 
Adverse weather, A1 0.007285 1.9986 31.93 29.28 
Adverse weather, A2 0.001880 0.9998 16.48 113.45 
Adverse weather, A3 0.000845 0.9999 7.40 252.50 
Extreme weather 0.000114 1 1 1401.76 
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Table 5.4 Weather parameters and component failure rates with a 6-state model 
Weather state Steady state probability 
Average 
duration 
(hours) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(occ/yr) 
Component 
failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Normal weather 0.989875 195.5357 44.35 0.202 
Adverse weather, A1 0.006554 1.9982 28.73 24.41 
Adverse weather, A2 0.001857 0.9997 16.27 86.17 
Adverse weather, A3 0.001090 0.9998 9.55 146.80 
Adverse weather, A4 0.000510 0.9999 4.47 313.58 
Extreme weather 0.000114 1 1 1401.76 
 
       
Table 5.5 Weather parameters and component failure rates with a 10-state model 
Weather state Steady state probability 
Average 
duration 
(hours) 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
(occ/yr) 
Component 
failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Normal weather 0.989875 195.5357 44.35 0.202 
Adverse weather, A1 0.004933 1.9964 21.65 16.22 
Adverse weather, A2 0.001555 0.9992 13.63 51.44 
Adverse weather, A3 0.001135 0.9993 9.95 70.50 
Adverse weather, A4 0.000855 0.9994 7.49 93.56 
Adverse weather, A5 0.000638 0.9995 5.59 125.36 
Adverse weather, A6 0.000455 0.9997 3.99 175.69 
Adverse weather, A7 0.000294 0.9998 2.57 272.54 
Adverse weather, A8 0.000146 0.9999 1.28 548.97 
Extreme weather 0.000114 1 1 1401.76 
 
 
 
The parameters presented in Table 5.1 can be compared with those shown in Tables 5.2-
5.5 where adverse weather is divided into a number of substates. In each case, the sum 
of the probabilities of the adverse weather substates is equal to the probability of the 
aggregated adverse weather state in the three state weather model. The expected number 
of adverse weather occurrences are distributed among its substates. The last columns in 
Tables 5.1-5.5 are the component failure rates in the different weather states. The failure 
rate increases more rapidly as the adverse weather severity increases. 
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5.5  Sensitivity analysis 
 
As noted earlier, the state space diagram expands rapidly as the number of weather 
states increases. The following analysis was done using a computer program “RETADS 
– Reliability Evaluation of Transmission and Distribution Systems” developed in Visual 
C++ during this research work. This is a general program that can consider two line and 
three line parallel redundant systems. The number of weather states in these studies is 
limited to 10, which is sufficient for reasonable accuracy. It can be upgraded relatively 
easily, however, if needed. The data required are the intended number of weather states 
to be included; the average durations of normal, adverse and extreme weather; and the 
average component failure rates and repair times. This program effectively generates the 
stochastic transitional probability matrix and successively computes the average system 
failure rate, outage duration, unavailability and the Error Factor. The results are directly 
exported to an Excel output file.  
 
In the following sensitivity studies, four cases are considered in which 10%, 20%, 30% 
and 40% of bad weather failures are attributed to major adverse weather. The percentage 
of failures credited to bad weather is allowed to vary from 0% to 100% in steps of 10%. 
The percentage of failures attributed to adverse weather is assumed to be equally 
divided between the adverse weather substates. The notations bF and mF  stand for the 
percentage of failures assigned to bad weather and the percentage of bad weather 
failures occurring in major adverse weather respectively. The basic system reliability 
indices and the Error Factor are evaluated and compared to examine the applicability of 
the weather models. It is assumed that repair cannot be performed during bad weather 
situations. 
 
 
Case I: 10% of bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather 
 
Table 5.6 shows the Error Factor for the weather models created by varying the number 
of states from 3-10 assuming that 10% of bad weather failures occur in extreme weather. 
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The Error Factor obtained using the two weather state model is also shown in the second 
column of Table 5.6 for comparison purposes. Table 5.6 shows that the Error Factor 
increases as the number of adverse weather substates increases. The increase becomes 
smaller as the number of states in the weather model increases. This is illustrated 
pictorially in Figure 5.3. 
 
Table 5.6 Error Factor using the different weather models, ( mF = 10%) 
bF (%)  Two state 
Three 
state 
Four 
State 
Five 
state 
Six 
state 
Seven 
State 
Eight 
state 
Nine 
state 
Ten 
state 
0 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
10 1.27 1.35 1.39 1.42 1.43 1.45 1.46 1.47 1.48 
20 2.06 2.34 2.51 2.61 2.69 2.75 2.80 2.84 2.88 
30 3.37 3.96 4.34 4.56 4.72 4.85 4.96 5.05 5.13 
40 5.18 6.18 6.84 7.22 7.50 7.73 7.91 8.06 8.20 
50 7.48 8.98 9.99 10.57 11.00 11.33 11.60 11.83 12.03 
60 10.27 12.34 13.75 14.57 15.17 15.63 16.00 16.32 16.59 
70 13.52 16.22 18.11 19.20 19.98 20.58 21.08 21.48 21.83 
80 17.25 20.62 23.04 24.42 25.41 26.17 26.78 27.29 27.72 
90 21.42 25.51 28.51 30.22 31.43 32.35 33.10 33.71 34.23 
100 26.05 30.88 34.51 36.56 38.01 39.11 39.99 40.71 41.32 
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Figure 5.3  Error Factor for Case I 
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Figure 5.3 illustrates that the Error Factor increases with the recognition of the three 
state weather model and that the influence of using more weather states is considerable. 
The two state and three state weather models underestimate the predicted system failure 
rate and higher state weather models provide better estimates.  
 
Table 5.7 shows the system unavailability and Table 5.8 shows the average outage 
duration for Case I.  
 
 
Table 5.7 System unavailability, ( mF  = 10%) 
bF (%)  Two state 
Three 
state 
Four 
State 
Five 
state 
Six 
state 
Seven 
state 
Eight 
state 
Nine 
state 
Ten 
state 
0 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
10 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 
20 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.026 
30 0.031 0.037 0.041 0.043 0.044 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.048 
40 0.049 0.059 0.066 0.070 0.072 0.075 0.076 0.078 0.079 
50 0.072 0.087 0.097 0.103 0.107 0.111 0.113 0.116 0.118 
60 0.100 0.121 0.135 0.143 0.149 0.154 0.157 0.161 0.163 
70 0.132 0.160 0.179 0.189 0.197 0.203 0.208 0.212 0.216 
80 0.169 0.204 0.228 0.242 0.251 0.259 0.265 0.270 0.274 
90 0.210 0.253 0.282 0.299 0.311 0.321 0.328 0.334 0.339 
100 0.256 0.306 0.342 0.363 0.377 0.388 0.397 0.404 0.410 
 
 
 
Table 5.8 Average system outage duration, ( mF = 10%) 
bF (%)  
Two 
state 
Three 
state 
Four 
State 
Five 
state 
Six 
state 
Seven 
State 
Eight 
state 
Nine 
state 
Ten 
state 
0 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 
10 4.36 4.44 4.48 4.51 4.53 4.54 4.55 4.56 4.57 
20 5.00 5.10 5.15 5.17 5.19 5.20 5.21 5.22 5.23 
30 5.37 5.43 5.46 5.48 5.49 5.50 5.51 5.51 5.52 
40 5.55 5.59 5.61 5.62 5.63 5.63 5.64 5.64 5.64 
50 5.65 5.68 5.69 5.69 5.70 5.70 5.70 5.70 5.71 
60 5.71 5.72 5.73 5.73 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 
70 5.74 5.75 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 
80 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 
90 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 
100 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 
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As shown in Table 5.7, the unavailability increases with the percentage of failures 
occurring in bad weather. The utilization of a three state weather model increases the 
estimated system unavailability when a large portion of failures are attributed to bad 
weather. The unavailability increases further as the weather model includes more states, 
but the difference reduces with utilization of an increasing number of states. Table 5.8 
shows that the average outage duration increases initially but does not progress in the 
same manner, as the percentage of failures in bad weather increases. The change in 
average outage duration as a result of incorporating multi-state weather models is 
negligible.  
 
 
Case II: 20% of bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather 
 
The Error Factor for Case II is shown in Table 5.9. Figure 5.4 provides a pictorial 
illustration of the effects on the Error Factor of using a multi-state weather model.  
 
Table 5.9 Error Factor using the different weather models, ( mF  = 20%) 
bF (%) Two state 
Three 
state 
Four 
State 
Five 
state 
Six 
state 
Seven 
State 
Eight 
state 
Nine 
state 
Ten 
state 
0 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
10 1.27 1.63 1.67 1.69 1.71 1.72 1.73 1.74 1.75 
20 2.06 3.41 3.55 3.64 3.70 3.75 3.79 3.83 3.86 
30 3.37 6.19 6.51 6.70 6.83 6.94 7.03 7.11 7.17 
40 5.18 9.87 10.41 10.74 10.97 11.16 11.31 11.44 11.56 
50 7.48 14.33 15.17 15.66 16.02 16.30 16.53 16.72 16.89 
60 10.27 19.51 20.68 21.37 21.87 22.26 22.58 22.84 23.07 
70 13.52 25.31 26.88 27.79 28.45 28.96 29.37 29.72 30.02 
80 17.25 31.69 33.70 34.86 35.69 36.33 36.85 37.28 37.65 
90 21.42 38.58 41.08 42.50 43.52 44.31 44.94 45.46 45.90 
100 26.05 45.95 48.97 50.68 51.90 52.83 53.58 54.20 54.72 
 
 
It can be seen from Figure 5.4 that the Error Factor increases significantly with the 
utilization of a three state weather model when 20% of the bad weather failures are 
attributed to major adverse weather. The Error Factor increases further with increase in 
the number of weather states until the change becomes relatively insignificant. The two 
state weather model severely underestimates the expected failure rate. The use of a three 
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state weather model significantly reduces the potential error in the estimated failure rate. 
In this case, a four state weather model may provide a reasonably accurate assessment.  
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Figure 5.4  Error Factor for Case II 
 
The system unavailability and average outage duration for this case are shown in Tables 
5.10-5.11. 
 
Table 5.10 System unavailability, ( mF = 20%) 
bF (%)  Two state 
Three 
state 
Four 
State 
Five 
state 
Six 
state 
Seven 
State 
Eight 
state 
Nine 
state 
Ten 
state 
0 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
10 0.009 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
20 0.018 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.036 
30 0.031 0.059 0.062 0.064 0.065 0.066 0.067 0.068 0.069 
40 0.049 0.096 0.101 0.104 0.107 0.109 0.110 0.111 0.113 
50 0.072 0.141 0.149 0.154 0.157 0.160 0.162 0.164 0.166 
60 0.100 0.192 0.204 0.211 0.216 0.219 0.223 0.225 0.228 
70 0.132 0.250 0.266 0.275 0.281 0.286 0.290 0.294 0.297 
80 0.169 0.314 0.334 0.345 0.353 0.360 0.365 0.369 0.373 
90 0.210 0.382 0.407 0.421 0.431 0.439 0.445 0.451 0.455 
100 0.256 0.456 0.486 0.503 0.515 0.524 0.531 0.538 0.543 
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Table 5.11 Average system outage duration, ( mF = 20%) 
bF (%)  
Two 
state 
Three 
state 
Four 
State 
Five 
state 
Six 
state 
Seven 
State 
Eight 
state 
Nine 
state 
Ten 
state 
0 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 
10 4.36 4.68 4.70 4.72 4.73 4.74 4.74 4.75 4.75 
20 5.00 5.32 5.34 5.35 5.35 5.36 5.37 5.37 5.37 
30 5.37 5.56 5.57 5.58 5.58 5.59 5.59 5.59 5.59 
40 5.55 5.67 5.67 5.68 5.68 5.68 5.68 5.68 5.69 
50 5.65 5.72 5.72 5.73 5.73 5.73 5.73 5.73 5.73 
60 5.71 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 
70 5.74 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 
80 5.77 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 
90 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 
100 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 
 
 
 
Case III: 30% of bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather 
 
Table 5.12 shows the Error Factor for Case III. As in Case II, the largest increase in 
Error Factor occurs when going from a two state to a three state weather model. The 
variation in Error Factor is presented graphically in Figure 5.5. It can be seen from 
Figure 5.5 that the difference between the Error Factors obtained using the two state and 
three state weather models is more than that in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. 
 
Table 5.12 Error Factor using the different weather models, ( mF = 30%) 
bF (%) 
Two 
state 
Three 
state 
Four 
State 
Five 
state 
Six 
state 
Seven 
State 
Eight 
state 
Nine 
state 
Ten 
state 
0 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
10 1.27 2.12 2.15 2.17 2.18 2.19 2.20 2.21 2.22 
20 2.06 5.14 5.26 5.33 5.38 5.42 5.45 5.48 5.51 
30 3.37 9.67 9.93 10.08 10.19 10.28 10.36 10.42 10.47 
40 5.18 15.41 15.86 16.12 16.31 16.46 16.59 16.69 16.79 
50 7.48 22.12 22.80 23.20 23.49 23.72 23.90 24.06 24.20 
60 10.27 29.62 30.57 31.13 31.53 31.85 32.11 32.33 32.51 
70 13.52 37.76 39.02 39.76 40.29 40.71 41.04 41.33 41.57 
80 17.25 46.42 48.03 48.97 49.64 50.16 50.59 50.94 51.25 
90 21.42 55.50 57.50 58.66 59.48 60.12 60.64 61.07 61.44 
100 26.05 64.95 67.36 68.75 69.74 70.50 71.12 71.63 72.06 
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Figure 5.5  Error Factor for Case III 
 
 
Table 5.13 and Table 5.14 present the system unavailability and average outage duration 
for Case III respectively. 
 
Table 5.13 System unavailability, ( mF = 30%) 
bF (%)  Two state 
Three 
state 
Four 
State 
Five 
state 
Six 
state 
Seven 
State 
Eight 
state 
Nine 
state 
Ten 
state 
0 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
10 0.009 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
20 0.018 0.048 0.049 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.052 
30 0.031 0.094 0.096 0.098 0.099 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.102 
40 0.049 0.151 0.155 0.158 0.160 0.161 0.163 0.164 0.165 
50 0.072 0.218 0.225 0.228 0.231 0.234 0.235 0.237 0.238 
60 0.100 0.293 0.302 0.307 0.311 0.315 0.317 0.319 0.321 
70 0.132 0.374 0.386 0.393 0.399 0.403 0.406 0.409 0.411 
80 0.169 0.460 0.476 0.485 0.492 0.497 0.501 0.505 0.508 
90 0.210 0.550 0.570 0.581 0.590 0.596 0.601 0.605 0.609 
100 0.256 0.644 0.668 0.682 0.692 0.699 0.705 0.710 0.715 
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Table 5.14 Average system outage duration, ( mF = 30%) 
bF (%)  Two state 
Three 
state 
Four 
State 
Five 
state 
Six 
state 
Seven 
State 
Eight 
state 
Nine 
state 
Ten 
state 
0 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 
10 4.36 4.93 4.95 4.95 4.96 4.96 4.97 4.97 4.97 
20 5.00 5.48 5.48 5.49 5.49 5.49 5.50 5.50 5.50 
30 5.37 5.64 5.65 5.65 5.65 5.65 5.65 5.66 5.66 
40 5.55 5.71 5.71 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 
50 5.65 5.74 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 
60 5.71 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.77 5.77 
70 5.74 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.78 
80 5.77 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 
90 5.78 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 
100 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 
 
 
 
Case IV: 40% of bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather 
 
The results for Case IV are shown in Tables 5.15-5.17. Table 5.15 shows that the 
increase in Error Factor when the three state weather model is applied is even greater 
than that in the previous cases and this effect diminishes with the utilization of higher 
state weather models. The variation in the Error Factor is shown in Figure 5.6. 
 
Table 5.15 Error Factor using the different weather models, ( mF = 40%) 
bF (%) 
Two 
state 
Three 
state 
Four 
State 
Five 
state 
Six 
state 
Seven 
State 
Eight 
state 
Nine 
state 
Ten 
state 
0 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
10 1.27 2.79 2.81 2.83 2.84 2.84 2.85 2.86 2.86 
20 2.06 7.42 7.52 7.57 7.61 7.65 7.67 7.70 7.72 
30 3.37 14.11 14.31 14.43 14.52 14.59 14.65 14.70 14.74 
40 5.18 22.26 22.61 22.82 22.97 23.09 23.19 23.27 23.34 
50 7.48 31.47 32.00 32.31 32.54 32.72 32.86 32.99 33.10 
60 10.27 41.43 42.17 42.60 42.92 43.17 43.37 43.55 43.69 
70 13.52 51.93 52.90 53.47 53.89 54.22 54.48 54.71 54.90 
80 17.25 62.78 64.03 64.75 65.28 65.69 66.02 66.30 66.54 
90 21.42 73.88 75.42 76.32 76.96 77.46 77.87 78.21 78.50 
100 26.05 85.14 87.00 88.08 88.85 89.44 89.93 90.33 90.67 
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Table 5.16 System unavailability, ( mF = 40%) 
bF (%)  
Two 
state 
Three 
state 
Four 
State 
Five 
state 
Six 
state 
Seven 
State 
Eight 
state 
Nine 
state 
Ten 
state 
0 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
10 0.009 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 
20 0.018 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.074 
30 0.031 0.138 0.140 0.141 0.142 0.142 0.143 0.143 0.144 
40 0.049 0.219 0.222 0.224 0.226 0.227 0.228 0.229 0.230 
50 0.072 0.311 0.316 0.319 0.321 0.323 0.324 0.326 0.327 
60 0.100 0.410 0.417 0.421 0.424 0.427 0.429 0.431 0.432 
70 0.132 0.514 0.524 0.529 0.534 0.537 0.539 0.542 0.544 
80 0.169 0.622 0.634 0.642 0.647 0.651 0.654 0.657 0.659 
90 0.210 0.732 0.748 0.757 0.763 0.768 0.772 0.775 0.778 
100 0.256 0.844 0.863 0.873 0.881 0.887 0.892 0.896 0.899 
 
 
Table 5.17 Average system outage duration, ( mF = 40%) 
bF (%)  
Two 
state 
Three 
state 
Four 
State 
Five 
state 
Six 
state 
Seven 
State 
Eight 
state 
Nine 
state 
Ten 
state 
0 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.79 
10 4.36 5.14 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.16 5.16 
20 5.00 5.57 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 
30 5.37 5.69 5.69 5.69 5.69 5.69 5.69 5.69 5.70 
40 5.55 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 
50 5.65 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 
60 5.71 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 
70 5.74 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 
80 5.77 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 5.78 
90 5.78 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 
100 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.79 
 
 
Figure 5.6 clearly shows that the influence of using the three state weather model in this 
case is even higher than that in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. In this case, the effects of utilizing 
an increasing number of weather states diminish. The profiles associated with some of 
the weather models are not shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 to avoid overlapping profiles. It 
becomes clear that a three state representation is sufficient to achieve reasonably 
accurate results when a considerably large portion of failures are caused by extreme 
weather. 
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Figure 5.6  Error Factor for Case IV 
 
Figures 5.3-5.6 illustrate that the inclusion of extreme weather conditions dominates the 
effect of considering multiple adverse weather substates. The influence on the predicted 
indices of incorporating multiple substates can be considerable when small percentages 
of bad weather failures are attributed to major adverse weather and the percentages of 
line failures in bad weather are relatively large.  
 
The analysis indicates that the number of states in a weather model have different 
impacts when the percentage of failures occurring in major adverse weather varies. The 
profiles shown in Figure 5.3 are quite different from those in Figure 5.6 and the number 
of states selected depends on the percentage of failures occurring in extreme weather. 
All the Error Factor profiles, however, clearly show that at least three weather states 
should be utilized in a reliability assessment. 
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5.6  Summary 
 
This chapter introduces the concept of multi-state weather modeling in the reliability 
assessment of a system exposed to a great deal of weather variation. A series of weather 
models are developed and examined by application to a two line parallel redundant 
system. The basic reliability indices of average system failure rate, average outage 
duration and unavailability are presented. The effects of using a particular weather 
model are illustrated by comparisons of the Error Factor obtained using the various 
weather models.  
 
The studies show that the three state weather model can be used to accurately predict the 
system indices in some situations and that in other situations additional states should be 
included in the weather model to improve the accuracy. The analysis shows that the 
three state weather model provides acceptable results when the percentage of bad 
weather failures is significant and the percentage of failures caused by extreme weather 
is relatively high. The results also show that in virtually all situations a three state 
weather model provides a substantial improvement in reliability estimation than the 
utilization of a single or two state weather model. 
 
It should be appreciated that it is much easier to collect the required weather and failure 
statistics for the three state weather model than for the higher state weather models. The 
calculations in this chapter are based on the assumption that the component failures are 
uniformly distributed in the whole adverse weather period regardless of the severity 
level in the individual substate. There are virtually no available data on specific weather 
related failures. The results shown, however, clearly indicate that the effects of 
incorporating adverse weather in reliability prediction are important and that data should 
be collected for at least one or more adverse weather severity levels. 
 94 
Chapter 6 
 
SEGMENTED RELIABILITY INDICES 
 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
The weather environment is a vital element that severely impacts an electric utility’s 
operational ability and system reliability in overhead transmission and distribution 
systems. Outdoor electrical networks are vulnerable to extreme weather conditions such 
as ice storms, hurricanes, lightning etc. Although extreme events have relatively low 
probabilities of occurring, when they do occur, they can cause considerable physical 
destruction resulting in large numbers of customers being interrupted for long periods of 
time. The impacts can vary depending on the nature of the weather event and the system 
topology. It is important to identify the weather specific contribution to the total system 
indices. This can provide a quantitative insight into the potential risk due to failures in 
the various weather conditions. The recognition of the risk contributed by a particular 
weather category can be valuable information in working to minimize the anticipated 
impact.  
 
A distribution system usually occupies a small geographic area and therefore it is liable 
to be affected by prevailing weather situations. It is noted in Chapter 1, that the majority 
of power supply outages occur mainly in distribution systems and that most of these 
interruptions are due to bad weather conditions. The adequacy performance of a utility is 
measured using a wide range of reliability indices. The System Average Interruption 
Frequency Index (SAIFI) and the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) 
are commonly used reliability indices throughout the world. Canadian statistics on 
outage causes are published annually by the Canadian Electricity Association (CEA). 
Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1 show the individual cause contributions to the 
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SAIFI and SAIDI respectively. It is relatively easy to quantify such contributions from 
past performance. There has, however, been relatively little work done in estimating the 
reliability indices associated with weather specific failures in predictive assessment. 
 
The studies described in this chapter focus on dividing the system risk indices into the 
three main segments related to the weather conditions.  An approach to determine the 
weather specific indices is proposed and illustrated using a practical test distribution 
system. The effect of utilizing more repair resources is examined using a series of 
sensitivity studies. The analyses also illustrate the impact of more frequently occurring 
weather events. The load point indices are provided in the form of expected failure rate, 
average outage duration and unavailability. The feeder indices and the system indices of 
SAIFI and SAIDI are presented as index segments attributable to the three weather 
states. 
 
 
6.2  RBTS distribution system analysis 
 
The example system shown in Figure 6.1 is used to illustrate the proposed methodology. 
It is a part of the Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) [23] and represents a typical urban 
distribution system. Detailed reliability data associated with this system are presented in 
[23]. Tables 6.1-6.3 show the data used in the subsequent analyses. The customer types 
include residential, commercial, institution/government and small users. The 
transformers on Feeders 1, 3 and 4 are utility property and are included in the analysis. 
The transformers that supply the small users on Feeder 2 are customer owned and are 
not incorporated in the study. Although the feeders can be meshed through normally 
open points, they are normally operated as radial feeders. The feeder is sectionalized by 
disconnect switches. This permits isolation of the faulted sections and service to be 
restored to the customers on the healthy feeder sections. 
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Symbols :  T – Transformer, D – Distributor, S – Section, F – Feeder, Lp – Load point 
 
Figure 6.1  Representative urban distribution system 
 
 
The reliability parameters are as follows: 
 
Average failure rate for each section and distributor = 0.065 failures/yr-km 
Average repair time for each section and distributor = 5 hours 
Average failure rate for a transformer = 0.015 failures/year 
Average replacement time for a transformer = 10 hours 
Average switching time = 1 hour 
 
The fuses located on the lateral distributors are not shown in Figure 6.1. The circuit 
breakers and fuses are assumed to be 100% reliable. The failure rate of a transformer is 
LP1 LP2 LP3 LP4 LP5 LP6 
LP8 LP9 
LP7 
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 
D1 D2 D3 D5 D7 
D8 D9 
D4 D6 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
S5 S6 
N/O 
LP10 LP11 LP12 LP13 LP14 LP15 
T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 
D10 D11 D13 D15 D12 D14 
S7 S8 S9 S10 
LP16 LP17 LP18 LP19 LP20 LP22 
T16 T17 T18 T19 T20 T21 T22 
D16 D17 D18 D20 D22 D19 D21 
S11 S12 S13 S14 
N/O 
LP21 
Supply 
 
11 kV 
F4 
F1 
F3 
F2 
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considered to be unaffected by the weather conditions. A faulted transformer is replaced 
by a mobile transformer rather than repairing it. 
 
Table 6.1 Feeder section and lateral distributor lengths 
Length Feeder sections Lateral distributors 
0.60 km S4, S6, S9, S14 D1, D4, D10, D15, D17, D18 
0.75 km S1, S2, S3, S5, S7, S10, S12, S13 D6, D11, D13, D16, D21 
0.80 km S8, S11 D2, D3, D5, D7, D8, D9, 
D12,D14, D19, D20, D22 
 
 
Table 6.2 Load point data 
Load point Average load (MW) 
Peak load 
(MW) 
Number of 
customers Customer type 
1, 2, 3, 10, 11 0.535 0.8668 210 Residential 
12, 17, 18, 19 0.450 0.7291 200 Residential 
8 1.000 1.6279 1 Small user 
9 1.150 1.8721 1 Small user 
4,  5, 13, 14, 20, 21 0.566 0.9167 1 Institutional 
6, 7, 15, 16, 22 0.454 0.7500 10 Commercial 
 
 
Table 6.3 Feeder data 
Feeder Load points Average load (MW) 
Peak load 
(MW) 
Number of 
customers 
F1 1−7 3.645 5.934 652 
F2 8−9 2.150 3.500 2 
F3 10−15 3.106 5.057 632 
F4 16−22 3.390 5.509 622 
Total 22 12.291 20.00 1908 
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6.2.1  Conventional approach 
 
Failure events at the specified load point can be identified by a visual inspection of the 
system topology. A faulted distributor is isolated automatically by a 100% reliable fuse; 
therefore, the fault on any distributor does not interrupt other loads on the same feeder. 
A load point on a feeder experiences an outage due to failure of the transformer on the 
load point, the distributor and any segment of the feeder. The approximate equation 
method [17] is used to calculate the primary indices. The fundamental reliability indices 
of load point k are given by Equation 6.1.  For load points 8 and 9, the parameters Tλ  
and Tr are not applicable. The outage duration depends on the applicable restoration 
process. The value of Sir is 5 hours when it is necessary to repair the faulted line element 
to restore the service and 1 hour if the supply can be simply restored by switching 
action. 
   ∑++= SiDkTk λλλλ           (6.1a) 
∑++= SiSiDkDkTTk rrrU λλλ          (6.1b)  
kkk UR λ=         (6.1c) 
where, Tλ  =  average failure rate of a transformer  
Dkλ =  average failure rate of distributor k 
 Siλ =  average failure rate of feeder section i  
  Tr =  average repair time of a transformer 
Dkr =  average repair time of distributor k 
 Sir =  average repair time of feeder section i  
 
The load point indices ( )kk U,λ  computed using Equation 6.1 are used to obtain the 
feeder or system indices (SAIFI, SAIDI) given by Equation 6.2.  
NNSAIFI lp
k kk∑ == 1λ      (6.2a)   
NNUSAIDI lp
k kk∑ == 1      (6.2b)   
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where, lp denotes the number of load points connected to the feeder/system and Nk is the 
number of customers at load point k, and N is the total number of customers in the 
system. 
 
The load point indices of average failure rate, average annual outage time 
(unavailability) and average outage duration obtained without considering weather 
conditions using Equation 6.1 are shown in Table 6.4.  
 
Table 6.4 Load point indices for conventional approach 
Load point Failure rate (failures/year) 
Unavailability 
(hours/year) 
Outage duration 
(hours) 
1 0.239 0.73 3.03 
2 0.252 0.79 3.13 
3 0.252 0.79 3.13 
4 0.239 0.73 3.03 
5 0.252 0.79 3.13 
6 0.249 0.77 3.11 
7 0.252 0.75 2.98 
8 0.140 0.54 3.88 
9 0.140 0.50 3.60 
10 0.243 0.73 3.00 
11 0.252 0.79 3.13 
12 0.256 0.81 3.16 
13 0.252 0.74 2.93 
14 0.256 0.75 2.95 
15 0.243 0.73 3.00 
16 0.252 0.79 3.13 
17 0.242 0.74 3.06 
18 0.242 0.73 3.00 
19 0.256 0.79 3.11 
20 0.256 0.79 3.11 
21 0.252 0.74 2.93 
22 0.256 0.75 2.95 
 
 
 
The primary indices for the different load points given in Table 6.4 differ marginally 
from each other. A significant difference can be seen in the case of load points 8 and 9. 
These load points are inherently more reliable as Feeder 2 is a relatively short feeder and 
the transformers are not included. 
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The indices, SAIFI and SAIDI, can be determined for different levels in the system. A 
single feeder or the combination of feeders can be considered. The load points 
connected to the common feeder are aggregated to determine the system indices at the 
feeder level. The indices for the four feeders are denoted by F1-F4. The evaluation of 
indices for the whole system considers all 22 load points and is designated as SYSTEM 
in Table 6.5 and in the subsequent analyses. The system indices for the feeders and the 
whole system are given in Table 6.5.  
 
Table 6.5 SAIFI and SAIDI for conventional method 
Feeder SAIFI  SAIDI  
F1 0.248 0.770 
F2 0.140 0.540 
F3 0.250 0.770 
F4 0.247 0.760 
SYSTEM 0.248 0.770 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 6.5 that Feeder 2 has better indices. It should be noted that the 
indices for the entire system cannot be obtained by simply summing the indices of the 
four feeders. Table 6.5 shows that the overall system indices are dominated by the less 
reliable feeders.  
 
 
 
6.2.2  Weather considerations 
 
The following studies incorporate the effects of weather on the component failure rates 
and repair times. The process used to determine the component failure rates in various 
weather conditions is the same as that illustrated in Chapter 3. In this process, the 
weather steady state probabilities are first evaluated and the failure rate in each 
individual weather state is calculated by allocating a portion of the total line failures to 
each weather state. The average annual failure rate and weather related failure rates are 
related to each other. For convenience, Equation 3.1 from Chapter 3 is shown as 
Equation 6.3.  
  
m
m
a
a
n
navg PPP λλλλ ++=       (6.3) 
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The nP , aP , mP  are the steady state probabilities of normal, adverse and major adverse 
weather, respectively, and nλ , aλ , mλ are the failure rates in normal, adverse and major 
adverse weather expressed in failures per year of the respective weather state. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, these failure rates can be deduced using Equation 3.2 by 
assigning the percentage of failures occurring in bad weather )( bF , and the portion of 
bad weather failures that occur in major adverse weather )( mF . 
 
Using the line failure rates and repair times for normal weather, the load point indices of 
failure rate, average outage duration and unavailability in the normal weather condition 
can be obtained. The fundamental reliability indices of load point k in normal weather 
are given by Equation 6.4. 
    ∑++= nSinDkTnk λλλλ         (6.4a)   
∑++= nSinSinDknDknTTnk rrrU λλλ          (6.4b)   
n
k
n
k
n
k UR λ=         (6.4c)   
 
The indices for the feeders and for the entire system in the normal weather condition, i.e. 
nSAIFI and nSAIDI , can be evaluated using the load point indices given in Equation 6.5. 
NNSAIFI lp
k k
n
k
n ∑
=
=
1
λ      (6.5a)   
NNUSAIDI lp
k k
n
k
n ∑
=
=
1
     (6.5b)   
 
The line failure rates and repair times in adverse weather can be used to find the load 
point indices in the adverse weather state. The load point indices obtained in adverse 
weather subsequently provide the feeder and system indices. The indices corresponding 
to major adverse weather can be determined in a similar manner. 
 
The equations for the calculation of adverse and major adverse weather related indices 
are shown in Equations 6.6-6.9. 
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Adverse weather: 
∑++= aSiaDkTak λλλλ           (6.6a) 
∑++= aSiaSiaDkaDkaTTak rrrU λλλ           (6.6b) 
a
k
a
k
a
k UR λ=        (6.6c) 
NNSAIFI lp
k k
a
k
a ∑
=
=
1
λ      (6.7a) 
NNUSAIDI lp
k k
a
k
a ∑
=
=
1
     (6.7b) 
 
Major adverse weather: 
 
∑++= mSimDkTmk λλλλ          (6.8a) 
∑++= mSimSimDkmDkmTTmk rrrU λλλ           (6.8b) 
m
k
m
k
m
k UR λ=        (6.8c) 
NNSAIFI lp
k k
m
k
m ∑
=
=
1
λ      (6.9a) 
NNUSAIDI lp
k k
m
k
m ∑
=
=
1
     (6.9b) 
 
The load point and feeder/system indices in the different weather conditions obtained 
using Equations 6.4-6.9 are not actual values. These indices can, however, be weighted 
by the respective weather probability and summed to obtain the expected values. 
 
The expected indices of the kth load point are given by Equation 6.10. 
 
 
m
km
a
ka
n
knk PPP λλλλ ++=      (6.10a) 
 
m
km
a
ka
n
knk UPUPUPU ++=       (6.10b) 
 kkk UR λ=        (6.10c) 
 
The expected values of SAIFI and SAIDI considering the weather effects are obtained 
using Equation 6.11. 
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m
m
a
a
n
nW SAIFIPSAIFIPSAIFIPSAIFI ++=    (6.11a) 
m
m
a
a
n
nW SAIDIPSAIDIPSAIDIPSAIDI ++=    (6.11b) 
 
In order to illustrate the procedure described above, consider the line and transformer 
data shown in Table 6.6 and Feeder 2 of the system shown in Figure 6.1. The analysis 
assumes that the unavailability of the breakers and fuses is negligible.  
 
Table 6.6 Basic reliability data 
Average restoration time (hours) 
Circuit 
element 
Failure rate 
(failures/year) Normal 
weather 
Adverse 
weather 
Extreme 
weather 
Line 0.065 per km 5 10 100 
Transformer 0.015 10 20 100 
 
The repair times for failures that occur in adverse and extreme weather are extended in 
Table 6.6. Difficulties due to adverse weather can delay component repair or 
replacement activities and extreme weather can create considerable damage and require 
a long time to restore service. 
 
The resulting steady state weather probabilities using the three state weather model and 
weather statistics shown in Section 3.2 are given below. The average durations of 
normal, adverse and major adverse weather are approximately 200 hours, 2 hours and 1 
hour, respectively, and major adverse weather occurs once per year.  
=nP 0.989875  =aP 0.010011  =mP 0.000114 
The line failure rates under the various weather conditions can be illustrated using 
distributor D8, which is 0.8km long. The average failure rate for this line is 0.052 f/yr. 
Assume that 40% of the line failures occur in bad weather and 40% of the bad weather 
failures occur in major adverse weather. In this case, the failure rates under the various 
weather conditions are as follows: 
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nλ = 0.032 f/yr of normal weather  
 
aλ = 1.247 f/yr of adverse weather 
mλ = 72.98 f/yr of major adverse weather 
 
The unweighted load point indices for Feeder 2 in the three different weather states are 
shown in Table 6.7 for the purpose of illustration. The unadjusted system indices for 
Feeder 2 are shown in Table 6.8. These results represent the intermediate stage of the 
calculation procedure. 
 
         Table 6.7 Unadjusted load point indices in the three different weather conditions 
Load point 8 Load point 9 
Load point index Normal 
weather 
Adverse 
weather 
Extreme 
weather 
Normal 
weather 
Adverse 
weather  
Extreme 
weather 
Failure rate 0.085 3.350 195.89 0.085 3.350 195.89 
Unavailability 0.330 25.09 14177.4 0.310 22.99 12824.4 
Outage duration 3.88 7.49 72.37 3.60 6.86 65.47 
 
 
Table 6.8 Unadjusted system indices for Feeder 2 in the three weather conditions 
Index Normal weather Adverse weather Extreme weather 
SAIFI 0.085 3.35 195.89 
SAIDI 0.330 25.09 14177.4 
 
 
In order to obtain the actual reliability indices, the results shown in Tables 6.7-6.8 are 
weighted by the appropriate weather probabilities using Equation 6.10 and Equation 
6.11. The resulting load point indices are shown in Table 6.9 and the system indices are 
shown in Table 6.10. Table 6.10 also shows the individual weather state contributions to 
the total system indices. 
 
Table 6.9 Load point indices for Feeder 2 
Load 
point 
Failure rate 
(failure/year)  
Unavailability 
(hours/yr) 
Average outage 
duration (hours) 
8 0.140 2.194 15.671 
9 0.140 1.999 14.278 
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Table 6.10 System indices for Feeder 2 
Index Normal 
weather 
Adverse 
weather 
Extreme 
weather 
Expected value 
Sum(C2:C4*) 
SAIFI 0.084 0.034 0.022 0.140 
SAIDI 0.327 0.251 0.811 1.389 
*C2, C4 – Column 2, Column 4 
 
As expected, the load point failure rate and the SAIFI shown in Tables 6.9-6.10 are the 
initial values shown in Tables 6.4-6.5 calculated using the conventional approach. The 
unavailability and SAIDI differ from the values obtained using the conventional method 
because of the changes in the restoration time for failures in the various weather states. 
 
The analysis can be extended to examine a larger system. The next section presents a 
series of case studies for the test distribution system. 
 
 
 
6.3  Case studies 
 
The following analyses examine the distribution system shown in Figure 6.1 in order to 
illustrate the influence of weather conditions on the basic reliability indices and on the 
system indices of SAIFI and SAIDI. The alternative supply available through a normally 
open point is assumed to be 100% reliable and the switching time is 1.0 hour regardless 
of the weather condition.  
 
The cases considered involve different combinations of the percentages of failures 
occurring in bad weather and in major adverse weather and are designated as Case I-
Case IV as follows: 
 
 Case I: 40% of line failures in bad weather and 10% of bad weather 
failures in extreme weather, i.e. bF = 40% and mF = 10% 
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 Case II: 40% of line failures in bad weather and 40% of bad weather 
failures in extreme weather, i.e. bF = 40% and mF = 40% 
 Case III: 80% of line failures in bad weather and 10% of bad weather 
failures in extreme weather, i.e. bF = 80% and mF = 10% 
 Case IV: 80% of line failures in bad weather and 40% of bad weather 
failures in extreme weather, i.e. bF = 80% and mF = 40% 
 
Table 6.11 shows the load point indices for Case I obtained using Equation 6.11. It can 
be seen from Table 6.11 that the average load point failure rates are equal to those 
shown in Table 6.4 obtained using the conventional approach. Unlike the failure rates, 
the unavailabilities and the average outage durations increase significantly when 
weather is included in the calculation.  
 
 
Table 6.11 Load point indices considering weather effects, Case I 
Load point Failure rate (failures/year) 
Unavailability 
(hours/year) 
Outage duration 
(hours) 
1 0.239 1.219 5.095 
2 0.252 1.358 5.378 
3 0.252 1.358 5.378 
4 0.239 1.219 5.095 
5 0.252 1.358 5.378 
6 0.249 1.323 5.310 
7 0.252 1.258 4.982 
8 0.140 1.107 7.908 
9 0.140 1.018 7.266 
10 0.243 1.220 5.031 
11 0.252 1.358 5.378 
12 0.256 1.392 5.444 
13 0.252 1.234 4.889 
14 0.256 1.269 4.962 
15 0.243 1.220 5.031 
16 0.252 1.358 5.378 
17 0.243 1.254 5.168 
18 0.243 1.220 5.031 
19 0.256 1.359 5.314 
20 0.256 1.359 5.314 
21 0.252 1.234 4.889 
22 0.256 1.269 4.962 
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The load point unavailabilities for all the cases are collectively shown in Table 6.12. 
Table 6.13 presents the load point average outage durations for the cases considered. 
Figures 6.2-6.3 further illustrate these indices. It is clear from Figure 6.2 that the load 
point unavailabilities increase significantly when going from Case I to Case II. The 
difference is even larger when going from Case III to Case IV. The unavailability for 
Case III is smaller than that for Case II because the percentage of bad weather failures 
assigned to major adverse weather is smaller in Case III than in Case II. The failures that 
occur in extreme weather drive these changes. The variations in the load point average 
outage durations for the various cases are shown in Figure 6.3.  
 
 
Table 6.12 Load point unavailabilities for Cases I-IV 
Load 
point Conventional Case I Case II Case III Case IV 
1 0.725 1.219 2.166 1.713 3.605 
2 0.790 1.358 2.444 1.920 4.093 
3 0.790 1.358 2.444 1.920 4.093 
4 0.725 1.219 2.166 1.713 3.605 
5 0.790 1.358 2.444 1.920 4.093 
6 0.774 1.323 2.374 1.871 3.974 
7 0.751 1.258 2.239 1.770 3.733 
8 0.543 1.107 2.194 1.671 3.844 
9 0.504 1.018 1.999 1.520 3.483 
10 0.729 1.220 2.167 1.715 3.608 
11 0.790 1.358 2.444 1.920 4.093 
12 0.806 1.392 2.514 1.969 4.213 
13 0.738 1.234 2.181 1.723 3.616 
14 0.755 1.269 2.250 1.772 3.735 
15 0.729 1.220 2.167 1.715 3.608 
16 0.790 1.358 2.444 1.920 4.093 
17 0.742 1.254 2.235 1.762 3.725 
18 0.729 1.220 2.167 1.715 3.608 
19 0.794 1.359 2.445 1.923 4.096 
20 0.794 1.359 2.445 1.923 4.096 
21 0.738 1.234 2.181 1.723 3.616 
22 0.755 1.269 2.250 1.772 3.735 
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Table 6.13 Load point average outage durations for Cases I-IV 
Load 
point Conventional Case I Case II Case III Case IV 
1 3.031 5.095 9.050 7.168 15.094 
2 3.133 5.378 9.684 7.610 16.228 
3 3.133 5.378 9.684 7.610 16.228 
4 3.031 5.095 9.050 7.168 15.094 
5 3.133 5.378 9.684 7.610 16.228 
6 3.108 5.310 9.532 7.521 15.982 
7 2.978 4.982 8.871 7.015 14.799 
8 3.884 7.908 15.671 11.975 27.560 
9 3.605 7.266 14.278 10.898 24.975 
10 3.004 5.031 8.933 7.072 14.882 
11 3.133 5.378 9.684 7.610 16.228 
12 3.157 5.444 9.832 7.696 16.467 
13 2.927 4.889 8.640 6.829 14.335 
14 2.953 4.962 8.801 6.926 14.601 
15 3.004 5.031 8.933 7.072 14.882 
16 3.133 5.378 9.684 7.610 16.228 
17 3.058 5.168 9.215 7.265 15.364 
18 3.004 5.031 8.933 7.072 14.882 
19 3.106 5.314 9.564 7.513 16.010 
20 3.106 5.314 9.564 7.513 16.010 
21 2.927 4.889 8.640 6.829 14.335 
22 2.953 4.962 8.801 6.926 14.601 
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Figure 6.2  Load point unavailabilities for Cases I-IV 
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Figure 6.3  Load point average outage durations for Cases I-IV 
 
The segmented SAIFI and SAIDI and the total values (SAIFIw and SAIDIw) are shown 
in Tables 6.14-6.21. The last columns are evaluated using Equation 6.11. Tables 6.14-
6.15 present the system SAIFI and SAIDI for Case I. The results for Case II are shown 
in Tables 6.16-6.17. Tables 6.18-6.19 apply to Case III.  Tables 6.20-6.21 show the 
results for Case IV. 
 
The study shows that the expected SAIFI, i.e SAIFIw, obtained from weather related 
failures and the SAIFI from a conventional calculation are the same. A large 
contribution to the expected SAIFI, however, comes from bad weather situations. The 
SAIFI in normal weather in Cases I and II are the same because the portion of failures in 
normal weather is constant. The contribution of adverse weather decreases and that of 
major adverse weather increases when going from Case I to Case II. The SAIFI in 
extreme weather is even higher in Case III and Case IV. 
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The expected SAIDI, i.e. SAIDIw, however, is largely influenced by the bad weather 
conditions. Table 6.15 shows that the SAIDI incorporating weather effects differs 
significantly from that obtained using the conventional method shown in Table 6.5 and 
that the pronounced effect is dictated by the adverse and major adverse weather. The 
results shown in Tables 6.14-6.21 indicate that the extreme weather contribution to the 
system indices increases significantly as more failures are assigned to extreme weather. 
                 
 
Table 6.14 SAIFI, Case I, ( bF = 40% and mF = 10%) 
Feeder nn SAIFIP ×  
a
a SAIFIP ×  
m
m SAIFIP ×  WSAIFI  
F1 0.154 0.084 0.009 0.248 
F2 0.084 0.050 0.006 0.140 
F3 0.155 0.085 0.009 0.250 
F4 0.154 0.084 0.009 0.247 
SYSTEM 0.154 0.084 0.009 0.248 
 
 
 
Table 6.15 SAIDI, Case I, ( bF = 40% and mF = 10%) 
Feeder nn SAIDIP ×
 
a
a SAIDIP ×
 
m
m SAIDIP ×
 
WSAIDI
 
F1 0.515 0.399 0.391 1.305 
F2 0.327 0.377 0.405 1.108 
F3 0.525 0.403 0.395 1.322 
F4 0.515 0.389 0.379 1.282 
SYSTEM 0.515 0.397 0.388 1.300 
 
        
 
 
Table 6.16 SAIFI, Case II, ( bF = 40% and mF = 40%) 
Feeder nn SAIFIP ×
 
a
a SAIFIP ×
 
m
m SAIFIP ×
 
WSAIFI
 
F1 0.154 0.056 0.037 0.248 
F2 0.084 0.034 0.022 0.140 
F3 0.155 0.057 0.038 0.250 
F4 0.154 0.056 0.037 0.247 
SYSTEM 0.154 0.056 0.037 0.248 
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Table 6.17 SAIDI, Case II, ( bF = 40% and mF = 40%) 
Feeder nn SAIDIP ×
 
a
a SAIDIP ×
 
m
m SAIDIP ×
 
WSAIDI
 
F1 0.515 0.267 1.564 2.345 
F2 0.327 0.251 1.618 2.196 
F3 0.525 0.269 1.578 2.372 
F4 0.515 0.260 1.514 2.289 
SYSTEM 0.515 0.265 1.552 2.332 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.18 SAIFI, Case III, ( bF = 80% and mF = 10%) 
Feeder nn SAIFIP ×
 
a
a SAIFIP ×
 
m
m SAIFIP ×
 
WSAIFI
 
F1 0.061 0.168 0.019 0.248 
F2 0.028 0.101 0.011 0.140 
F3 0.061 0.169 0.019 0.249 
F4 0.061 0.167 0.019 0.247 
SYSTEM 0.061 0.168 0.019 0.248 
          
      
 
 
Table 6.19 SAIDI, Case III, ( bF = 80% and mF = 10%) 
Feeder nn SAIDIP ×
 
a
a SAIDIP ×
 
m
m SAIDIP ×
 
WSAIDI
 
F1 0.267 0.795 0.782 1.844 
F2 0.109 0.753 0.809 1.671 
F3 0.277 0.802 0.789 1.868 
F4 0.267 0.774 0.757 1.799 
SYSTEM 0.267 0.791 0.776 1.834 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.20 SAIFI, Case IV, ( bF = 80% and mF = 40%) 
Feeder nn SAIFIP ×
 
a
a SAIFIP ×
 
m
m SAIFIP ×
 
WSAIFI
 
F1 0.061 0.112 0.075 0.248 
F2 0.028 0.067 0.045 0.140 
F3 0.061 0.113 0.075 0.249 
F4 0.061 0.112 0.074 0.247 
SYSTEM 0.061 0.112 0.075 0.248 
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Table 6.21 SAIDI, Case IV, ( bF = 80% and mF = 40%) 
Feeder nn SAIDIP ×
 
a
a SAIDIP ×
 
m
m SAIDIP ×
 
WSAIDI
 
F1 0.267 0.531 3.127 3.925 
F2 0.109 0.502 3.236 3.848 
F3 0.277 0.536 3.155 3.968 
F4 0.267 0.517 3.029 3.813 
SYSTEM 0.267 0.528 3.104 3.900 
 
 
6.4  The effect of restoration time  
 
Major storms can cause lengthy customer interruptions, resulting in huge monetary 
losses. The EEI’s survey on Utility Storm Restoration Response [6] found that the 
average time required to restore service after a major storm strikes the system is 5.6 
days. This statistic is based on the survey results of 44 responses from six participating 
utilities over a period of 14 years. Outage durations increase considerably when more 
damage occurs due to exceeding the system design level. A system with a low design 
level suffers more damage than a system that can tolerate more severe stress when 
exposed to the same storm. In order to examine the effects, the repair time is reduced 
from the 100 hours considered in the previous section to 50 hours following system 
failures due to storms.  
 
Table 6.22 and Table 6.23 show the load point unavailabilities and average outage 
durations respectively for the four cases studied. The load point failure rates are found to 
be the same as for the repair time of 100 hours.  
      
The variation in unavailabilities for the different percentages of failures occurring in bad 
weather and major adverse weather is shown in Figure 6.4. This figure can be compared 
with Figure 6.2. The quantitative differences between the various cases in Figure 6.2 and 
in Figure 6.4 are similar. It is important to note that the unavailability values in Figure 
6.4 are considerably smaller. The load point average outage durations are illustrated in 
Figure 6.5. 
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Table 6.22 Load point unavailabilities for restoration time = 50 hours (hours/year) 
Load 
point Conventional Case I Case II Case III Case IV 
1 0.725 1.044 1.464 1.362 2.203 
2 0.790 1.156 1.639 1.517 2.483 
3 0.790 1.156 1.639 1.517 2.483 
4 0.725 1.044 1.464 1.362 2.203 
5 0.790 1.156 1.639 1.517 2.483 
6 0.774 1.128 1.595 1.481 2.416 
7 0.751 1.076 1.512 1.406 2.278 
8 0.543 0.906 1.389 1.268 2.234 
9 0.504 0.836 1.272 1.157 2.029 
10 0.729 1.045 1.466 1.364 2.206 
11 0.790 1.156 1.639 1.517 2.483 
12 0.806 1.184 1.683 1.554 2.551 
13 0.738 1.059 1.479 1.372 2.213 
14 0.755 1.087 1.523 1.409 2.281 
15 0.729 1.045 1.466 1.364 2.206 
16 0.790 1.156 1.639 1.517 2.483 
17 0.742 1.072 1.508 1.398 2.271 
18 0.729 1.045 1.466 1.364 2.206 
19 0.794 1.158 1.640 1.520 2.486 
20 0.794 1.158 1.640 1.520 2.486 
21 0.738 1.059 1.479 1.372 2.213 
22 0.755 1.087 1.523 1.409 2.281 
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Figure 6.4  Load point unavailabilities for restoration time = 50 hours 
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Table 6.23 Load point average outage durations for restoration time = 50 hours (hours) 
Load 
point Conventional Case I Case II Case III Case IV 
1 3.031 4.362 6.120 5.700 9.223 
2 3.133 4.580 6.494 6.014 9.844 
3 3.133 4.580 6.494 6.014 9.844 
4 3.031 4.362 6.120 5.700 9.223 
5 3.133 4.580 6.494 6.014 9.844 
6 3.108 4.528 6.404 5.955 9.715 
7 2.978 4.262 5.990 5.573 9.033 
8 3.884 6.471 9.921 9.090 16.016 
9 3.605 5.968 9.084 8.292 14.548 
10 3.004 4.308 6.042 5.626 9.097 
11 3.133 4.580 6.494 6.014 9.844 
12 3.157 4.631 6.581 6.072 9.970 
13 2.927 4.195 5.861 5.439 8.775 
14 2.953 4.251 5.957 5.505 8.916 
15 3.004 4.308 6.042 5.626 9.097 
16 3.133 4.580 6.494 6.014 9.844 
17 3.058 4.418 6.217 5.766 9.365 
18 3.004 4.308 6.042 5.626 9.097 
19 3.106 4.527 6.415 5.940 9.716 
20 3.106 4.527 6.415 5.940 9.716 
21 2.927 4.195 5.861 5.439 8.775 
22 2.953 4.251 5.957 5.505 8.916 
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Figure 6.5  Load point average outage durations for restoration time = 50 hours 
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The average outage durations shown in Figure 6.3 where the repair time is 100 hours 
and those in Figure 6.5 where the repair time is 50 hours can be compared. The 
variations in the average outage durations are similar and the effect of a fast repair 
strategy can be seen. 
 
The SAIFI contributions for three different weather classes and the total SAIFI under 
the conditions that 40% of the total line failures occur in bad weather and 10% of the 
bad weather failures are attributed to major adverse weather are given in Table 6.24. The 
SAIDI for this case is given in Table 6.25. The results for the rest of the case studies are 
shown in Tables 6.26-6.31.  
 
Table 6.24 SAIFI, Case I, ( bF = 40% and mF = 10%) 
Feeder nn SAIFIP ×  
a
a SAIFIP ×  
m
m SAIFIP ×  WSAIFI  
F1 0.154 0.084 0.009 0.248 
F2 0.084 0.050 0.006 0.140 
F3 0.155 0.085 0.009 0.250 
F4 0.154 0.084 0.009 0.247 
SYSTEM 0.154 0.084 0.009 0.248 
       
Table 6.25 SAIDI, Case I, ( bF = 40% and mF = 10%) 
Feeder nn SAIDIP ×
 
a
a SAIDIP ×
 
m
m SAIDIP ×
 
WSAIDI
 
F1 0.515 0.399 0.198 1.112 
F2 0.327 0.377 0.203 0.906 
F3 0.525 0.403 0.200 1.127 
F4 0.515 0.389 0.192 1.095 
SYSTEM 0.515 0.397 0.197 1.108 
 
       
Table 6.26 SAIFI, Case II, ( bF = 40% and mF = 40%) 
Feeder nn SAIFIP ×
 
a
a SAIFIP ×
 
m
m SAIFIP ×
 
WSAIFI
 
F1 0.154 0.056 0.037 0.248 
F2 0.084 0.034 0.022 0.140 
F3 0.155 0.057 0.038 0.249 
F4 0.154 0.056 0.037 0.247 
SYSTEM 0.154 0.056 0.037 0.248 
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Table 6.27 SAIDI, Case II, ( bF = 40% and mF = 40%) 
Feeder nn SAIDIP ×
 
a
a SAIDIP ×
 
m
m SAIDIP ×
 
WSAIDI
 
F1 0.515 0.267 0.792 1.573 
F2 0.327 0.251 0.811 1.389 
F3 0.525 0.269 0.799 1.593 
F4 0.515 0.260 0.767 1.542 
SYSTEM 0.515 0.265 0.786 1.566 
 
 
 
Table 6.28 SAIFI, Case III, ( bF = 80% and mF = 10%) 
Feeder nn SAIFIP ×
 
a
a SAIFIP ×
 
m
m SAIFIP ×
 
WSAIFI
 
F1 0.061 0.168 0.019 0.248 
F2 0.028 0.101 0.011 0.140 
F3 0.061 0.169 0.019 0.249 
F4 0.061 0.167 0.019 0.247 
SYSTEM 0.061 0.168 0.019 0.248 
          
 
      
Table 6.29 SAIDI, Case III, ( bF = 80% and mF = 10%) 
Feeder nn SAIDIP ×
 
a
a SAIDIP ×
 
m
m SAIDIP ×
 
WSAIDI
 
F1 0.267 0.795 0.396 1.458 
F2 0.109 0.754 0.406 1.268 
F3 0.277 0.802 0.399 1.479 
F4 0.267 0.774 0.384 1.425 
SYSTEM 0.267 0.791 0.393 1.451 
 
                  
 
Table 6.30 SAIFI, Case IV, ( bF = 80% and mF = 40%) 
Feeder nn SAIFIP ×
 
a
a SAIFIP ×
 
m
m SAIFIP ×
 
WSAIFI
 
F1 0.061 0.112 0.074 0.248 
F2 0.028 0.067 0.045 0.139 
F3 0.061 0.113 0.075 0.249 
F4 0.061 0.112 0.074 0.247 
SYSTEM 0.061 0.112 0.075 0.248 
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Table 6.31 SAIDI, Case IV, ( bF = 80% and mF = 40%) 
Feeder nn SAIDIP ×
 
a
a SAIDIP ×
 
m
m SAIDIP ×
 
WSAIDI
 
F1 0.267 0.531 1.583 2.382 
F2 0.109 0.502 1.622 2.234 
F3 0.277 0.536 1.598 2.411 
F4 0.267 0.517 1.535 2.319 
SYSTEM 0.267 0.528 1.572 2.368 
 
 
The SAIFI values calculated in this section compare with those of the preceding section, 
regardless of the variation in repair time. The case-to-case comparisons show that the 
variation in the percentage of failures assigned to bad weather or major adverse weather 
does not have any influence on the total SAIFI. 
 
The ability to conduct repairs in a short period when failures occur in extreme weather 
has a very positive effect on SAIDI. The contributions due to extreme weather failures 
decrease proportionately as the repair time is reduced. This reduction is more 
pronounced when a large percentage of failures occur in major adverse weather than 
when the percentage of failures in this weather is small. In the former case, the major 
adverse weather contribution dominates the total effect while in the latter case the 
contribution of major adverse weather is relatively close to that of adverse weather.  
 
 
 
6.5  Extreme weather severity analysis 
 
The occurrence of major storms can vary from region to region and from year to year. 
Weather scientists claim that extreme weather conditions are becoming more frequent 
and severe. This section considers the impact of increases in the frequency of major 
adverse or extreme weather. It is assumed that the number of major storms varies from 
one event per year to three events per year. The case of a major adverse weather event 
occurring once a year was illustrated in the previous section. The following analysis is 
performed under the conditions that the major adverse weather occurs two and three 
times per year.  
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The line failure rates under the various weather conditions are held constant for the 
different frequencies of encountering major adverse weather. As an example, for a total 
average failure rate of 1.0 f/yr, the weather related failure rates for 40% of the line 
failures occurring in bad weather and 10% of the bad weather failures occurring in 
major adverse weather are as follows. 
 
 
nλ = 0.606 failures per year of normal weather  
aλ = 35.96 failures per year of adverse weather  
mλ
 = 350.88 failures per year of major adverse weather 
 
The steady state probabilities of normal, adverse and major adverse weather are 
0.989875, 0.010011 and 0.000114 respectively for major adverse weather occurring 
once a year. These probabilities change when the frequency of major adverse weather 
changes. The steady state probabilities of the three weather states are determined using 
the state space diagram shown in Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 and the following weather 
transition rates: 
 
ma = 8760mf  occ/hr   mn = 8760mf  occ/hr 
ma nn −= 54.195/1 occ/hr  mn aa −= 2/1  occ/hr 
m a = 21  occ/hr       m n = 1/2 occ/hr 
The parameter mf  is the frequency of occurrence of major adverse weather. The normal 
weather average duration using the transition rates shown in Section 3.2 is 195.54 hours. 
 
The resulting steady state probabilities for major adverse weather occurring two times 
per year are Pn = 0.989871, Pa = 0.009901 and Pm = 0.000228 and for three times per 
year are Pn = 0.989869, Pa = 0.009789 and Pm = 0.000342. 
 
The two cases, designated as Case (a) and Case (b), are examined to investigate the 
impact of the variation in the frequency of extreme weather occurrence. 
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Case (a): 40% of failures occur in bad weather and 10% of bad weather failures in 
extreme weather 
 
The load point indices are shown in Tables D.1-D.3 in Appendix D. The system indices 
SAIFI and SAIDI are presented in Tables 6.24-6.35.  
 
• Major adverse weather occurring two times per year 
 
Table 6.32 SAIFI, Case (a), ( bF = 40% and mF = 10%), mf = 2 
Feeder nn SAIFIP ×
 
a
a SAIFIP ×
 
m
m SAIFIP ×
 
WSAIFI
 
F1 0.154 0.083 0.019 0.256 
F2 0.084 0.050 0.011 0.145 
F3 0.155 0.084 0.019 0.258 
F4 0.154 0.083 0.019 0.256 
SYSTEM 0.154 0.083 0.019 0.256 
  
 
Table 6.33 SAIDI, Case (a), ( bF = 40% and mF = 10%), mf = 2 
Feeder nn SAIDIP ×
 
a
a SAIDIP ×
 
m
m SAIDIP ×
 
WSAIDI
 
F1 0.515 0.395 0.781 1.690 
F2 0.327 0.373 0.808 1.507 
F3 0.525 0.398 0.788 1.711 
F4 0.515 0.384 0.757 1.656 
SYSTEM 0.515 0.392 0.775 1.683 
 
 
• Major adverse weather occurring three times per year 
 
Table 6.34 SAIFI, Case (a), ( bF = 40% and mF = 10%), mf = 3 
Feeder nn SAIFIP ×
 
a
a SAIFIP ×
 
m
m SAIFIP ×
 
WSAIFI
 
F1 0.154 0.082 0.028 0.265 
F2 0.084 0.049 0.017 0.150 
F3 0.155 0.083 0.028 0.266 
F4 0.154 0.082 0.028 0.264 
SYSTEM 0.154 0.082 0.028 0.265 
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Table 6.35 SAIDI, Case (a), ( bF = 40% and mF = 10%), mf = 3 
Feeder nn SAIDIP ×
 
a
a SAIDIP ×
 
m
m SAIDIP ×
 
WSAIDI
 
F1 0.515 0.390 1.172 2.076 
F2 0.327 0.368 1.212 1.907 
F3 0.525 0.394 1.182 2.100 
F4 0.515 0.380 1.135 2.030 
SYSTEM 0.515 0.388 1.163 2.066 
 
 
It can be seen from Tables 6.32-6.35 that both the SAIFI and SAIDI increase when 
extreme weather hits the system more frequently and that the increase is basically due to 
the increase in the index segment associated with extreme weather. 
 
The effect on the failure rate is illustrated in Figure 6.6. The label ‘Fr’ represents the 
frequency of extreme weather occurrence. 
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Figure 6.6  Load point failure rates, Case (a) 
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Case (b): 80% of failures occur in bad weather and 40% of bad weather failures in 
extreme weather 
 
Tables D.1-D.3 in Appendix D show the load point indices in Case (b). The system 
indices SAIFI and SAIDI are shown in Table 6.36-6.39. The system indices increase 
more in Case (b) than in Case (a) when the frequency increases. This relatively large 
increase arises due to the fact that the contribution of extreme weather increases 
considerably when more failures occur during extreme weather.  
 
The failure rate is shown graphically in Figure 6.7. This figure, when compared with 
Figure 6.5, clearly illustrates that the increase in failure rate with the frequency of 
extreme weather in Case (b) is larger than that in Case (a).  
 
• Major adverse weather occurring two times per year   
      
 
Table 6.36 SAIFI, Case (b), ( bF = 80% and mF = 40%), mf = 2 
Feeder nn SAIFIP ×
 
a
a SAIFIP ×
 
m
m SAIFIP ×
 
WSAIFI
 
F1 0.061 0.111 0.149 0.321 
F2 0.028 0.066 0.089 0.183 
F3 0.061 0.112 0.150 0.323 
F4 0.061 0.110 0.148 0.320 
SYSTEM 0.061 0.111 0.149 0.321 
 
 
Table 6.37 SAIDI, Case (b), ( bF = 80% and mF = 40%), mf = 2 
Feeder nn SAIDIP ×
 
a
a SAIDIP ×
 
m
m SAIDIP ×
 
WSAIDI
 
F1 0.267 0.525 6.246 7.039 
F2 0.109 0.497 6.465 7.071 
F3 0.277 0.530 6.302 7.110 
F4 0.267 0.512 6.050 6.829 
SYSTEM 0.267 0.522 6.201 6.990 
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• Major adverse weather occurring three times per year 
 
Table 6.38 SAIFI, Case (b), ( bF = 80% and mF = 40%), mf = 3 
Feeder nn SAIFIP ×
 
a
a SAIFIP ×
 
m
m SAIFIP ×
 
WSAIFI
 
F1 0.061 0.110 0.223 0.394 
F2 0.028 0.066 0.134 0.227 
F3 0.061 0.110 0.225 0.397 
F4 0.061 0.109 0.223 0.393 
SYSTEM 0.061 0.110 0.224 0.395 
  
 
Table 6.39 SAIDI, Case (b), ( bF = 80% and mF = 40%), mf = 3 
Feeder nn SAIDIP ×  
a
a SAIDIP ×  
m
m SAIDIP ×  WSAIDI  
F1 0.267 0.519 9.369 10.156 
F2 0.109 0.491 9.697 10.297 
F3 0.277 0.524 9.454 10.255 
F4 0.267 0.506 9.075 9.848 
SYSTEM 0.267 0.516 9.301 10.085 
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Figure 6.7  Load point failure rates, Case (b) 
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The load point unavailabilities and average outage durations for both Cases (a) and (b) 
are shown in Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 respectively. 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Load points
Un
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
(hr
s/
yr
)
Fr = 1 Fr = 2 Fr = 3
Fr = 1 Fr = 2 Fr = 3
Case-a:
Case-b:
 
 
Figure 6.8  Load point unavailabilities, Case (a) and Case (b) 
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Figure 6.9  Load point average outage durations, Case (a) and Case (b) 
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It is clear from Figures 6.8-6.9 that the influence on the unavailability and the average 
outage duration as a result of an increasing number of extreme weather events is 
significant. The impact increases further when the percentage of failures in extreme 
weather increases. The unavailabilities and average outage durations in Case (b) 
increase more rapidly than in Case (a) when extreme weather occurs more frequently.  
 
 
 
6.6  Failure bunching analysis of radial feeders 
 
Although many distribution systems are designed and constructed as loop or mesh 
circuits, they are operated as single radial feeders using normally open points. As noted 
earlier, a normally open point basically reduces the amount of component exposed to 
failure. In the event of a system failure, a normally open point can be closed and another 
opened in order to minimize the total disconnected load. Most studies do not consider 
the overlapping failure of two radial feeders based on the reasoning that the likelihood 
of multiple failures is negligible. This may not be the case when a severe storm occurs, 
as a storm can impact two or more radial feeders in the same area. The storm can create 
failure bunching of the radial feeders. Under these conditions, no alternative supply will 
be available and service restoration will involve repair rather than switching actions.  
 
In order to illustrate the failure bunching of two radial feeders, consider the system 
shown in Figure 6.10. The system has been simplified to make the problem amenable by 
avoiding a large possible combination of failure events and therefore there are no 
sectionalizing points on the feeder. The lateral distributors and transformers are not 
included in this analysis. The attention in this study is on failure bunching of multiple 
feeders. In Figure 6.10, when both Feeder 3 and Feeder 4 are on outage, the entire 
system experiences failure. This is a second order failure event and can be considered as 
a second order mincut. The system shown in Figure 6.11 is used to investigate failure 
bunching of three feeders. The basic reliability data for the feeders are shown in Table 
6.40. 
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Figure 6.10  Distribution system with two feeders 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11  Distribution system with three feeders 
 
Table 6.40 Basic feeder reliability data 
Feeder Length (km) Average failure 
rate (f/yr) 
Average repair 
time (hrs) 
F1 2.85 0.18525 5 
F3 2.90 0.18850 5 
F4 2.90 0.18850 5 
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The Markov approach described in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 can be used to determine 
the basic reliability indices of the second order mincut (Figure 6.10) and the third order 
mincut (Figure 6.11), respectively. Repair is conducted only in normal weather. 
 
The overlapping failure of both primary circuits will impact all the load points on Feeder 
3 and Feeder 4 in Figure 3.10. The load point failure rates are therefore equal. The 
SAIFI can be deduced from Equation 6.2a. Since the load point failure rate ( )λ in 
Equation 6.2a is equal for each load point, the SAIFI is equal to the load point failure 
rate. The SAIDI is determined using Equation 6.2b and is equal to the unavailability.  
 
Table 6.41 shows the reliability indices for coincident failures of the radial feeders. The 
two cases of 40% and 80% of failures occurring in bad weather are considered. The 
percentage of bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather is held at 40%.   
 
Table 6.41 Reliability indices for the second order and the third order failures 
System in Figure 6.10 System in Figure 6.11 
Reliability 
indices bF = 40% 
mF = 40% 
bF = 80% 
mF = 40% 
bF = 40% 
mF = 40% 
bF = 80% 
mF = 40% 
Failure rate (f/yr) 0.00183 0.0066 0.00014 0.00094 
Unavailability(hrs/yr) 0.00820 0.0300 0.00514 0.00348 
Outage duration (hrs) 4.48 4.54 3.67 3.70 
SAIFI (int/cust-yr) 0.00183 0.0066 0.00014 0.00094 
SAIDI (hrs/cust-yr) 0.00820 0.0300 0.00514 0.00348 
 
 
The results shown in Table 6.41 indicate that the concurrent failure of multiple feeders 
is relatively rare and its expected contribution to the average reliability indices over a 
long period is small. It should be appreciated, however, that when the actual event does 
occur it will have a major impact on the system indices during that year. The method 
applied in this study has some limitations as it deals with probability and expected 
values. It does not provide a simulation of actual outage events. Other rigorous methods 
such as sequential Monte Carlo simulation can be used if this information is desired.   
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6.7  Summary  
 
This chapter introduces an approach to divide the overall reliability index into segments 
relevant to the weather conditions. The approach is illustrated using a practical 
distribution configuration representing an urban system. A series of case studies are 
performed to examine the effect of failures that occur in bad weather. This chapter also 
illustrates how reliability is affected when repair can be performed in a relatively short 
period following a major storm. Sensitivity studies are conducted to quantify the 
implication of more frequently occurring extreme weather conditions and a failure 
bunching effect analysis of multiple radial feeders is presented. 
 
The numerical results show that the major portion of the system indices comes from the 
bad weather failures. The load point failure rates are immune to variations in the 
percentages of failures occurring in bad weather. The load point unavailabilites and 
average outage durations, however, are directly influenced. The SAIFI therefore remains 
constant but the SAIDI is largely affected. Sensitivity analysis shows that the major 
adverse weather contribution increases significantly when a majority of failures are 
attributed to major adverse weather. 
 
The reduction in repair time following the system damage caused by storms has a 
positive impact on the SAIDI. The SAIFI, however, does not change. On the other hand, 
the variation in the frequency of major adverse weather significantly impacts both SAIFI 
and SAIDI. Extreme weather events occur relatively infrequently but when they do 
occur,   they can have a big impact on the system reliability indices as the likelihood of 
multiple feeder failures increases significantly.  
 
The weather specific reliability evaluation procedure described in this chapter gives 
considerably more information than is provided by a single aggregated index. This 
knowledge can be useful in deducing those areas in which investment may provide the 
greatest reliability improvement.  
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Chapter 7 
 
MAJOR EVENT DAY ANALYSIS 
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
Electric power systems are designed to withstand a certain level of stress. They cannot, 
however, be constructed to resist excessive physical disturbances. It is not feasible for 
utilities to build power systems that provide their customers with reliable and 
economical power under all possible conditions. The system reliability should reflect the 
ability of the system to meet the stress levels for which it was planned, designed, 
maintained and operated. Electric utilities have significant control over internal causes 
such as switching procedures, maintenance schedules, etc., but their control over 
external factors is limited. Severe weather conditions such as high winds, extreme 
precipitation, hurricanes, etc., often exceed the system design and operational limits. 
The occurrence of these events significantly affects the overall performance of a power 
system.  
 
The utilization of a range of reliability indices to measure the performance of a utility is 
a common practice throughout the world. Many utilities use reliability indices to track 
the performance of a utility, region or a part of a circuit. Reliability indices are also used 
for quantitative comparison of the performance between various utilities. The regulatory 
trend appears to be moving to performance-based rates, where performance is rewarded 
or penalized based on service continuity quantified by reliability indices. In the modern 
electricity market, customers have options to purchase electricity from their suppliers. 
Some commercial and industrial customers ask utilities for their reliability indices 
before locating a facility within the utility’s service territory.  
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In some circumstances, external interferences significantly impact the daily operational 
ability of a utility and the reliability indices increase dramatically. The extraordinary 
days in which such events occur are generally referred to as “major event days” [19]. It 
is important that utilities evaluate their actual performance for normal day operations 
that exclude the significant abnormal days. This policy seems to favour the utility and 
some people believe that if utilities are allowed to exclude major events, the utility may 
diminish its ability to assure reliable service. The argument of whether or not utilities 
should be permitted to exclude major events is not within the scope of this research. The 
attention in this chapter is on major event day identification. 
 
There is no completely uniform method that is equitable to all utilities for separating a 
particular abnormal event from normal day operations. In the past, relatively simple 
methods have been used to define a major event day [19]. An IEEE Working Group has 
recently [19] developed a statistically based approach called the “Beta Method” based 
on using the log-normal distribution. This chapter briefly discusses the traditional and 
the new statistical ways to classify a major event. A wide range of possible reliability 
distributions are presented for randomly generated data samples. The histograms and 
corresponding correlation between utility performance data and lognormal distributions 
are examined. 
 
 
 
7.2  Major Event Day classification 
 
As noted earlier, there are two general approaches to classify a major event, or major 
event day. These approaches are described in the following sections. 
 
 
 
7.2.1  Traditional approach 
 
A major event was classified in IEEE Standard 1366-1998 [24] as follows:  
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“Designates a catastrophic event which exceeds reasonable design or operational limits 
of the electric power system and during which at least 10% of the customers within an 
operational area experience a sustained interruption during a 24-hour period”.  
 
The magnitude of physical destruction and the number of customers on outage depends 
largely on the intensity of the disastrous events and the service territory. Storms, 
hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. are intuitively declared as disasters. There are no physical 
measures that permit a comparison of the severity associated with a catastrophic event 
with the system design and operational limits. No two ice storms are the same; no two 
hurricanes are the same; nor are two earthquakes. The “outage of 10% of the customers” 
criterion is easy to understand, but the number of customers interrupted can vary widely 
due to the utility service area. For instance, a storm striking an area causes relatively 
fewer customers on outage in a rural distribution system than in an urban distribution 
system. The traditional classification of a major event is therefore inconsistent when 
applied to distribution utilities with different sizes and operating in various geographic 
areas.  
 
 
7.2.2  New statistical approach 
 
A statistically based approach designated as the “Beta Method” has been developed by 
the IEEE Working Group on System Design. This approach is anticipated to be fair to 
all utilities regardless of their size, and facilitates removal of abnormal events from 
normal days [25]. The blanket assumption made in creating the Beta Method is that the 
natural logarithm of the daily reliability index, preferably the SAIDI, is normally 
distributed.  
 
The following is the basic procedure used to segment the major event days in the Beta 
Method [25]: 
• Sort the SAIDI/day in descending order 
• Calculate the natural log of each value, ignore zero values if any 
• Evaluate the mean ( )α and standard deviation )(β of the log values 
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• Determine the threshold using Equation 7.1  
βα 5.2+
= eTMED         (7.1) 
• Each day which exceeds the threshold is designated as a Major Event Day 
 
The total SAIDI after removing the major event days represents the SAIDI over only the 
period of normal days. This index should be adjusted to account for the disregarded 
days. Theoretically, a major event day that is omitted would have had an average normal 
index if the major event had not occurred. Equation 7.2 [26], can be used to determine 
the adjusted SAIDI. 
 
raw
MEDTotal
Total
adj SAIDIDD
DSAIDI
−
=      (7.2) 
where, 
adjSAIDI = adjusted index  
rawSAIDI  = the index over the period omitting the major events 
TotalD  =  the total days including major event days (days) 
MEDD  =  the major event days over the reporting period (days) 
 
The beta methodology has been approved in IEEE Standard 1366-2003 and many 
utilities are implementing it. There are, however, two major problems in regard to 
approximating the index (SAIDI) by a log normal distribution. If the reliability index is 
not really log normally distributed, the process will be inconsistent. The lognormal 
distribution also does not account for the days which experience no interruptions 
because the natural log of zero is undefined. This will distort the reliability distribution. 
It has been reported by a number of small utilities that they have a significantly large 
number of days without any outages [25]. The IEEE Working Group has proposed 
several alternatives to address this problem, but there is no unique conclusion as yet. 
 
The applicability of the lognormal distribution is examined in the following studies. 
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7.3  Reliability distributions 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the Beta Method depends entirely on the log 
normality of the reliability index. Recent research shows that reliability indices can have 
a wide variety of distributions [27]. The reliability distributions differ due to topological 
changes, operational policies, maintenance practices and sizes of systems. For instance, 
rural and urban electric distribution systems can have quite different reliability index 
distributions, including normal, log-normal, exponential, etc.  
 
The focus in this section is on the possible shapes of reliability index distributions. A 
range of probability distributions including lognormal, and Weibull distributions with 
different shape and scale parameters are illustrated. The resulting distributions when 
Weibull samples are subjected to a natural logarithm transformation are displayed. 
 
 
 
7.3.1  The lognormal distribution 
 
The lognormal distribution is an important tool in reliability studies. A random variable 
X is said to be log-normally distributed if lnX is normally distributed. The probability 
density function of the lognormal distribution can be defined by Equation 7.3 [17]. 
( ) 


−
−= 2
2
2
ln
2
1)( β
α
piβ
XExp
X
xf      (7.3) 
where,  X >0  
  
β
 = standard deviation of lnX  
 
α = mean of lnX 
 
One million log-normally distributed samples were randomly generated using the 
MATLAB function lognrnd ( )V,,σµ , where, µ  and σ  are the mean and standard 
deviation of the random variable X, respectively, and V is the row vector. The resulting 
relative frequency distribution is shown in Figure 7.1. The number of bins is considered 
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to be equal to the nearest integer of the square root of the number of samples [28]. The 
distribution of the natural log of the log-normal samples is shown in Figure 7.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1  A typical lognormal distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2  Distribution of the natural-log of the lognormal samples 
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It can be seen from Figure 7.2 that the distribution is a good fit to the normal 
distribution. This process was used to examine other possible reliability index 
distributions. 
 
 
 
7.3.2  The Weibull distribution  
 
The Weibull distribution is an important distribution in general statistical analysis and 
reliability evaluation due to its flexible nature. It has one very special feature; the 
distribution has no fixed shape. The shape is characterised by the values of the 
parameters in the function. The general Weibull probability density function is given by 
Equation 7.4 [17]. 
 



 

 −
−

 −
=
− γγ
ω
µ
ω
µ
ω
γ xExpxxf
1
)(        (7.4) 
where,  
  µ≥x    
  0, >αγ       
               γ = shape parameter 
 
µ
 = location parameter  
 
ω = scale parameter 
 
The resulting distribution when µ = 0 and ω  = 1 is known as the standard Weibull 
distribution, and the case where 0=µ  is called the two parameter Weibull distribution.  
 
The MATLAB function ( )Vwblrnd ,,γω  can be used to produce the Weibull random 
samples. The parameter V is the row vector of random numbers. Table 7.1 presents the 
basic parameter values associated with one million randomly generated samples.  
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Table 7.1 Parameter values for the random samples 
Statistic γ  = 0.5 γ  = 1.0 γ  = 1.5 γ  = 2.0 γ  = 3.0 
Sample mean 0.502109 0.500053 0.496362 0.496523 0.517766 
Standard deviation 1.129639 0.49934 0.337376 0.259152 0.188028 
Minimum value 0 0 0.00003 0.00064 0.0059 
Maximum value 46.34944 6.74502 3.11945 2.05546 1.38162 
Log mean,α  -2.53959 -1.26993 -0.98354 -0.86742 -0.73719 
Log standard dev., β  2.56792 1.28243 0.85635 0.63994 0.42654 
 
 
Figure 7.3 shows the probability distributions for various shape parameters ( )γ . The 
number of bins is the closest integer of the square root of the number of samples. The 
distributions of the natural-log of the same samples are displayed in Figure 7.4. The 
shapes of the distributions are similar to that of the standard normal distribution, but are 
not completely symmetrical. This is illustrated by comparing the cumulative 
probabilities of each distribution with that of the standard normal distribution.   
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Figure 7.3  Distribution of the Weibull samples 
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Figure 7.4  Distribution of natural-log of the Weibull samples 
 
Table 7.2 shows the respective cumulative probability values associated with each 
distribution shown in Figure 7.4. The parameters µ and σ  given in the first column refer 
to the mean and standard deviation of the corresponding distributions. Table 7.2 shows 
that the probability of a value exceeding a specified level i.e. σµ 5.0+ , is different for 
each distribution and that all the Weibull generated values are different from the 
normally distributed values. 
 
Table 7.2  Comparison of the cumulative probabilities for the different distributions 
Weibull data distributions Sample 
value being 
greater than 
Standard 
normal 
distribution γ  = 0.5 γ  = 1.0 γ  = 1.5 γ  = 2.0 γ  = 3.0 
σµ 0.0+  0.5000 0.5702 0.5703 0.5704 0.5706 0.5706 
σµ 5.0+  0.3085 0.3442 0.3445 0.3440 0.3446 0.3444 
σµ 0.1+  0.1587 0.1324 0.1323 0.1322 0.1324 0.1321 
σµ 5.1+  0.0668 0.0214 0.0213 0.0212 0.0215 0.0216 
σµ 0.2+  0.0227 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
σµ 5.2+  0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 7.3 shows the number of standard deviations that yield the same probability value 
for all the associated distributions. This factor has the same meaning as the β  
coefficient in Equation 7.1. 
 
Table 7.3 Number of standard deviation from the mean of the respective distribution 
Multiplying factor for the other distributions Multiplier of 
the standard 
deviation for 
a normal 
distribution 
Probability 
from the 
normal 
distribution 
γ  = 0.5 γ  = 1.0 γ  = 1.5 γ  = 2.0 γ  = 3.0 
0.0 0.5000 0.1631 0.1644 0.1645 0.1650 0.1648 
0.5 0.3085 0.5776 0.5767 0.5762 0.5765 0.5763 
1.0 0.1587 0.9267 0.9264 0.9267 0.9266 0.9255 
1.5 0.0668 1.2261 1.2259 1.2258 1.2260 1.2262 
2.0 0.0228 1.4887 1.4872 1.4892 1.4863 1.4864 
2.5 0.0062 1.7200 1.7248 1.7169 1.7180 1.7210 
 
 
The coefficients given in the first column give the probabilities in the second column for 
the pure normal distribution. The remaining columns show the multiplying factors, or 
the coefficients of β , in order to provide the same probability. 
 
The results shown in Table 7.3 indicate that the utilization of the same multiplying 
factor for different kinds of distributions will result in different numbers of major event 
days. In other words, the number of segmented major event days will be more in the 
case of a normal distribution than for the rest of the distributions if the same β  
coefficient is implemented. In conclusion, the beta methodology will allot different 
numbers of major event days for utilities operating under the same conditions but having 
different performance index distributions.  
 
 
 
7.4  Utility performance index distributions 
 
The probability plot method can be used to provide a visual inspection as to whether a 
given random variable belongs to a particular distribution. The normal probability plot 
of the natural-log of the reliability index provides the visual indication for the fitness of 
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the data to the log normal distribution. If the log values do come from the normal 
distribution, the plot will appear linear.  
 
The following analysis examines the data for an unknown utility over different numbers 
of years [29]. The histograms and the corresponding probability plots are presented. The 
number of bins in the following analyses is approximately the square root of the sample 
size. Figure 7.5 shows the histogram of the one year (1998) of data and its probability 
plot is shown in Figure 7.6. Figures 7.7-7.8 show the histogram and probability plot for 
two years of data respectively. The histograms for three years (1998-2000), four years 
(unknown) and seven years (1995-2001) of data are shown in Figures 7.9, 7.11 and 7.13, 
respectively. Their respective probability plots are illustrated in Figures 7.10, 7.12 and 
7.14.  
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Figure 7.5  Histogram of one year data 
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Figure 7.6  Normal probability plot of one year data 
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Figure 7.7  Histogram of two year data 
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Figure 7.8  Normal probability plot of two year data 
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Figure 7.9  Histogram of three year data 
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Figure 7.10  Normal probability plot of three year data 
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Figure 7.11  Histogram of four year data 
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Figure 7.12  Normal probability plot of four year data 
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Figure 7.13  Histogram of seven year data 
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Figure 7.14  Normal probability plot of seven year data 
 
It can be seen from the displays on the preceding pages that the distribution shapes are 
dissimilar for different amounts of data used. For example, the histogram in Figure 7.5 
obtained for one year of data shows a scooped left tail and a relatively short right tail 
whereas Figure 7.11 shows a comparatively peaky histogram with a relatively long tail 
to the right, when four years of data is employed. It is clear from the displays that the 
right tail tends to be longer when more data are used in the analysis.  
 
Normal probability plots in conjunction with histograms can be used to examine the 
historical data. Figure 7.6 illustrates that a large number of observations fall in the linear 
zone, but the data on the two extreme ends depart from the extrapolated line. It is clear 
from Figures 7.8 and 7.10 that the highest values of the given samples reasonably reside 
in a straight line. This indicates the upper end extreme values fit a log normal 
distribution. There are, however, some outliers associated with the left tail of these 
histograms. This is not the case with the plot of the four year data shown in Figure 7.12. 
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The upper end extreme values of the given samples do not reasonably fit a lognormal 
distribution. This is even more pronounced in Figure 7.14 for the seven year data. It is 
important to appreciate that decisions regarding major event day determination are 
based on the probabilities associated with the tail of the assumed distribution. 
 
The analysis shows that the shape of the distribution is sensitive to the number of years 
during which the performance data is collected. It appears from the data set that the 
reliability index can be represented by a log normal distribution in some cases but not in 
others. In some cases, the transformed histogram of the performance data differs 
significantly from a normal distribution. The peak values, which are the candidate major 
event days, do not satisfy the log normal distribution and in this case the log normal 
distribution may not be a valid representation of the reliability index. As a consequence, 
a major day will be classified improperly.  The study of a relatively small amount of 
historical data from one utility, however, makes it difficult to reach specific conclusions 
regarding the inconsistencies that may exist between utilities of different sizes, in 
various environments and with dissimilar operating philosophies. 
 
 
 
7.5  Summary 
 
Exceptional abnormal events that cause a significantly large number of customers on 
outage for an extended time are generally categorised as major events. Some of the 
reliability data reported to regulators by electric power utilities exclude storm or major 
event interruptions. Major events considerably impact the reliability indices. Many 
regulators allow exclusions based on the reasoning that the capability of a utility during 
storms does not reflect the true everyday performance. There is, however, no specific 
boundary value which segments a major event day from the normal days. 
 
This chapter describes approaches for segmenting major event days. The recently 
published statistically based “Beta Method” and the more traditional classification for 
the definition of a major event day are briefly reviewed. A series of reliability 
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distributions including the lognormal distribution and a number of Weibull distributions 
with varying shape parameters are observed. The differences in shape are illustrated 
using the cumulative probability values of the distribution function. This chapter 
graphically presents some performance data, in the form of SAIDI/day, for an unknown 
utility and illustrates the inconsistency associated with the automatic assumption that the 
reliability index is log-normally distributed.  
 
The analysis of different candidate reliability distributions shows that the variations in 
the shapes of distributions affect the resulting probabilities of a major event days. This 
can create inconsistencies between utility applications when the same metric is enforced. 
The study of normal probability plots reveal that the lognormal distribution does not 
always provide the best representation of the reliability performance index.  
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Chapter 8 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Electric power delivery systems usually exist in open weather environments. The 
weather creates varying degrees of physical stresses on the system elements, sometimes 
to the extent that the stress exceeds the system design and operational limits. The failure 
rate of a component is greatly enhanced by bad weather situations. The likelihood of 
multiple line failures is much higher in bad weather than in normal weather. The 
phenomenon of coincident failures of two or more circuits as a result of excessive stress 
imposed by weather conditions is designated as failure bunching. The reliability of 
electrical transmission or distribution systems is normally improved by parallel 
operation of lines and therefore multiple circuit failures severely deteriorate the system 
reliability. As noted in Chapter 1, problems that arise in distribution systems are 
responsible for most customer interruptions and a large number of supply outages occur 
during unfavourable weather situations.  
 
The research described in this thesis is focused on weather modeling in the reliability 
evaluation of parallel redundant systems. A series of weather models are developed and 
used to illustrate the impacts on the predicted reliability indices. An approach to divide 
the reliability indices into normal, adverse and extreme weather conditions is introduced 
and illustrated using a practical distribution system. The methods associated with 
classifying extraordinary events that can have immense impacts on the overall system 
performance are discussed. 
 
The fundamental concepts of weather modeling in reliability evaluation of transmission 
and distribution systems are introduced in Chapter 2 where the weather environment is 
divided into the two states of normal and adverse weather. The application of the two 
state weather model is illustrated using two simple systems, a second order mincut and a 
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third order mincut. The Error Factor curves and the basic reliability indices of average 
system failure rate, average outage duration and unavailability clearly show the 
importance of incorporating adverse weather in reliability assessments. The results show 
that the recognition of failure bunching effects becomes more significant as the level of 
redundancy increases. The creation of a two state weather model [8,10] was a significant 
improvement over the single state weather representation. The basic weakness of the 
two state model, however, is that it aggregates extreme weather periods with other 
relatively mild adverse weather periods and consequently results in incorrect appraisals. 
 
A three state weather model is introduced in Chapter 3 in order to incorporate extremely 
adverse weather conditions. The systems studied in Chapter 2, using the two state 
weather model, are re-examined to investigate the impacts due to including extreme 
weather in the analysis. The results show that the reliability estimates obtained using the 
two state weather model are highly optimistic and the error increases as more failures 
occur in major adverse weather. The three state weather model should therefore be 
applied in these assessments. The Error Factor curves presented in Figure 3.10 with the 
variation in component parameters illustrate that systems with relatively low reliability 
experience lower impacts compared to those with better reliability. The studies show 
that higher frequency weather events with short durations and lower frequency weather 
events with longer durations have similar impacts on the average system failure rates.  
 
The significance of weather modeling in transmission and distribution system reliability 
evaluation is illustrated in Chapter 4, using a simple practical system consisting of 
second order and third order mincuts. The load point and system indices are evaluated 
with varying percentages of failures occurring in bad weather and in extreme weather. 
Three line parallel systems are relatively more reliable than two line parallel systems. 
The reliability benefits, however, diminish when more failures occur in bad weather. 
Figures 4.2-4.5 accentuate the differences between the system indices of SAIFI, SAIDI, 
AENS and ECOST obtained utilizing the two state and three state weather models. This 
illustrates how the two state weather model underestimates the potential risk when more 
failures occur in extreme weather. The utilization of a three state weather model 
provides better appraisals in practical situations. 
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The stress created by weather is a continuous function of the weather intensity which 
directly correlates with the failure rate of an overhead circuit. Chapter 5 attempts to 
reflect the continuous phenomenon of weather conditions by using a large number of 
discrete states to represent the weather severity. The applicability of various multi-state 
weather models is illustrated in Figures 5.3-5.6 by a comparison of the respective Error 
Factor curves. It is clearly shown that a particular weather model does not provide 
accurate results in all conditions. The number of weather states used should be in 
accordance with the relative combinations of line failures occurring in adverse and 
major adverse weather. A three state weather model can provide acceptable results when 
a large percentage of line failures occur in bad weather and more than 20% of the bad 
weather failures occur in major adverse weather. Additional states should be included in 
the weather model in other situations. 
 
The reliability index segmenting approach introduced in Chapter 6 emphasizes the 
contribution of different weather conditions to the system indices of SAIFI and SAIDI. 
The analysis of a practical distribution configuration shows that bad weather conditions 
make significant contributions to the system indices when relatively more outages occur 
in bad weather and that the reliability index segment due to extreme weather increases 
sharply when more failures occur in this weather. The study shows that the SAIDI can 
be significantly improved by reducing the restoration time due to the damage caused by 
major storms. Sensitivity studies on the frequency of storm occurrence illustrate that the 
system reliability degrades with increase in the frequency of storms. The approach 
proposed in this research work permits these factors to be quantified and examined in 
attempts to optimize customer service reliability. 
 
The metric established in IEEE Standard 1366 [19] for separating the major event days, 
i.e. the days in which exceptional events occur that are beyond the control of a utility, is 
discussed in Chapter 7. The statistical approach designated as the Beta Method is based 
on the assumption that the SAIDI/day statistic is log-normally distributed. This method 
is being increasingly adopted by many utilities. The analysis of candidate reliability 
distributions indicates that the utilization of a lognormal distribution does not 
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consistently classify a major event. Electric distribution systems of different sizes and 
operating in different environments can have a variety of reliability index distributions. 
The Beta Method is not consistent in this situation. In a purely statistical approach, some 
situations that are not major events may be designated as major events in the numerical 
evaluation. For example, a tree falling on a transmission circuit may cause a lengthy 
power interruption. The increased daily SAIDI in this case could result in this situation 
being classified as a major event.  
 
The reliability models developed in this thesis by incorporating the continuously varying 
weather become physically compatible with actual weather situations and can provide 
reasonably accurate appraisals. A two state weather model is easy to implement and 
requires relatively fewer data. It should, however, be appreciated that disregarding 
extreme weather conditions and varying weather phenomenon results in highly 
inaccurate assessments. It therefore becomes important to include sufficient weather 
states in the analysis. Future work in multi-state weather modeling could represent a 
particular weather situation such as lightning, hurricane, tornadoes, ice storms, wind 
velocities etc. by relevant individual states and each state accompanied by 
corresponding weather and line failure statistics. 
 
The recognition of different weather contributions to the system indices pinpoints the 
situations where maximum reliability improvement can be achieved. The discussions 
associated with major event day classification should provide valuable information to 
utilities/regulators that are increasingly scrutinising the exclusion of major events from 
reliability performance evaluation. 
 
The research described in this thesis illustrates the increasing concerns regarding 
weather effects on power system reliability. The concepts presented are a step forward 
in the continuing development of accurate transmission and distribution system 
reliability evaluation techniques and clearly illustrate the need to collect data associated 
with weather conditions and line failures.  
 150 
REFERENCES 
  
 
 
[1] R. Billinton and R. N. Allan, “Reliability Evaluation of Power Systems”  
      Second Edition, Plenum Press, New York, 1996. 
 
[2] Canadian Electricity Association, “2003 Annual Service Continuity Report on 
      Distribution System Performance in Electrical Utilities,” June 2004. 
 
[3] Canadian Electricity Association, “2000 Annual Service Continuity Report on 
      Distribution System Performance in Electrical Utilities,” 2001. 
 
[4] D. V. Ford, “The British Electricity Board National Fault and Interruption  
      Reporting Scheme- Objectives, Development and Operating Experience,” IEEE  
     Winter Power Meeting, 1972. 
 
[5] A. A. Chowdhury and D. O. Koval, “Deregulated Transmission System Reliability 
      Planning Criteria Based on Historical Equipment Performance Data,” IEEE Trans. 
      on Industry Applications, Vol. 37, No. 1, Jan/Feb. 2001. 
 
[6] Edition Electric Institute (EEI), “Utility Storm Restoration Response,” Jan 2004. 
 
[7] R. Billinton and J. E. Billinton, “Distribution System Reliability Indices,” IEEE  
      Trans. on Power Delivery, Vol. 4, No.1, Jan.1989, pp. 561-568. 
 
[8] D. P. Gaver, F. E. Montmeat, and A.D. Patton, “Power System Reliability I-  
      Measures of Reliability and Methods of Calculation,” IEEE Trans. on Power  
      Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 83, No. 7, pp. 727-737, July 1964. 
 151 
 
[9] R. Billinton and W. Li, “A Novel Method for Incorporating Weather Effects in 
     Composite System Adequacy Evaluation,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems,  
      Vol. 6, No. 3, 1991, pp. 1154-1160. 
 
[10] R. Billinton and K.E. Bollinger, “Transmission System Reliability Evaluation 
       Using Markov Processes,” IEEE Trans. on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol.  
       PAS-87, No. 2, pp. 538-547, Feb. 1968.    
 
[11] R. Billinton and M. S. Grover, “Reliability Assessment of Transmission and  
       Distribution Systems,” IEEE Trans. on PAS-94, No.3, pp. 724-732, May/June 1975.    
 
[12] R. Billinton and M.S. Grover, “Quantitative Evaluation of Permanent Outages in  
        Distribution Systems,” IEEE Trans. on PAS-94, No.3, pp.733-741, May/June 1975.  
 
[13] R. Billinton, G. Singh and J. Acharya, “Failure Bunching Phenomena in Electrical 
        Power Transmission Systems,” 16th Advances in Reliability Technology  
        Symposium, UK, April 14-16, 2005. 
 
[14] R. Billinton, C. Wu, and G. Singh, “Extreme Adverse Weather Modeling in  
        Transmission and Distribution System Reliability Evaluation,” Proceedings of  
        Power Systems Computation Conference, Spain, June 2002. 
 
[15] R. Billinton, and J. Acharya, “Consideration of Multi-state Weather Models in 
        Reliability Evaluation of Transmission and Distribution Systems,” Proceedings of 
        CCECE, pp. 601-604, May 2005. 
 
[16] Z. G. Todd, “A Probability Method for Transmission and Distribution Outage   
        Calculations,” IEEE Trans. on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 33, No. 7,   
         pp. 696-701, July 1964.          
 
 152 
[17] R. Billinton and R.N. Allan, “Reliability Evaluation of Engineering Systems: 
        Concepts and Techniques,” Second Edition, Plenum Press, 1992. 
 
[18] G. D. Singh, “Extreme Weather Modeling in Transmission and 
        Distribution System Reliability Modeling Incorporating Extreme Adverse 
       Weather Considerations,” M. Sc. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2003. 
 
[19] IEEE Standard 1366-2003, “IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution System  
       Reliability Indices,” May 2004. 
 
[20] IEEE Standard 346:1973, “Terms For Reporting and Analyzing Outages of  
       Electrical Transmission and Distribution Facilities and Interruptions to Customer  
       Service,” 1973. 
 
[21] Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness Canada. [Online] 
        Available: http://www.ocipep.gc.ca/disaster/default.asp 
 
[22] S. A. Ali, “Application of Customer Interruption Costs in Distribution System 
        Reliability Worth Evaluation,” M.Sc. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2000. 
 
[23] R. N. Allan, R. Billinton, I. Sarief, L. Goel and K. S. So, “A Reliability Test 
       System for Educational Purposes – Basic Distribution System Data and Results,” 
       IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, Vol. 6, No. 2, May 1991. 
 
[24] IEEE Standards 1366-1998, “IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution System  
       Reliability Indices,” 1998. 
 
[25] C. A. Warren and R. Saint, “IEEE Reliability Indices Standards, Major Event Day 
        Calculations and How They Relate to Small Utilities,” IEEE Industry Applications 
        Magazine, Vol. 11, Issue 1, pp. 16-22, Jan/Feb. 2005. 
 
 153 
[26] R. Christie, J. Bouford, J. McDaniel, D. Schepers and C. Warren, “P1366 Major 
       Event Day Language Draft,” [Online], Downloaded in March 2005,  
       http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/td/dist/sd/doc/ 
 
[27] Z. Pan, “Distribution System Risk Assessment using Reliability Distributions,”  
        M. Sc. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 2003. 
 
[28] N. T. Kottegoda and R. Rosso, “Statistics, Probability and Reliability for Civil and  
        Environmental Engineers,” McGraw-Hill, New York, 1997. 
 
[29] IEEE Working Group on System Design, [Online], Downloaded in March, 
        2005, http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/td/dist/sd/doc/ 
 154 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
STORM DATA 
 
The following data are taken from Utility Storm Restoration Response report of the 
Edison Electric Institute (EEI) [6]. 
 
Table A.1 Effect of Ice Storms 
Estimated physical damage 
 
Date 
(mm-yy) 
Peak 
number of 
customers 
on outage 
Outage 
duration 
(days) 
Number 
of poles 
replaced 
Number 
of 
transfor-
mers 
replaced 
Wire 
replaced 
(miles) 
Comment 
Feb-94 224,000 16 15,565 828 1,037 Major ice 
storm 
Jan-96 61,000 4 NA NA NA  
Feb-96 650,000 8 NA NA 100  
Mar-97 160,000 5 420 420 100  
Oct-97 213,000 4 670 610 170 Snow & wind 
Jan-98 83,400 2 NA NA NA  
Dec-98 167,700 5 525 276 NA Christmas-98 
Nov-98 160,000 3 860 780 130 Snow & wind 
Jan-99 120,000 4 100 100 NA  
Jan-99 109,685 5 153 62 NA New year-99 
Jan-99 220,000 4 NA 250 38  
Jan-00 17,3000 5 NA NA NA  
Dec-00 226,139 8 1,917 174 547 Storm #1 
Dec-00 212,508 8 1,383 123 772 Storm #2 
Oct-01 99,000 3 580 620 120 Snow & wind 
Mar-02 93,000 2 620 270 70 Snow & wind 
Dec-02 464,000 6 1,322 2,196 85  
Dec-02 1,375,000 9 3,200 2,300 549  
Dec-02 41,951 5 463 64 NA  
Feb-03 350,000 5 NA NA NA  
Apr-03 196,000 6 600 580 160  
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Table A.2 Effect of Hurricanes 
Estimated physical damage Date 
(mm-
yr) 
Peak #of 
customers 
on outage 
Outage 
duration 
(days) Poles replaced 
Transformer 
replaced 
Wire 
replaced 
Name of 
Hurricane 
Sep-89 696,000 18 8,800 6,308 700 Hugo 
Sep-89 180,000 12 NA 2,300 286 Hugo 
Aug-96 225,000 4 NA NA NA Bertha 
Sep-96 790,000 10 5,500 2,800 3,000 Fran 
Sep-96 450,000 9 1,400 921 217 Fran 
Sep-98 244,500 4 NA NA NA Bonnie 
Sep-98 260,000 3 644 328 118 Georges 
Sep-99 537,000 6 1,160 586 680 Floyd 
Sep-02 95,000 2 310 520 85 Isadora 
Oct-02 243,000 2 1,800 920 202 Lily 
Sep-03 320,000 2 212 307 70 Isabel 
 
 
Table A.3 Effect of other weather conditions 
Estimated physical damage 
Date 
(mm-yr) 
Peak # of 
Customers 
on outage 
Outage 
duration 
(days) 
Poles 
replace
d  
Tranfor-
mers 
replaced 
Wire 
replaced 
(miles) 
Storm event 
May-89 228,000 8 NA NA NA Tornadoes 
Mar-93 170,000 7 NA NA NA Snow blizzard 
Apr-97 80,000 2 790 340 80 Wind storm 
May-98 442,000 8 1,540 1,210 470 Lightning & 
wind storm 
July-98 106,000 2 570 820 90 Lightning & 
wind storm 
May-99 99,000 2 680 570 110 Lightning & 
wind storm 
Sep-99 322,494 8 350 210 85 Tropical storm Floyd 
May-00 155,000 4 NA NA NA Thunderstorm 
May-03 142,000 1.5 NA NA NA Thunderstorm 
May-03 218,000 6 1,100 200 NA Tornadoes 
Jun-03 350,000 3 NA NA NA Thunderstorm 
Sep-03 480,883 8 444 306 103 Tropical storm Isabel 
 
   NA    data not available
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Appendix B 
 
STOCHASTIC TRANSITIONAL PROBABILITY MATRICES 
 
 
B.1 Three component system with a two state weather model 
 
The stochastic transitional probability matrix for the state space diagram shown in 
Figure 2.6 is given by Equation B.1. 
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where,  [ ] 88][ xa InB =   
 [ ] 88][ xn IaD =  
][I  is the identity matrix and matrices [A] and [C] are given below. 
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[C] =  
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B.2 Three component system with a three state weather model 
 
Equation B.2 gives the stochastic transitional probability matrix associated with the state 
space diagram shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
[ ]








=
JHG
FED
CBA
P       (B.2) 
 
  where, 
   [ ] 88][ xa InB =    [ ] 88][ xm InC =    
[ ] 88][ xn IaD =   [ ] 88][ xm IaF =    
[ ] 88][ xn ImG =    [ ] 88][ xa ImH =  
 
[ ]I  is the identity matrix and matrices [A], [E] and [J] are given as follows. 
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Appendix C 
 
LOAD POINT INDICES AND INTERRUPTION COSTS 
 
 
Table C.1-C.16 show the reliability indices for the system shown in Figure 4.1 when the 
percentage of failures occurring in bad weather and major adverse (extreme) weather is 
varied. Table C.17 provides the individual user sector interruption costs and the 
composite customer damage functions (CCDF) for the different outage durations. 
 
 
Case I:  Percentage of line failures occurring in bad weather = 50% 
 
 
(a) 10% of bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather 
 
 
Table C.1 Reliability indices for load point L1 ( bF = 50% and mF = 10%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage duration 
(hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.002047 5.34 0.0109 1006.31 218.78 
1-2-4 0.003843 5.34 0.0205 1889.22 410.68 
Total 0.005890 5.34 0.0314 2895.53 629.46 
 
 
Table C.2 Reliability indices for load point L2 ( bF = 50% and mF = 10%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.030864 6.91 0.2135 17841.86 3415.76 
1-2-4 0.003843 5.34 0.0205 1574.09 328.54 
Total 0.034707 6.74 0.2340 19415.95 3744.30 
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(b) 30% of line failures in bad weather occurring in major adverse weather 
 
 
Table C.3 Reliability indices for load point L1 ( bF = 50% and mF = 30%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/kW) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.018005 5.36 0.0966 8898.07 1932 
1-2-4 0.029600 5.36 0.1588 14628.32 3176 
Total 0.047605 5.36 0.2554 23526.39 5108 
 
 
Table C.4 Reliability indices for load point L2 ( bF = 50% and mF = 30%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/kW) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.066867 6.99 0.4679 39253.60 7486.40 
1-2-4 0.029600 5.36 0.1588 12185.73 2540.80 
Total 0.096467 6.50 0.6267 51439.33 10027.20 
 
 
 
(c) 40% bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather 
 
 
Table C.5 Reliability indices for load point L1 ( bF = 50% and mF = 40%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/kW) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.032020 5.36 0.1719 15824.28 3438 
1-2-4 0.050435 5.36 0.2707 24924.98 5414 
Total 0.082455 5.36 0.4426 40749.26 8852 
 
 
Table C.6 Reliability indices for load point L2 ( bF = 50% and mF = 40%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure 
rate(f/yr)  
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/kW) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.090257 7.00 0.6331 53085.56 10129.60 
1-2-4 0.050435 5.36 0.2707 20763.08 4331.20 
Total 0.140692 6.42 0.9038 73848.64 14460.80 
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(d) 50% of bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather 
 
Table C.7 Reliability indices for load point L1, ( bF = 50% and mF = 50%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/kW) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.048655 5.36 0.2612 24045.3 5224 
1-2-4 0.074012 5.36 0.3973 36576.73 7946 
Total 0.122667 5.37 0.6585 60622.03 13170 
 
 
Table C.8 Reliability indices for load point L2, ( bF = 50% and mF = 50%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/kW) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.114802 7.02 0.8065 67779.10 129040 
1-2-4 0.074012 5.36 0.3973 30469.26 6356.80 
Total 0.188814 6.38 1.2038 98248.36 19260.8 
 
 
 
Case II:  Percentage of line failures occurring in bad weather = 90% 
 
 
(a) 10% bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather 
 
 
Table C.9 Reliability indices for load point L1 ( bF = 90% and mF = 10%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.009477 5.36 0.0509 4683.53 1017.60 
1-2-4 0.017158 5.36 0.0921 8479.48 1842.56 
Total 0.026635 5.36 0.1430 13163.01 2860.16 
 
 
Table C.10 Reliability indices for load point L2 ( bF = 90% and mF = 10%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.083628 7.04 0.5898 49561.30 9436.80 
1-2-4 0.009477 5.36 0.0509 3901.49 814.40 
Total 0.093105 6.88 0.6407 53462.79 10251.20 
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(b) 30% bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather 
 
 
Table C.11 Reliability indices for load point L1 ( bF = 90% and mF = 30%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.058448 5.37 0.3139 28955.14 6278 
1-2-4 0.088518 5.37 0.4755 43851.82 9510 
Total 0.146966 5.37 0.7894 72806.96 15788 
 
 
Table C.12 Reliability indices for load point L2 ( bF = 90% and mF = 30%) 
Minimal 
Cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.155517 7.05 1.0972 92339.77 17555.20 
1-2-4 0.088518 5.37 0.4755 36526.07    7608.00 
Total 0.244035 6.44 1.5727 128865.84 25163.20 
 
 
 
(c) 40% bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather 
 
 
Table C.13 Reliability indices for load point L1 ( bF = 90% and mF = 40%) 
 
 
Table C.14 Reliability indices for load point L2 ( bF = 90% and mF = 40%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure 
rate (f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.194327 7.05 1.3710 115383.60 21936.00 
1-2-4 0.13342 5.37 0.7166   55054.43 11465.60 
Total 0.327747 6.37 2.0876 170438.03 33401.60 
 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.092633 5.37 0.4975 45890.39 9950 
1-2-4 0.13342 5.37 0.7166 66096.27 14332 
Total 0.226053 5.370864 1.2141 111986.66 24282 
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(d) 50% bad weather failures occurring in major adverse weather 
 
Table C.15 Reliability indices for load point L1 ( bF = 90% and mF = 50%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
1-2-3 0.128379 5.37 0.6894 63598.96 13788 
1-2-4 0.177994 5.37 0.9559 88178.23 19118 
Total 0.306373 5.37 1.6453 151777.19 32906 
 
Table C.16 Reliability indices for load point L2 ( bF = 90% and mF = 50%) 
Minimal 
cut 
Failure rate 
(f/yr) 
Average 
outage 
duration (hrs) 
Unavailability 
(hrs/yr) 
ECOST 
($/yr) 
EENS 
(kWh/yr) 
3-4 0.231402 7.05 1.6325 137397.25 26120.00 
1-2-4 0.177994 5.37 0.9559    73447.44 15294.40 
Total 0.409396 6.32 2.5884 210844.69 41414.40 
 
 
Table C.17 Sector interruption costs and composite customer damage functions (CCDF) 
User sector interruption cost ($/kW) CCDF ($/kW) Duration 
(hr) Agricultural Cag 
Commercial 
Ccm 
Industrial 
Cin 
Residential 
Crs 
Load 
Point L1  
Load 
Point L2 
1.00 0.649 8.552 9.085 0.482 4.64 5.09 
3.33 1.77 26.38 21.99 3.61 13.93 14.73 
4.00 2.064 31.317 25.163 4.914 16.60 17.45 
5.00 2.58 42.86 32.52 7.14 22.48 23.46 
5.31 2.74 46.64 34.85 7.90 24.40 25.41 
5.34 2.75 47.02 35.07 7.97 24.58 25.60 
5.36 2.76 47.26 35.22 8.02 24.71 25.73 
5.37 2.77 47.39 35.30 8.05 24.77 25.79 
6.32 3.26 59.59 42.57 10.57 30.94 32.06 
6.37 3.28 60.25 42.95 10.71 31.28 32.38 
6.38 3.29 60.38 42.03 10.74 31.35 32.47 
6.42 3.31 60.92 43.34 10.85 31.62 32.74 
6.44 3.32 61.18 43.50 10.91 31.75 32.87 
6.50 3.35 61.99 43.96 11.08 32.16 33.29 
6.88 3.54 67.14 46.93 12.19 34.76 35.92 
6.91 3.56 67.56 47.16 12.28 34.97 36.13 
6.96 3.59 68.24 47.55 12.43 35.31 36.48 
6.99 3.60 68.67 47.79 12.52 35.52 36.69 
7.00 3.61 68.80 47.87 12.54 35.59 36.76 
7.02 3.62 69.07 48.03 12.61 35.73 36.90 
7.04 3.63 69.35 48.18 12.67 35.87 37.04 
7.05 3.63 69.49 48.26 12.70 35.94 37.11 
8.00 4.12 83.008 55.808 15.69 42.75 43.98 
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Appendix D  
 
LOAD POINT INDICES FOR EXTREME WEATHER SEVERITY ANALYSIS 
 
Tables D.1-D.6 present the load point indices associated with the distribution system 
shown in Figure 6.1 for various extreme weather frequencies. 
 
Case (a): 40% of the total failures occurring in bad weather and 10% of the bad 
weather failures in extreme weather 
 
• Load point failure rates 
 
Table D.1 Load point failure rates (failures/year), Case (a) 
Number of extreme weather events 
Load point One per year Two per year Three per year 
1 0.239 0.247 0.255 
2 0.252 0.261 0.269 
3 0.252 0.261 0.269 
4 0.239 0.247 0.255 
5 0.252 0.261 0.269 
6 0.249 0.258 0.266 
7 0.252 0.261 0.269 
8 0.140 0.145 0.150 
9 0.140 0.145 0.150 
10 0.243 0.251 0.259 
11 0.252 0.261 0.269 
12 0.256 0.264 0.273 
13 0.252 0.261 0.269 
14 0.256 0.264 0.273 
15 0.243 0.251 0.259 
16 0.252 0.261 0.269 
17 0.243 0.251 0.259 
18 0.243 0.251 0.259 
19 0.256 0.264 0.273 
20 0.256 0.264 0.273 
21 0.252 0.261 0.269 
22 0.256 0.264 0.273 
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• Load point unavailabilities 
 
Table D.2 Load point unavailabilities (hours/year), Case (a) 
Number of extreme weather events 
Load point 
One per year Two per year Three per year 
1 1.219 1.571 1.923 
2 1.358 1.761 2.165 
3 1.358 1.761 2.165 
4 1.219 1.571 1.923 
5 1.358 1.761 2.165 
6 1.323 1.714 2.104 
7 1.258 1.623 1.988 
8 1.107 1.507 1.907 
9 1.018 1.379 1.741 
10 1.220 1.573 1.925 
11 1.358 1.761 2.165 
12 1.392 1.809 2.225 
13 1.234 1.587 1.939 
14 1.269 1.634 2.000 
15 1.220 1.573 1.925 
16 1.358 1.761 2.165 
17 1.254 1.619 1.984 
18 1.220 1.573 1.925 
19 1.359 1.763 2.166 
20 1.359 1.763 2.166 
21 1.234 1.587 1.939 
22 1.269 1.634 2.000 
 
 
• Load point average outage durations 
 
Table D.3 Load point average outage durations (hours), Case (a) 
Number of extreme weather events 
Load point 
One per year Two per year Three per year 
1 5.095 6.352 7.530 
2 5.378 6.748 8.032 
3 5.378 6.748 8.032 
4 5.095 6.352 7.530 
5 5.378 6.748 8.032 
6 5.310 6.653 7.911 
7 4.982 6.219 7.378 
8 7.908 10.391 12.707 
9 7.266 9.508 11.599 
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Table D.3 Continued… 
Number of extreme weather events Load point 
One per year Two per year Three per year 
10 5.031 6.271 7.433 
11 5.378 6.748 8.032 
12 5.444 6.841 8.149 
13 4.889 6.081 7.196 
14 4.962 6.182 7.325 
15 5.031 6.271 7.433 
16 5.378 6.748 8.032 
17 5.168 6.455 7.660 
18 5.031 6.271 7.433 
19 5.314 6.667 7.934 
20 5.314 6.667 7.934 
21 4.889 6.081 7.196 
22 4.962 6.182 7.325 
 
 
Case (b): 80% of the total failures occurring in bad weather and 40% of the bad 
weather failures in extreme weather 
 
Table D.4 Load point failure rates (failures/year), Case (b) 
Number of extreme weather events Load point 
One per year Two per year Three per year 
1 0.239 0.309 0.380 
2 0.252 0.327 0.401 
3 0.252 0.327 0.401 
4 0.239 0.309 0.380 
5 0.252 0.327 0.401 
6 0.249 0.322 0.396 
7 0.252 0.327 0.401 
8 0.139 0.183 0.227 
9 0.139 0.183 0.227 
10 0.242 0.314 0.385 
11 0.252 0.327 0.401 
12 0.256 0.331 0.407 
13 0.252 0.327 0.401 
14 0.256 0.331 0.407 
15 0.242 0.314 0.385 
16 0.252 0.327 0.401 
17 0.242 0.314 0.385 
18 0.242 0.314 0.385 
19 0.256 0.331 0.407 
20 0.256 0.331 0.407 
21 0.252 0.327 0.401 
22 0.256 0.331 0.407 
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• Load point unavailabilities 
 
 
 
Table D.5 Load point unavailabilities (hours/year), Case (b) 
Number of extreme weather events 
Load point 
One per year Two per year Three per year 
1 3.605 6.448 9.291 
2 4.093 7.351 10.608 
3 4.093 7.351 10.608 
4 3.605 6.448 9.291 
5 4.093 7.351 10.608 
6 3.974 7.128 10.282 
7 3.733 6.682 9.632 
8 3.844 7.071 10.297 
9 3.483 6.402 9.321 
10 3.608 6.452 9.296 
11 4.093 7.351 10.608 
12 4.213 7.574 10.935 
13 3.616 6.463 9.310 
14 3.735 6.686 9.636 
15 3.608 6.452 9.296 
16 4.093 7.351 10.608 
17 3.725 6.671 9.618 
18 3.608 6.452 9.296 
19 4.096 7.354 10.613 
20 4.096 7.354 10.613 
21 3.616 6.463 9.310 
22 3.735 6.686 9.636 
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• Load point average outage duration 
 
 
 
Table D.6 Load point average outage durations (hours), Case (b) 
Number of extreme weather events 
Load point 
One per year Two per year Three per year 
1 15.094 20.844 24.462 
2 16.228 22.493 26.432 
3 16.228 22.493 26.432 
4 15.094 20.844 24.462 
5 16.228 22.493 26.432 
6 15.982 22.123 25.982 
7 14.799 20.448 23.999 
8 27.560 38.555 45.302 
9 24.975 34.909 41.006 
10 14.882 20.550 24.117 
11 16.228 22.493 26.432 
12 16.467 22.854 26.869 
13 14.335 19.776 23.196 
14 14.601 20.174 23.678 
15 14.882 20.550 24.117 
16 16.228 22.493 26.432 
17 15.364 21.250 24.953 
18 14.882 20.550 24.117 
19 16.010 22.191 26.077 
20 16.010 22.191 26.077 
21 14.335 19.776 23.196 
22 14.601 20.174 23.678 
 
 
